

CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

Volume XLI

JANUARY 1946

Number 1

THE DATE OF THE CAPITOLINE *FASTI*

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THE *Fasti Capitolini*,¹ lists of consuls and other chief magistrates, once on a building in the Roman Forum but now preserved in the Palazzo dei Conservatori on the Capitol, are generally believed to have been inscribed and brought up to date by 30 B.C. and then subsequently to have been continued through the reign of Augustus. The basis of this dating is the fact that the names of the triumvir Marcus Antonius and his grandfather Marcus Antonius, the orator, are erased (and subsequently restored) on the stones. According to the suggestion of Bartolommeo Borghesi, these erasures are to be explained as a result of the senatorial decrees of 30, when, following Mark Antony's defeat, his statues were defaced or removed from the city, his honors were canceled, and members of his family were forbidden to take the *praenomen* Marcus.² Borghesi's view has

been seriously challenged only by Otto Hirschfeld, who in 1875 argued that the *Fasti* were not inscribed until after 12 B.C.³ Hirschfeld's arguments for dating the consular lists were rejected because he failed to explain the erasure of the Antonian name; but his suggestion that the accompanying list of triumphs, in which the Antonii were not canceled, were all inscribed at one time after 19 B.C. has been accepted. It is the purpose of this paper to propose another explanation for the erasures in the consular *Fasti* and a date shortly before 17 B.C. for their inscription.

In accord with the accepted belief that the *Fasti* were inscribed before 30 B.C. is the date of the building in the Roman Forum whose walls they are thought to have adorned—the Regia; for this building, the house or office of the *pontifex*

¹ *CIL*, I, Part I (2d ed.) (hereafter referred to as "*CIL*"), pp. 1-54. For fragments of the *Fasti Capitolini* (*FC*), including the triumphal lists, found since that volume was published in 1893, see *Klio*, II (1902), 248-59; *Röm. Mitt.*, XIX (1904), 117-23; *NS*, 1925, pp. 376-82; 1926, pp. 62-67. A monumental edition of the consular and triumphal lists has been prepared by Professor Attilio Degraffi and will be published by the Union of Italian Academies. In a letter of October 28, 1945, Professor Degraffi informed me that the edition was already in page proof and would be printed as soon as suitable paper could be secured.

² *Dio* II. 19. 3: τὰ τοῦ Ἀντωνίου κοσμήματα τὰ μὲν καθείλαν τὰ δ' ἀπέλεψαν, τὴν τε ἡμέραν ἐν ᾗ ἐγεγέννητο μισρὰν ἐνόμισαν,

[CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY, XLI, JANUARY, 1946]

καὶ τὸ τοῦ Μάρκου πρόσημα ἀπέειπον μηδὲν τῶν συγγενῶν αὐτοῦ εἶναι. *Plut. Cicero* 49: τὰς τ' εἰκόνας ἢ βουλὴ καθείλαν Ἀντωνίου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρωσε τιμὰς καὶ προσεφάρσατο μηδὲν τῶν Ἀντωνίων ὄνομα Μάρκου εἶναι. Cf. *Ant.* 86; see also Borghesi, *Œuvres*, IX, 6 and *CIL*¹, p. 10.

³ Hirschfeld's two articles, first printed in *Hermes*, Vols. IX and X, are reprinted in his *Kleine Schriften* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 330-52. Hirschfeld was answered by Mommsen in *Hermes*, Vol. IX, reprinted in *Röm. Forsch.* (Berlin, 1879), II, 58-85. Mommsen's conclusions on the date of the *Fasti* have been generally accepted. Schön, s.v. "Fasti," *P.-W.*, VI, 2033, considered them "unanfechtbar" in the light of the evidence then available.

maximus, was completely reconstructed about 36 by the pontifex Cn. Domitius Calvinus.⁴ But though the Regia, where the chief pontiff in earlier times set up each year a list of magistrates and of notable events, was a suitable place for the *Fasti*, there is no proof either from ancient sources or from archeological and architectural evidence that the *Fasti* were actually on the Regia. No fragments of the *Fasti* were found in the excavations of the Regia in 1886, 1889, and 1899. Although isolated fragments of the *Fasti* were found in the vicinity of the Regia, the only considerable group of these stones whose place of discovery is surely attested came to light in another place—beside the steps at the northeast corner of the Temple of Castor. The identification of the monument to which the *Fasti* belonged does not fall within the scope of this paper, but it is important to point out here that the attribution of the *Fasti* to the Regia is pure supposition and that the date of Domitius' Regia cannot be used to support the theory that the *Fasti* were inscribed before 30 B.C.⁵

The lists of magistrates are written on blocks of marble a foot and a half thick

⁴ See *CIL*, pp. 5 and 11.

⁵ Dr. Frank E. Brown, author of the most recent study of the Regia (*Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*, XII [1935], 67-88) makes no mention of the *FC* in his article, but he has authorized me to state that from his investigation of the site he was convinced that the inscriptions were not on the Regia. He was disposed to assign the *FC* to the Arch of Augustus, which lies at the northeast corner of the Temple of Castor. It was in the vicinity of this arch that Carlo Fea found eight fragments of the *FC* in 1816-17 (see *CIL*, p. 4). News has now come from Professor Degraffi in Rome that he has established the fact that the *Fasti Capitolini* were inscribed not on the Regia but on the inside of the two lateral openings of this triple arch. Professor Degraffi made his results known at a meeting of the Accademia Pontificia di Archeologia on April 26, 1945; at the same meeting Dr. G. Gatti read a paper on the reconstruction of the Arch of Augustus. Dr. L. B. Holland and I had independently reached a similar result, though we differ from the two Italian scholars on the date both of the *FC* and of the arch. On the arch see Dr. Holland's forthcoming article in *AJA*.

on four double-column tablets. The lists, which have been preserved in fragments, apparently began with the kingship, though that section is lost, and included the full set of republican consuls, censors, dictators, masters of horse, and other chief magistrates, like the decemvirs and the military tribunes with consular power. From the year 49 the offices of Julius Caesar and his heir are given in such detail as to make it clear that the *Fasti* were an official record of the new order. The fourth and last tablet contained the names of consuls at least through the year 12 B.C. The current view is that the later sections were added after 30. The rest of the consuls of the Augustan Age, preserved for A.D. 1-13, were added in a single column on the margin beside the *aedicula* that incased the fourth tablet. Also on the margin beside the pertinent years were notices of the series of secular games, to which Augustus' celebration of 17 B.C. belonged. The triumphs from the kingship to the year 19 B.C., after which time triumphs were restricted to members of the imperial house, were inscribed on four pilasters. The first and second of these were attached to the wall to which the third tablet belonged, and the third and fourth apparently to the wall that held the fourth tablet.

The erasures in the consular lists, in all of which the names are restored, occur in the name of Marcus Antonius under 47 and 37 and in that of his grandfather as consul and censor of 99 and 97. Other records of the Antonii are missing from the extant fragments. In the triumphal lists the only records of the Antonii preserved—the triumph of L. Antonius in 41 and the ovation of Marcus in 40—are intact. The erasures seem to have affected not only the Antonii who had the *praenomen* Marcus but all the members of Mark Antony's family, for in the *Fasti*

Colotiani—lists belonging to some unknown temple or college or colony—there are erasures and restorations of the names of all the Antonii who occur (*CIL*², p. 64). Besides Marcus, they include his brother Lucius and his uncle Gaius. In the *Fasti Venusini*, Mark Antony's consulship of 34, which he held for only one day, is not erased but is completely omitted, and the suffect consul, L. Sempronius, appears in his place.⁶

Yet there are consular *Fasti* in which the names of the Antonii are untouched. In the *Fasti Amiternini* (*CIL*², p. 61) the name of Antony's uncle Gaius, consul 63, was not touched, and in the *Fasti Amerini* (*ibid.*, p. 63), known only from manuscript authority, the names of Marcus and his brother apparently occurred without erasure. More significant is the full inclusion of the Antonii in a set of *Fasti* recently discovered in an Augustan center of the imperial cult, the so-called *Fasti Arentini*.⁷ This list, which was inscribed in the closing months of 2 B.C., covers the years 43 B.C.—A.D. 3, the last four years being subsequent additions. In it the earlier Antonii are listed intact in all their offices, including Marcus' consulship of 34.⁸

There can be little doubt that the decrees of 30 B.C. led to the erasure of Mark Antony's name on such official

records as existed. But that was not necessarily the time when the erasure took place in the Capitoline *Fasti*. Not only Mark Antony but his son Iullus came to a disastrous end. Iullus was one of five prominent nobles involved, in 2 B.C., with the emperor's daughter Julia in a scandal that rocked the empire.⁹ Although the emperor in the letter which he sent to the senate on the subject laid the emphasis on accusations of gross immorality, it is certain that he suspected a plot against his regime and that Iullus was the chief object of suspicion. Tacitus (*Ann.* iii. 24) implies that Iullus was accused of *maiestas*. Dio says that he was believed to aspire to monarchy; and Seneca's words, "iterum timenda cum Antonio mulier," suggest a similar idea.¹⁰ Whereas the other four nobles were, like Julia, relegated to islands, Iullus was given the death penalty, and his son, Augustus' great-nephew, was sent into permanent exile.¹¹

The emperor's wrath against Iullus must have been the more violent because this son of his old enemy was, as Velleius stated (ii. 100) a "singulare exemplum clementiae Caesaris." Although Antony's elder son by Fulvia was put to death in 30, this younger son by the same mother was saved and was given a *praenomen* which emphasized his relationship with the imperial house.¹² The boy was brought

⁶ *CIL*², pp. 66–67. On this consulship of Antony see Dio xlix. 39. 1; cf. Hirschfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 345, n. 1; Mommsen, *RF*, II, 71–72, esp. n. 13.

⁷ These *Fasti* belonged to a *schola of vicorum magistrorum* found in the Via Marmorata in Rome (see Mancini, *Bull. com.*, LXIII [1935], 35–79, and Degraffi, *Bull. com.*, LXIII [1935], 173–78). On the date see pp. 75–76 and 178. The text of the *Fasti* is also available in *Ann. épigr.*, 1937, No. 62, and 1938, No. 66.

⁸ As far as I know, the only other inscription in which the Antonian name is erased is a Latin metrical inscription from Corinth on which the name of Mark Antony's grandfather, the orator, is canceled (see *CIL*, I, Part II [2d ed.], 2662; cf. Taylor and West, *AJA*, XXXII [1928], 9–22). As Mr. S. McA. Mosser has pointed out to me, a Phrygian town named for Antony's wife, Fulvia, had the name obliterated on its coins (see Head, *BMC, Phrygia*, p. 213 n.).

⁹ Vell. II. 100; Sen. *Brev. vit.* 4. 6; Tac. *Ann.* iv. 44; Dio iv. 10. 15. For full evidence on Iullus see Groag, *Prosopographia Imperii Romani (PIR)* (2d ed.), I, A 800, pp. 153 f.

¹⁰ On the political aspects of Julia's fall and Iullus' connection with it see Groag, *Wiener Studien*, XL (1918), 150–67; XLI (1919), 74–88.

¹¹ Velleius' version (ii. 100) is that Iullus died by his own hand. For Iullus' son see Tac. *Ann.* iv. 44.

¹² Iullus was an old *cognomen* of the Julii, an earlier form of Iulus (see discussion below). Under Augustus the use of such *cognomina* as *praenomina* became fairly common among the nobility (see Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* [Oxford, 1939], p. 377). Antony's son had some right to a Julian name, for Antony's mother was a Julia. The name was probably given to the boy not at his birth but after the decrees of 30 B.C. (see Mommsen, *Gesammelte Schriften*, VII [Ber-

up by his stepmother, Octavia, with the son and the four daughters she bore to C. Claudius Marcellus and to Antony. Iullus was married to one of his stepsisters, the elder Marcella, and was honored with a priesthood and with high offices, culminating in 10 B.C. in the consulship. He was a favorite of Augustus, yielding, Plutarch says (*Ant.* 87), only to Agrippa and to the sons of Livia in the emperor's affections. He was a poet of some reputation, whose position at the court is shown by the ode (iv. 2) in which Horace, in terms of self-depreciation, credits Iullus with the poetic gifts required to celebrate in fitting manner the glories of Augustus.

It is with the catastrophe of Iullus that I would associate the erasures in the Capitoline *Fasti*. No one so far has upheld this view, though Mommsen thought of it and rejected it.¹³ As he pointed out, there is an indication in Tacitus that the erasure of Iullus' name was at least considered. Describing a proposal in the senate in A.D. 20 that the name of Cn. Piso, enemy of Germanicus, should be removed from the *Fasti*, Tacitus (*Ann.* iii. 18) quotes Tiberius as arguing that the name should not be erased, since the names of Marcus and Iullus were still in the *Fasti*—"ne nomen Pisonis fastis eximeretur, quando M. Antonii qui bellum patriae fecisset, Iulli Antonii qui domum Augusti violasset manerent."

While thinking it possible that the name of Iullus may have been erased in 2 B.C., Mommsen held that the cancellation of all the Antonii, a wholesale removal of a family for which he knew no parallel, could have taken place in 30 but not in 2 B.C. There is, it may be noted, a parallel available now in the *Fasti Aveni-*

lin, 1899], 187 f.). It is not likely that Iullus was originally called Marcus, the praenomen which was banned for the Antonii, for that was the name of Mark Antony's elder son.

¹³ *RF*, II, 75-76.

ni. The name of Asinius Pollio, consul 40 B.C., is erased there, undoubtedly as a result of the disgrace of his son, Asinius Gallus, in A.D. 30.¹⁴ As far as the Antonii are concerned, Mommsen's view was that the relations between the house of Antony and the dynasty were so close in 2 B.C. that the removal of the names could not have been authorized. By that time, it will be remembered, the families were joined not only by the marriages of Antony and Octavia and of Iullus and Marcella but by the union of a daughter of Antony and Octavia with Augustus' favorite stepson, Drusus. More important was the betrothal, almost certainly arranged by 2 B.C., of the only daughter of this last marriage to Augustus' grandson, Gaius, heir to the succession.¹⁵ It seemed clear already that, if the succession was to be maintained, the blood of Antony would flow in the veins of future Roman emperors, and one would agree with Mommsen that Augustus would hardly have consented at that time to the removal of the Antonian name from the *Fasti*.

Here one may ask whether the removal of all the Antonii, which Mommsen con-

¹⁴ Degraffi (*op. cit.*, pp. 174 f.) is undoubtedly right in his suggestion that this is the explanation of the erasure. Mancini's explanation (*op. cit.*, p. 55) that Asinius Pollio's refusal to take part in the war against Antony accounted for the cancellation is unlikely; for if the editors of these *Fasti* had wished to ban his name, they would simply have omitted it as they did that of Licinius Murena under 23 B.C. (see Mommsen, *RF*, II, 71-74). The disgrace of some unknown descendant may also be responsible for the erasure in the *Fasti Asenini* of L. Caninius, consul 37 B.C. For the erasure of Mark Antony's grandfather in a Latin inscription of Corinth see n. 8 above. These parallels for the erasure of an ancestor have come to light since Mommsen wrote, but a possible instance in the triumphal lists was available to him. The name of L. Cornelius Dolabella is erased under 98 A.C., perhaps because he was regarded as an ancestor of the Cn. (?) Dolabella who was slain at the command of Vitellius (*Tac. Hist.* II. 63-64), by whom he was feared as a possible rival (see Münzer, s.v. "Cornelius" [138], *P.-W.*, IV, 1299).

¹⁵ Gaius was married to Claudia Livia (Livilla) before his departure for the East in 1 B.C. (cf. Dio IV. 10. 18).

sidered possible in 30, could have been accepted as official policy even then. The senate, passing its decrees in 30 before Octavian came back from the East, seems to have expected the family to continue, for the decrees did not ban the family but simply forbade them to name their sons Marcus.¹⁶ Octavian's attitude is indicated by the fact that he not only permitted Antony's son and his two daughters by Octavia to retain their father's *nomen* but accepted them as members of the imperial house, giving to the son a Julian name which was destined to appear in the consular *Fasti* in combination with Antonius. Augustus' policy was not to destroy the Antonii who had survived but to continue them in union with his own house.

Now at Rome, as elsewhere, unauthorized activity sometimes accounted for obliteration of monuments, and that is, I believe, the explanation of the removal of the Antonii. In A.D. 20, in spite of Tiberius' objections, the name of Cn. Piso was erased on one inscription.¹⁷ Later in the reign of Tiberius the name of Asinius Gallus (and in one instance that of his father) was erased on many inscriptions and subsequently restored on most of them.¹⁸ The erasures probably took place in 30, when the senate voted to condemn Gallus; and the restorations may have occurred slightly later, when Tiberius failed to bring Gallus to trial. Similarly, in 2 B.C. certain men at the court may have erased the names not only of Iullus but of the other Antonii found in the two sets of

Fasti,¹⁹ and the emperor in displeasure may have had the names restored. It is possible that, just as in A.D. 20, adherents of Germanicus are to be credited with the removal of Piso's name, so partisans of Tiberius, who may even have engineered the mysterious downfall of Julia,²⁰ were responsible for the cancellation of the Antonii. Tiberius was then sulking at Rhodes, where he had gone because of dislike of his wife and jealousy of Gaius and Lucius. Unlike the family of his brother and of Augustus, Tiberius and his son were not related to the Antonii, and their prestige would not be diminished—it might even be enhanced—by the ignominy inflicted on the Antonian name.

As far as Marcus and Iullus were concerned, Tacitus' version of Tiberius' statement, which sounds like one of Tiberius' efforts to base his actions on the precedents of Augustus, would lead one to think that Augustus did not favor even the obliteration of their names. If Marcus' name was removed from monuments, as it probably was by virtue of the senatorial decrees passed in the emperor's absence in 30, it was, as the *Fasti Aventini* show, later restored under Augustus. Unfortunately, these *Fasti*, which were inscribed in the very period of Iullus' fall, August–December, 2 B.C.,²¹ have a lacuna

¹⁹ Perhaps through oversight the triumphal lists were not touched.

²⁰ Groag (see n. 10 above) has a very different interpretation of the fall of Julia. In his view Augustus was humbling Tiberius through the disgrace of his wife.

²¹ From Velleius' account, with which Dio is apparently in accord, it would seem that the fall of Julia occurred soon after the dedication of the Temple of Mars Ultor, which took place on August 1. Mommsen's arguments for that date (*CIL*, p. 318, *comm. diurn.* under May 12) are now supported by new evidence for the *consules suffecti* of that year supplied by the *Fasti Aventini* and other inscriptions (see Mancini, *op. cit.*, pp. 67 f.; and Groag, *PIR*, II, C 390, p. 93). The date of the *Fasti Aventini* is fixed by Degraffi (*op. cit.*, p. 178) between August 1 and December 31 of 2 B.C. The original inscription included the *consules ordinarii* of 2 B.C., but not the *suffecti* who were added

¹⁶ This prohibition followed the tradition of the Manlii, who, after the execution of M. Manlius Capitolinus, were forbidden to use the *praenomen* Marcus (see Münzer, s.v. "Manlius" [51], P.-W., XIV, 1167 ff.). Similarly, in A.D. 20 the son of Cn. Piso was forced to change the *praenomen* which he had inherited from his father (cf. Tac. *Ann.* iii. 17; see also Groag, *PIR*, II, C 287, pp. 58–61, and C 293, pp. 61 f.).

¹⁷ *CIL*, VI, 30751 (Dessau, 95).

¹⁸ For the evidence see Groag, *PIR*, I, A 1229, pp. 24–49.

where Iullus' name occurred in the lists. The spacing shows that the name was there, but we do not know whether, like the names of the other Antonii, it was left untouched. The year of Iullus' consulship is not extant in any other set of consular *Fasti*, but it is preserved intact as a consular date on two inscriptions, one of which is a dedication made by Augustus himself. This inscription would seem to show that Augustus did not, even temporarily, favor the cancellation of Iullus' name.²²

My view, then, is that, while Marcus' name was probably canceled by senatorial action in 30, the emperor did not at any time favor the obliteration of the Antonii. The removal of their names both in the *Fasti Capitolini* and in the *Fasti Colotiani* is to be explained as unauthorized action and their restoration as the policy of Augustus. While this unauthorized action was possible both in 30 and in 2 B.C., there is evidence, some of it already pointed out in Hirschfeld's careful analysis, for dating the inscription of the Capitoline *Fasti* after 30 B.C. If this evidence is sufficiently cogent, the catastrophe of Iullus would, I hold, provide the correct explanation of the erasures.

First of all, there is the style of the writing. Except for a lacuna of five years, the

lower part of the fourth pilaster containing the triumphs of the years 45-19 B.C. is almost entirely preserved; and it was the consistent style of the writing, as well as the fact that the Antonii are not erased that led to the acceptance of Hirschfeld's view that the pilasters were not inscribed before 19 B.C. But it is, of course, possible that these pilasters were inscribed after the tablets were completed.²³ In the magisterial *Fasti*, the lists after 30 B.C. consist only of three fragments, containing a total of 198 letters, from the year 26 to 22, and a small piece, containing only 39 letters, from the year 12 B.C. A comparison with the writing of the years before 30 is hampered by the scarcity of material, and that is particularly true of the year 12; but here, too, eminent epigraphists, whose results I have with due modesty checked on the stones, have been able to detect no essential differences in the writing before and after 30.²⁴

But there are special considerations that bear on the date when the double-column tablet was completed. Since the small fragment belonging to the year 12 is not a margin and since the single-column additions preserved do not begin until A.D. 1, it is possible that the original lists went beyond the year 12. According to calculations of Huelsen, which are necessarily nothing more than rough estimates, there were two to four additional years in

ed by a later hand. While it is impossible to ascertain the relative dates of these *Fasti* and Julia's fall, it may be noted that, if the erasure of Iullus had been accepted as official policy before these *Fasti* were inscribed, Iullus would have been simply omitted from the lists.

²² *CIL*, VI, 30974 (Dessau, 92). For the other consular date see *Ann. épigr.*, 1911, No. 89. Iullus' name also occurs on an inscription of one of his freedmen (*CIL*, VI, 12010). Mommsen suggested that the fact that the derivatives of the *FC* give the consuls of 10 A.C. as Africanus and Maximus (cf. *CIL*, p. 162) might indicate that the name of Iullus had been removed from the *Fasti*. But now that Africanus is recognized as the *praenomen* of Iullus' colleague in the consulship, Africanus Fabius Maximus, it is clear that the compilers took Africanus as Iullus Antonius' *cognomen* (see Dessau, *PIR*, II, F 37, p. 48).

²³ Dr. L. B. Holland, whom I have consulted on architectural problems connected with the *FC*, believes that, although tablets and pilasters may have been inscribed at the same time, the architect probably did not in his original design plan to have the pilasters inscribed.

²⁴ Hirschfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 333 f.; Mommsen, *RF*, II, 76-77; Henzen, *CIL*, p. 11. Bormann, as quoted by Mommsen, and Huelsen, in a signed note under Henzen's statement, detect certain minor differences. Hirschfeld also argued that the *Fasti Colotiani*, inscribed in two columns, which are preserved for the years 45-40 and 23-12 A.C., were all written at one time. The script certainly supports this view, though Mommsen pointed out (*RF*, II, 84) that the period between words used throughout the first column was omitted in the upper part of the second column.

the last double-column tablet.²⁵ But an indication of earlier date for the original inscription is to be found in the position of the entries on the secular games. Since the *Fasti* include, besides magistrates, such details as *lustra*, explanations of *cognomina*, and lists of Rome's most important wars, the natural place for these entries would seem to have been the text of the *Fasti*.²⁶ But the two records of secular games preserved, those of 236 and of 17, are on the margin near the magistrates of these years. The natural conclusion is that the *Fasti* had already been inscribed before the Augustan secular games in 17.

Judging, then, from the style of the writing and the fact that the notices of the secular games appear to be additions, I should be disposed to date the consular *Fasti* after 22, the last year for which we have a considerable fragment, and before 17 and to assume that the later years in the fourth tablet are a subsequent addition. Such a date would accord far better than the years immediately before 30 B.C. with the type of monument to which the *Fasti* belonged. As Hirschfeld pointed out, Octavian in the thirties was too much occupied with civil and foreign war to have time for an extensive building program.

Furthermore, this particular building was a monument of the Roman republic as viewed by the Augustan regime. It en-

shrined the memory of the men who as consuls gave their names to years. With the consuls it perpetuated the fame of the *triumphatores*, whose statues later adorned Augustus' magnificent Forum. Such a monument should belong not to the years of revolution in the thirties, when there was little interest in the republic, but to the period after 27, when, in name at least, Augustus carried through his restoration of the republic. This was the time when Horace in his ringing patriotic odes, Vergil in Anchises' speech and his description of Aeneas' shield, Livy in his vivid portrayal of early Rome, were glorifying the heroes of the republic. Horace, Vergil, and Livy reflect the activity of Augustus' maturity, when, striving to restore republican morals and religion, he became interested in reviving the great names that typified Roman virtue in the republic.

Whereas in the years of revolution from 40 to 30, the period to which the *Fasti* are now assigned, new men, whose ancestors had no place in the consular lists, predominated in the consulship, the situation was changed in later years; particularly after 19 B.C. for a considerable period members of the old nobility secured the majority of the consular appointments.²⁷ Most striking was the revival of the old patrician families, whose names recur again and again in the republican *Fasti*. The importance of this revival in Augustus' middle years has recently been pointed out by Ronald Syme:

Valerii, Claudii, Fabii, and Aemilii, houses whose bare survival, not to say traditional primacy, was menaced and precarious in the last century of the Free State, now stand foremost among the *principes viri* in an aristocratic monarchy linked with one another and with the dynasty; and though the Scipiones were all but extinct, numerous Lentuli saved

²⁵ Hirschfeld laid great stress on 12 B.C. as the terminal date of both the *FC* and the *Fasti Colotiani*. He believed that these *Fasti* were set up when Augustus became *pontifex maximus*. Huelsen (*Hermes*, XXIV [1889], 185-94) tried to show that 12 was not the terminal date of the fourth tablet of the *FC*. But there is too much uncertainty about the contents of the lost sections to permit the exact calculations that he attempted. At least two lines could be added to the calculations for *consules suffecti*. There may also have been much more material than Huelsen allowed for under the crucial year 27, and there may have been entries for wars of the Augustan period, as there were for earlier wars in the *FC*.

²⁶ Cf. Mommsen, *RF*, II, 59-61; Schön, *s.v.* "Fasti," *P.-W.*, VI, 2032. A notice of Domitian's secular games of A.D. 88 was also added on the margin later.

²⁷ See Syme, *op. cit.*, chap. xxv., esp. pp. 372-73. In 39-33, nineteen new men and nine nobles held the consulship; in 18-13, two new men and eleven nobles.

and transmitted the stock of the patrician Corneli. The dim descendants of forgotten families were discovered in obscurity, rescued from poverty and restored by subsidy to the station and dignity of their ancestors. After long lapse of ages shine forth on the *Fasti* a Quinctius, a Quinctilius, a Furius Camillus, but brief in duration and ill-starred.²⁸

It would seem probable that the marble lists in which such names "shine forth" were set up in a period when the nobility was in the ascendant.

Moreover, a date for these *Fasti* close to 20 B.C. would explain the puzzling fact that Livy, who began his history between 27 and 25 and probably completed the first decade in three or four years,²⁹ nowhere mentions the *Fasti Capitolini*. In this decade—the only extant section of his history in which there is serious doubt about the names of chief magistrates—Livy sometimes cites variant authorities on the officials of a given year and even makes secondhand use of a list of magistrates preserved on linen books in the Temple of Juno Moneta.³⁰ Livy was sensitive to the opinion of Augustus, and on one occasion quoted evidence supplied by the emperor on the office held by A. Cornelius Cossus when he secured the *spolia opima*.³¹ However much he may

have lacked the "research" spirit, it is, as Hirschfeld argued, incomprehensible that to resolve his difficulties Livy should not have appealed to the *Fasti* if this official record of republican magistrates was already available on a conspicuous monument in the Forum.

Some indication that the Capitoline *Fasti* are later than Livy is also to be found in the fact that there are more signs of interpolation in the names of the *Fasti* than there are in those of Livy's first decade.³² Both sources agree substantially on the *nomina* and therefore share any interpolations that may have been made in them. But the *Fasti* give the names in much more detail than Livy does. They provide every official not only with a *praenomen* and a *nomen* but usually with one or more *cognomina* and regularly with the *praenomina* of his father and his grandfather. Livy, on the other hand, frequently limits his names to *praenomen* and *nomen*, reports *cognomina* sparingly in his early books, and gives little genealogical detail. The *cognomina* and the genealogies of the Capitoline *Fasti*, based presumably on family *stemmata*, are obviously unreliable.³³ One *cognomen*, Augustinus, applied to the fifth-century consuls of the patrician Minucii and Genucii, was given after 300 B.C. to the plebeian branches of these families to commemorate the fact that a Minucius and a Genucius were among the first augurs chosen from the plebs.³⁴ It is significant

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 376–77. Syme goes on to note the revival of old *cognomina* like *Maluginensis* and *Medullina* and the use of ancient *cognomina* as *praenomina*. Iullus is a case in point.

²⁹ Cf. Livy I. 19. 3. Tenney Frank argued that Livy was writing Book xvii about 18 B.C. (see *AJP*, LIX [1938], 223 f.).

³⁰ See, e.g., Livy II. 54. 3 (where Livy seems to prefer a source that did not report the consulship of Vopiscus Iullus, who is listed without variant in the *FC*, in Diodorus, and in Dionysius); IV. 7. 10–12 and 23. 1–3; on variations in *cognomina*, VIII. 18. 2, 23. 17, IX. 15. 11; on triumphs, VIII. 39–40, IX. 15. 10. In one of these instances (IX. 15. 11) Mommsen (*Röm. Chron.*, pp. 112 f., n. 195; *RF*, II, 81 f.) thought he had found evidence that Livy had used the version of the *FC* without referring to it; but the discovery of a new fragment of the *Fasti* shows that, as Hirschfeld believed to be the case (*op. cit.*, p. 332), Mommsen was wrong (see Huelsen, *Röm. Mitt.*, XIX [1904], 119–22).

³¹ Livy IV. 20. 5–11, a passage probably added to the history after Augustus objected to the statement

that Cossus secured the *spolia opima* as military tribune. Unfortunately, the triumphal lists are not extant here. Cossus' *spolia opima* must have been listed, as were those of M. Claudius Marcellus in 222.

³² Cf. Mommsen, *RF*, I, 66–68; II, 230; Huelsen, *Klio*, II (1902), 252.

³³ See Cichorius, *Leipsiger Studien*, IX (1886), 226–42.

³⁴ See Mommsen, *RF*, I, 65–68; cf. Münzer, s.v. "Minucius," *P.-W.*, XV, 1937 f. The question whether there ever were any patrician Minucii and Genucii does not affect this discussion.

that Livy gives no *cognomen* to the fifth-century consuls of these two families.

Here it is worth while to compare with the Capitoline *Fasti* and with Livy the names of consuls and other chief magistrates from 509 to 443 preserved in Dionysius' Roman history, published in 7 B.C.³⁵ Dionysius frequently omits *cognomina* in his later books, but in his early books he gives more of them than Livy does for the same period. In thirty-five cases in which Livy omits *cognomina*, Dionysius gives *cognomina* which, as far as we can judge from the corrupt texts,³⁶ agree with the Capitoline *Fasti*. One of these, under 491 B.C., is the spurious Augurinus, not found in Livy. In only four cases, all in the later books, where Dionysius had apparently wearied of writing out the long names, does Livy agree with the *Fasti* in giving a *cognomen* omitted by Dionysius. It is impossible to compare variants for the magistrates of a given year, for Dionysius gives no variants and almost all those reported by Livy come in the period later than Dionysius' extant books. But there can be no doubt that Dionysius is closer to the Capitoline *Fasti* than Livy is. From internal evidence in the two writers it would be fair to conclude that Livy is earlier than the *Fasti* and Dionysius later.

Of some interest for the dating of the *Fasti* is the spelling of Iulus, the *cognomen* given in the fifth- and fourth-century lists

of the Capitoline *Fasti* to practically every member of the Julian house. This is a variant of Iullus, the name bestowed as a *praenomen* on Antony's son in order to emphasize his relationship to the Julian house, founded by a mythical Iullus or Iulus. While the *Fasti* consistently use the form Iulus, the weight of manuscript evidence in Diodorus favors the double consonant, and Dionysius' manuscripts give both the double and the single consonant.³⁷ In the first decade of Livy this *cognomen* has been corrupted; it occurs six times as "Tullus," obviously a mistake for "Iullus" from a capital letter or uncial manuscript; once as "Rullus,"³⁸ but never as "Iulus," though modern editors, following a conjecture of Sigonius,³⁹ incorrectly print this form. The spelling "Iulus," found in the *Aeneid* later became universal.⁴⁰ According to Mommsen, it was Vergil who altered "Iullus" to the trisyllabic "Iulus." But, he notes, "merkwürdigerweise," Iulus is the spelling adopted in the Capitoline *Fasti*. The simplest explanation would be that the editors of the *Fasti* prepared their list under the influence of Vergil's "Iulius, a magno demissum nomen Iulo." Although Vergil's alteration of the name may have been known before his death in 19, it

³⁷ Diodorus reports a *cognomen* for the Iulli only under 473 a.c., and Dionysius only under 489 and 482 (see Mommsen's tables).

³⁸ For "Tullus" see Mommsen's tables under the years 424, 408, 405, 401, 397; for "Rullus," under 403. In addition, the readings given in the Walters-Conway Oxford text of Livy (vi. 4. 7) under 388 indicate that here, too, the *cognomen* was originally Iullus. Under 430, where Livy's text (iv. 30. 1) shows no *cognomen*, Cassiodorus, whose lists are taken from Livy, reports the name L. Iullus Iullus.

³⁹ Sigonius was doubtless influenced by his familiarity with the Capitoline *Fasti*, of which he published an edition.

⁴⁰ Mommsen, *Gesammelte Schriften*, VII, 187 f., where most of the evidence is cited. The double consonant is found in Strabo xiii, p. 595; according to Mommsen, "Iullo" occurs in Festus, p. 460 (L.) but the manuscript reading is reported by Lindsay as "Iulio." This is a common error for Iullus or Iulus.

³⁵ Livy, Dionysius, and the *FC*, in spite of certain variations, obviously go back to a common source, at least for *nomina* and *praenomina* of magistrates. There are significant variations in the lists given in the universal history of Diodorus Siculus, published about 30 B.C. For a comparison of the lists see Mommsen's tables (*CIL*, pp. 98-181), where the ancient evidence, including variant readings, is given under each year.

³⁶ The corruptions exist not only in the text of Dionysius but in the derivatives of the *FC*, the Chronographer of A.D. 354, the *Fasti Hydatiani*, and the *Chronicon Paschale*, on which we have to depend, since the stones for this period are in large part lost. For Dionysius' relation to the *FC* it may be significant that under three years, 484-82, he gives the *praenomina* of the fathers of five consuls. The stones are not preserved for these filiations.

would not have been familiar in the thirties.

Finally, the peculiar chronology of the Capitoline *Fasti* and the curious dictator years included in them may be an indication of later date.⁴¹ For some reason which we have no means of knowing, the duration of the kingship was reduced in the *Fasti* from 244 to 243 years, and the date of the founding of Rome, indicated by numerals every decade, was 752. This was one year later than the date adopted by Atticus and Varro, the most important students of chronology in the late republic. If the lists were prepared in the thirties, we should expect Octavian to have accepted the chronology of Atticus and Varro, both of whom, before their deaths in 32 and 27, respectively, were high in the councils of the court.

The four dictator years are even harder to explain if this official record was made when Atticus and Varro were still alive and when the memory of republican institutions was still vivid. The *Fasti* insert in Roman annals four years—333, 324, 309, 301—recorded neither by Diodorus nor by Livy—years in which the *Fasti* give no consuls but list, instead, a dictator and a master of horse whose offices are recorded in each case by Livy under the previous year. Thus the Capitoline *Fasti* provide four additional years and account for them by the constitutionally impossible statement "hoc anno dictator et magister equitum sine co(n)s(ulibus) fuerunt." There is reason to believe that Atticus and Varro also worked out some similar correction that brought Roman chronology into harmony with Greek, but they would hardly have descended to the crudity of this device.

As a matter of fact, chronological

⁴¹ Mommsen, *Röm. Chron.* (Berlin, 1859), is still the safest guide; see also O. Leuze, *Röm. Jahreshlung* (Tübingen, 1909). For a convenient summary of the evidence see Niese-Hohl, *Grundriss der röm. Geschichte* (Munich, 1923), pp. 90-98.

studies were in progress in the period before the secular games in 17. Augustus charged the *quindecimviri sacris faciundis* with the task of settling the proper time for the games.⁴² Planning for a celebration that was apparently to have taken place in 16, they invented a series of earlier celebrations supposed to have occurred at intervals of one hundred and ten years in 456, 346, 236, and 126. This series is based on the insertion of the four years between 346 and 236. Among the *quindecimviri* were M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus and his son, Messalla Messallinus, members of the house whose founder was believed to have instituted the secular games. The dates established stressed the role of the Valerii in the games, for consuls of the Valerian gens functioned in the first two years of the series. I would suggest that the influence of the Valerii, and particularly of Messalla Corvinus, who, at least as far as his own family was concerned,⁴³ had antiquarian interests, may explain this peculiar correction in Roman chronology and that the correction was reflected in the *Fasti*.⁴⁴

⁴² Zosimus II. 4. 2; see my discussion, *AJP*, LV (1934), 101-20. I now believe I was mistaken in attributing the invention of the dictator years to Valerius Antias.

⁴³ Pliny *NH* xxxv. 8: "exstat Messalae oratoris indignatio, quae prohibuit inseri genti suae Laeviorum alienam imaginem." Pliny goes on to say that as a *senex* Messalla wrote a work in which he exposed fraudulent family claims. The *XVviri* may have been aided in their chronological studies by C. Ateius Capito, whom Augustus charged with the task of establishing the ritual for the games (Zos. II. 4. 2). Capito was famous not only for his knowledge of human and divine law but for his adulation of the emperor, and he would hardly have hesitated to falsify records (see Tac. *Ann.* III. 70 and 75; Gell. *xiii.* 12. 1; cf. also Schanz-Hosius, *Röm. Literaturgeschichte*, II [Munich, 1935], pp. 384-85).

⁴⁴ The chronological studies must have been completed some time before the games were held, for otherwise the dates for earlier celebrations invented by the *XVviri* would have fitted not the year 16 but 17, in which Augustus actually held the games. One might even suggest that the *XVviri* did not make a fresh set of calculations to fit the new date of the festival because the *Fasti*, with the appropriate Valerian consuls for the earlier games, were already inscribed.

A date after 30 B.C. for the inscription of the Capitoline *Fasti* is thus indicated by paleographical evidence, the revival of republican traditions and the glorification of the ancestors of Augustan nobles in the *Fasti*, the fact that Livy does not mention these records, the interpolations in the names, the spelling of Iulus, and the peculiar chronology. A date before 30 is favored only by the attribution of the *Fasti* to the Regia, which is purely hypothetical, and by the erasure of the Antonii, which may have taken place after the disgrace of Iullus Antonius in 2 B.C. My conclusion is that the *Fasti Capitolini* were inscribed after 30, that the erasures were unauthorized acts of 2 B.C., and that the restorations represented Augustus' own policy. I would date the inscription of the *Fasti* between 21 and 17. This period accords with the other indications of date in the *Fasti*.

If this redating of the Capitoline *Fasti*

is accepted, it will lead, I think, to a re-evaluation both of the *Fasti* and of Livy. The *Fasti* will be viewed as a composition not of the revolutionary period, when they would have depended on records compiled in the last years of the republic, but of Augustus' middle years, when republican history was being manipulated to strengthen the new order. Their independent value will thus be greatly weakened. The new dating will lead too, I hope, to a re-evaluation of Livy, who obviously could not consult these *Fasti*, for they had not yet been inscribed. Thus Livy will be cleared of the most serious sin of omission of which he has been accused. It is, I believe, in his lists and not in the Capitoline *Fasti* that we have genuine republican records. His history and not the gleaming marble of these inscribed stones is the "shining monument" of republican annals.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

NOTΣ, NOEIN, AND THEIR DERIVATIVES IN PRE-SOCRATIC
PHILOSOPHY (EXCLUDING ANAXAGORAS)

PART II. THE POST-PARMENIDEAN PERIOD

KURT VON FRITZ

MELISSUS AND ZENON

IN THE fragments of the works of Parmenides' immediate disciples, Zenon and Melissus, neither the word *vóos* nor any of its derivatives occurs. Nevertheless, they must be discussed briefly because their philosophy was not without influence on the further development of the concept. Setting aside a few deviations from the doctrine of Parmenides which have no bearing on our problem, as, for instance, Melissus' contention that the *τόν* was *ἄπειρον* rather than *πεπερασμένον*, both Zenon and Melissus tried to support the fundamental tenets of their master by new arguments and to defend it against the contrary evidence provided by our senses. This latter part of their philosophical labors implies at least a shift of emphasis, as compared with Parmenides' own view of the problem, and gave the speculation about the ways in which we can find access to ultimate reality a new direction.

Theophrastus was probably wrong when he said that Parmenides considered *φρονεῖν* or *νοεῖν* and *αἰσθάνεσθαι* one and the same thing. But it is significant that, in the decisive sections of his discussion of *δόξα*, Parmenides does not refer to the senses as the cause of erroneous beliefs but speaks of the *νόος πλαγκτός* of mortals. In the Introduction, it is true, the senses are mentioned,⁹⁸ when the goddess asks Parmenides not to ply—or to give free play to—"his unseeing eye and his buzzing ear." But the senses are described merely as unable to grasp the true reality.

⁹⁸ Parm. B1. 35 (Diels).

It is not altogether impossible that in the lost parts of the second half of the poem the senses were referred to again as having somehow contributed to the errors of mortals. But there can be no doubt that the decisive error is committed by the *vóos*, if it errs, even though, and in some respects even because, it is the *vóos* which has access to ultimate reality and is, in a way, in touch with it even when it errs.⁹⁹ The senses, in other words, even though they are not identified with the *vóos*, are certainly not contrasted with the *vóos* either, so as to be considered as the cause of error committed by the *vóos*, but come in only in a secondary function.

The difference between Parmenides and his direct disciples in this respect can be most easily shown by an analysis of Frag. B8 (Diels) of Melissus. In this fragment Melissus tries to prove that if those things which people consider as real, namely, water, fire, air, gold, iron, etc., are truly existent; if, furthermore, they are black and white,¹⁰⁰ dead and alive, etc., as people believe to be true; and if (in this respect) we see and hear correctly, then each one of them must have the properties which "it" (that which is) seemed to have (according to the preceding demonstration), which means that they cannot change in any respect or be converted into something else but must remain forever what they are. But, he continues, in

⁹⁹ See Part I, CP, XL (1945), 241.

¹⁰⁰ It is also characteristic for the shift of emphasis in regard to sensual perception that Melissus speaks of white and black, while Parmenides speaks of light and darkness, of sound and stillness, etc. (see Part I, CP, XL, 240).

fact, what is warm seems to become cold; and what is cold, warm; the hard seems to become soft; and the soft, hard, etc.; and everything seems to be converted into something else according to what we see in every instance.¹⁰¹ It follows, therefore, that we did not see correctly and that the appearance of a multiplicity of things was deceptive.

Melissus' argument is somewhat vague and certainly much less precise and cogent than that of Parmenides. But a few definite conclusions can be drawn. It is the senses which he accuses of the error which Parmenides attributes essentially to the *νόος πλαγκτός*. The words *νόος* and *νοεῖν* do not occur in any of the literal fragments of the work of Melissus. We can, therefore, not be absolutely sure that he used them at all or, if he did, in what sense. But it is clear that he tried to disprove the testimony of the senses by logical reasoning. It seems, furthermore, that he started from the testimony of the senses in order to show that this testimony, if followed out into its logical consequences, is self-contradictory.¹⁰²

Even though Zenon in the literal fragments neither refers expressly to the senses nor mentions the *νόος*, it is obvious that his purpose and methods in this re-

spect are essentially the same; for the testimony of the sense of vision shows that Achilles, for instance, in order to reach the turtle must first reach the point from which the latter started and that the turtle moves constantly. It follows, then, that, while Achilles reaches the point which the turtle had reached when he reached its starting-point, the turtle must have traveled some further distance, and so on *ad infinitum*. Hence it follows that Achilles can never reach the turtle. Yet the testimony of the senses says also that Achilles not only reaches the turtle but passes it by. Even though the senses are not mentioned in the fragments, it seems obvious that with this argument Zenon, just like Melissus, tries to prove that the testimony of the senses is self-contradictory.

With these arguments and this method of proof, Zenon and Melissus took a further important step toward the distinction between sensual perception and logical reasoning, which was to have a great influence on the development of the concepts of *νόος* and *νοεῖν*.

EMPEDOCLES

Among the non-Eleatic pre-Socratic philosophers of the two generations following Parmenides, Empedocles occupies a special position in two respects which are most essential for the further history of the concepts of *νόος* and *νοεῖν*, namely, in regard to the general character of his philosophical terminology and in regard to the "theory of knowledge," which is gradually evolving in this period. In most other respects he has much in common with some of the most outstanding philosophers of his time, notably with Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democritus. All these philosophers are profoundly influenced by Parmenides' reasoning. Yet all reject, in one way or another, his funda-

¹⁰¹ This seems to be the meaning of Melissus' words when he says: "We say that we see and hear and understand correctly. But it seems to us that the warm gets cold and the cold warm, etc."

¹⁰² The gist of Melissus' argument, which is not very clearly expressed in the fragment, seems to be this: (1) The senses tell us that various things, like water, fire, gold, etc., exist and that they are warm or cold, living or dead, hard or soft, etc. (2) If this were true, it would follow that water cannot turn into earth and that what is hard cannot become soft, since this would mean that in each case of this kind one thing turns into another or disappears (in the first case the water, in the second case the hard) and something else comes out of nothing (in the first case earth, in the second case the soft). But this is impossible, as demonstrated before, since whatever exists cannot have come out of nothing, or have turned into nothing. (3) Nevertheless, the senses tell us that water does turn into earth (stone) and that the hard becomes soft. (4) Hence the testimony of the senses is self-contradictory.

mental thesis of the absolute unity of that which is and his denial of motion, while they accept his doctrine that nothing can come out of nothing and that nothing can really perish. Empedocles and Anaxagoras, furthermore, accept Parmenides' verdict that the $\mu\eta\ \delta\nu$ can in no way exist, and therefore they deny the existence of an empty space, while Leucippus and Democritus start from the assumption that the $\mu\eta\ \delta\nu$ does, in a way, exist, namely, as the empty space, the $\kappaενόν$. All these philosophers, finally, agree that the testimony of our senses is not sufficient to make us grasp the true reality but that this testimony is not completely without value and that it is, at least to some extent, possible to grasp the truly real by means of a correction of the testimony of the senses, though the extent of this correction and the methods followed in accomplishing it vary greatly from one philosopher to another. Yet there are some fundamental differences between Empedocles and all the others.

In the first place, Empedocles, in contrast to Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democritus, still writes in verse and begins his philosophical poem with a "mythological" introduction.¹⁰³ This he has in common with Parmenides. Yet here, too, there is an essential difference. The poetic form of Parmenides' work is appropriate inasmuch as the truth, even though after much hard thinking, has come to him as a "revelation." But, apart from this, neither his thought itself nor its expression has been essentially affected by the poetic form. Where the *content* of the "revela-

tion" which he passes on to his listeners or readers is concerned, his language is abstract and his terminology very precise. Empedocles, on the other hand, wrote a religious and somewhat mystical poem, the so-called *Καθαρμοί*, and a philosophical and scientific one, which ancient writers, if they mention a title at all, usually quote as *Περὶ φύσεως*, though this title can hardly be original. This latter poem may be called more "scientific" than the work of Parmenides, because it attempts to give not only a causal explanation of the origin and evolution of the universe in which we live but also a detailed analysis of various special physical phenomena, not infrequently based on "scientific" experiments.¹⁰⁴ Yet in spite of this and in spite of the fact that the mythological introduction is much less closely linked up with the rest of the poem than in the work of Parmenides, the poetical and the philosophical or scientific elements are much less completely and clearly separated in his work. This is true not only of the introduction of the somewhat anthropomorphic forces of *Φιλότης* and *Νέικος* as the main driving agents in the genesis of the universe but, above all, of his terminology; for, in contrast to Parmenides, he uses in the philosophical or scientific parts of his poem many Homeric terms which in his time were no longer used outside of poetry, or even of epic poetry, and he not infrequently seems to vary the expressions or terms he uses merely for the sake of stylistic variety, even where the most essential concepts are concerned. This makes an analysis of his terminology a good deal more difficult. Yet if this peculiarity of Empedocles' style is taken into due consideration, it seems not impossible to arrive at definite and clear-cut results, which then may make it possible to determine more

¹⁰³ There can be no doubt that in the first line of the poem in which Pausanias is addressed (B1), Empedocles speaks in his own name. In contrast to Parmenides, who attributes the philosophical part of his poem directly to the goddess who reveals the truth to him, Empedocles seems to be the speaker throughout his work. But the invocation of the Muse in B4 is not merely a poetic form, since Empedocles obviously claims divine inspiration for what he has to say (cf. B23. 11; B2. 9; etc.).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. A66, A67, A34, B100 (Diels).

clearly the second main point of difference between him and his contemporaries, namely, in regard to the character of their "theory of knowledge."

The peculiarity of Empedocles' style and terminology stands out very clearly in the very first fragment of his main work in which the word *νόος* occurs:

στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται·
πολλὰ δὲ δειλ' ἔμπαια, τὰ τ' ἀμβλύνουσι
μερίμνας·

παῖτρον δὲ ζωῆς ἰδίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες
ὥκυμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀθρήντες ἀπέπταν
αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν
ἕκαστος

πάντοσ' ἐλαυνόμενοι, τὸ δ' ὅλον <πᾶς> εὐχεται
εὐρεῖν·

οὕτως οὐτ' ἐπίδερκτὰ τὰδ' ἀνδράσιν οὐτ'
ἐπακουστά

οὔτε νόφ περιληπτὰ· σύ δ' οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὦδ'
ἐλιάσθης,

πέπεισαι οὐ πλεόν ἢ βροτέῃ μῆτις ὄρωρεν.¹⁰⁵

The central statement in this passage is obviously that the life of human beings is too short and that everybody therefore believes only that which has come within the compass of his own very limited experience, while he thinks and boasts that he has found out the whole. In this way, Empedocles continues, men can neither see nor hear "this" (τάδε, which means, obviously: that which Empedocles is going to explain and which is the fundamental truth about the structure and evolution of the universe), nor can they encompass it with their *νόος*.

In this passage the *νόος* is mentioned along with seeing and hearing almost in the same way as in the famous fragment of Xenophanes.¹⁰⁶ It is differentiated from the senses, however, inasmuch as its function seems to be to encompass (περιλαμβάνειν) something. The relation of the *νόος* to the

senses is further clarified by another fragment,¹⁰⁷ in which Empedocles' listener or reader is warned not to give more credence to his sense of vision (ὄψις) than to his ears, or to his ears more than to the "revelations" (ττανώματα) of his tongue (which obviously means "to his sense of taste"), or to favor these as against any one of the other organs (γυῖα) in however many ways there is a pathway to νοεῖν (ὁπόση πόρος ἔστι νοῆσαι). This fragment makes it still clearer that, just as in Homer and Xenophanes,¹⁰⁸ the *νόος* in Empedocles' philosophy perceives, at least ordinarily,¹⁰⁹ through the organs of the senses. It also explains the περιλαμβάνειν in the first fragment. The *νόος* comprises (and makes use of) the testimony of all the senses. It is also its function to embrace in its comprehension the whole of the universe, but it is hampered in this task by the shortness of human life and the consequent insufficiency of experience. Finally, the *νόος* seems to have the function of selection; for we are exhorted to admit to the *νόος* that which is presented to us by the senses only in so far as it is clear.¹¹⁰ But what kind of clarity is meant, whether merely the clearness of the vision and distinctiveness of sounds or a clear and integrated insight into the interrelation between the testimony of various senses, is not determined by the fragment. On the negative side one may, furthermore, say that so far it is certainly not necessary to assume that the meaning of "logical reasoning" is in any way implied in the term.

The further interpretation of the two fragments is made rather difficult by the fact, already mentioned, that they contain a good many terms which seem either completely or nearly synonymous, partly

¹⁰⁷ B4.

¹⁰⁸ See Part I, CP, XL, 229.

¹⁰⁹ For possible exceptions see below, p. 18.

¹¹⁰ B3(4). 13: νόει δὲ ἢ ὅλην ἕκαστον.

¹⁰⁵ B2 (Diels).

¹⁰⁶ Xenoph. B24; cf. Part I, CP, XL, 229.

with one another, partly with terms which have already been discussed. On the side of sensual perception the analysis of these terms is comparatively easy. In the first line of the first fragment mentioned, Empedocles says that narrow *παλάμαι* are spread over our body. *Παλάμη* originally means "the palm of the hand," then "the open hand," and finally "the hand" without special qualification. But when in the other fragment Empedocles tells his reader *ἄθρει πάσῃ παλάμῃ*¹¹¹ and then enumerates the various senses, *παλάμη* obviously is a general designation of all organs of sensual perception. The choice of the term seems to convey the idea that the senses somehow *grasp* their objects. The other term, *ἀθρεῖν*, means originally "to gaze at," "to look upon something with great attention." In the expression quoted, this term also is extended to cover all the senses and obviously is chosen to mark the intensity with which the senses are bent upon their objects. It is perhaps interesting to note that the two expressions which Empedocles uses to designate sensual perception in general are borrowed from the sense of vision and the sense of touch,¹¹² that is, from the most comprehensive of our senses and from that sense which seems most directly in touch with its objects.¹¹³

The remaining two relevant terms in the two fragments are *μέριμνα* and *μητις*. The first of these words is supposed to be etymologically related to a word meaning "to remember," but in Homer it usually means "care," "solicitude," while the second one seems etymologically related to Lat. *metior*, "to measure," and in Homer usually means "foresight," "premedita-

tion of the future," then also "wisdom" and the "skill" of an artist who works according to a clearly visualized mental image of the thing which he is going to create. But in Empedocles the meaning of both these words can hardly be distinguished from that of *νόος*. The statement of B2. 2, *πολλά δὲ δεῖλ' ἐμπαια, τὰ τ' ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας*, is repeated in B110. 7. But there it is followed by a description of how the *μέριμναι*, if insignificant things intrude upon them, go away and "join their own family." "For everything," Empedocles continues, "has *φρόνησις* and its share of *νῶμα* [= *νόημα*]" Obviously, then, the *μέριμναι* belong to the same *γέννα* or family as *φρόνησις* and *νόημα*. This is confirmed by the first part of the fragment. Here we are told what happens if the *πραπίδες* (which is the same as *φρένες*) are firm and vigorous (*ἀδινάι*), while the second half explains what happens when the *μέριμναι* are blunted (*ἀμβλύνονται*). *Πραπίδες* and *μέριμναι* therefore seem equivalent. At most, they may be distinguished on the analogy of *νόος* and *νόημα*, the *πραπίδες* being the organ and its function, the *μέριμναι* the results of this function.

The case of *μητις* is only slightly different. *Μητρίεσθαι* in B139 means "to think of or contemplate an action." But this is also the meaning of *νοεῖν* in B84. 1. *Μητις* in B23 means the "skill of an artist," which, however, as pointed out above, is also a kind of foresight. In the two other passages in which the word occurs¹¹⁴ it means "mental capacity" in general. Aristotle, when quoting the second one of these passages,¹¹⁵ translates the word *μητις* by *φρόνησις* and adduces another fragment from Empedocles, which contains about the same statement as B106 but uses the word *φρένες*. Since *μητις*, in the sense of

¹¹¹ B3(4). 9.

¹¹² For analogies in other pre-Socratic philosophers see K. von Fritz, *Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck bei Demokrit, Platon und Aristoteles* (New York: Stechert, 1938), p. 22.

¹¹³ Cf. also Emped. B133.

¹¹⁴ B2. 9 and B106.

¹¹⁵ *Metaph.* Γ. 5. 1009 b 18.

"artistic skill" or "planning," seems merely a specialization of a larger concept, which can also be expressed by *νόος*, the conclusion seems justified that *μη̄τις*, *πραπίδες*, *μέριμνα*, *νοῦς*, and their various derivatives in Empedocles—in contrast to Homer, where they are well differentiated—all refer essentially to the same function and its results.

If this is so, two further inferences concerning the *νόος* can be drawn from these lines in B2 in which *μέριμναι* and *μη̄τις* are mentioned. The *νόος* can be dulled or blunted. This notion is familiar from Homer. But in Homer the *νόος* is blunted by a physical blow, by sorcery, or by a strong passion. In Empedocles it is blunted because, or when, it is too much directed toward trivial things.¹¹⁶ There is also the notion, encountered above in the works of Xenophanes, that the *νόος* of human beings, even if not blunted, is limited in its comprehension.¹¹⁷

Apart from this, the analysis so far has shown that, together with their synonyms, the words *νόος* and *νοεῖν* in Empedocles seem to designate mainly two things: (1) a mental capacity or function which selects, sifts,¹¹⁸ corrects, and, above all, co-ordinates and interconnects the testimony of the various senses and (2) planning of an action and foresight. The second meaning is interesting mainly because it shows that Empedocles has taken over a well-known Homeric usage, which, as far as we can judge from the fragments, was not adopted by earlier philosophers, though it seems to have also affected Anaxagoras' concept of *νοῦς*.¹¹⁹ But since

it does not occur in any passage which is of central importance for Empedocles' philosophy, it need not be further discussed.

The first meaning quoted seems to come near enough to the most frequent and probably most original meaning of the word in Homer: the *νόος* which not merely recognizes an object but understands a situation in which many objects are correlated to one another and the *νόος* which corrects a first, but erroneous, impression. There is, however, the important difference that in Empedocles the word *γινώσκειν* no longer has the same meaning or the same range of meaning as in Homer and that, therefore, a very essential part of the function of *γινώσκειν* in Homer is now attributed either to the senses or to the *νόος*.¹²⁰ For this and other reasons the relation between the *νόος* and the senses must be further analyzed.

According to B2, the senses are the *πόροι* through which the *νόος* receives the raw material for its insight into the true nature of the world. This may even be taken in a material sense, considering the fact that in B105. 3 the blood about the heart¹²¹ is described as the seat of the *νόος* and

¹¹⁶ The word *γινώσκειν* occurs only twice in the extant fragments of the work of Empedocles (B4 (5). 3 and B89). In both cases it does not mean "to recognize or identify an object," as in Homer, but "to understand a statement." Snell (*op. cit.*, p. 28) has tried to show how this meaning could derive from the original one, by pointing out that in an early period the thought which is expressed in words could be conceived as an object which must be recognized. To put it in a somewhat different way, one might perhaps say that to understand the thought means to recognize and understand its object, whether this be a concrete thing or an event, and add that in the early period of Greek speculation the thought and its object are often hardly distinguished. That this is still true to some extent of Empedocles is perhaps illustrated by B110. 2, where Empedocles exhorts his listener to *look upon* that which he has to tell him with a pure effort (that is, free from selfish cares) and straining (literally, "leaning on") his *πραπίδες* to the utmost. But the word *γινώσκειν* in the extant fragments of the work of Empedocles is used only where a statement is understood or an object through a statement but never, as usually in Homer, where an object is recognized directly as it presents itself to the sense of vision or touch, etc.

¹²¹ *περικάρδιον αἷμα*.

¹¹⁶ B110. 6 ff.

¹¹⁷ B2. 9: *πείσσει αὖ πλὸν ἢ βροτῶν μη̄τις ὄρεν*.

¹¹⁸ See B5. 3; cf. also below, p. 20.

¹¹⁹ I take Empedocles and Anaxagoras as contemporaries, though Anaxagoras may have been born somewhat, but hardly more than ten years, earlier than Empedocles. There is no indication that Empedocles' use of the word *νόος* was in any way influenced by Anaxagoras' very peculiar concept.

that, according to Theophrastus,¹²² Empedocles explained sensual perception as due to effluences or *ἀπορροαί* from the objects which penetrate into the sensual organs; for it seems reasonable to assume that these effluences are transmitted from the organs of perception to the heart, where they are sifted.¹²³

Yet there are some passages which indicate that the *νόος* in certain circumstances can acquire insight without the help of the senses. So Empedocles says of God¹²⁴ that he has no head or limbs (hence, we must infer, no special organs of vision, hearing, etc., but only a *φρήν*, which, as shown above, in Empedocles is the same as *νόος* and which pervades the whole universe with its swift *φροντίδες*).¹²⁵ In another passage¹²⁶ Empedocles says that we cannot reach God with our eyes or grasp him with our hands, "which," he says, "is the main path of firm conviction leading to the *φρήν* of human beings." The implications of this passage are much less clear than those of the first passage. It clearly says that (ordinarily?) the *φρήν* or *νόος* gets its most important raw material for true insight through the sense of vision and the sense of touch. If, on the other hand, the assumption is made that human beings can have some knowledge of God, the implication seems to be that this knowledge is acquired by the *νόος* directly and without the help of the senses.

¹²² See Emped. A86. 7 (from Theophr. *De sensu*).

¹²³ Cf. also B5. 3, where the words of the Muse are sifted in the *σπλάχνα*, to which the heart belongs. Though it is the meaning of the words which in this case is sifted by the *σπλάχνα* as the seat of *νόος*, the words as sounds must have reached the *σπλάχνα* through the senses.

¹²⁴ B134.

¹²⁵ This idea is in harmony with the statement in B110. 10 that everything in the world is pervaded with *φρόνησις* and *νόμος*, and it is not necessarily at variance with the assumption that the *φρόνησις* or *νόος* of human beings is especially concentrated in the heart.

¹²⁶ B133: οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθαι ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐφικτόν ἡμετέροις ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν, ἥτις τε μεγίστη πειθεὶς ἀνθρώποις ἀμαξήτος εἰς φρήνα πίπτει.

But there is still the possibility that Empedocles means merely to say that we cannot reach God with our senses alone and directly but that we can grasp his nature somehow indirectly by looking at the world as it is presented to us by the senses. In a way this would come rather near to the Christian idea of knowing God through his works. But it would still be necessary to ask whether this knowledge is acquired by logical inference, that is, by drawing a conclusion from the effect to the cause, or in some other fashion.

A partial answer to this question is given by two other fragments. In B17. 20 ff., Empedocles speaks of *Φιλότης* or Love as one of the main great driving agents which keep the world in motion. Then he goes on to say: *τὴν σὺ νόψ δέρκει, μηδ' ὀμμασιν ἦσο τεθηπώς*—a rather close parallel to the passage quoted before. But the way in which we acquire knowledge of *Φιλότης* is further described in B109: *γαῖη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀνόπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα διόν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀτόηλον, στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νείκος δὲ τε νείκει λυγρῷ*. This passage is of decisive importance not only for the interpretation of Empedocles but also for a full understanding of some of his great predecessors; for it shows clearly that in Empedocles' opinion the recognition of Love and the insight into its nature is not an indirect one and that it is not brought about by inference or logical reasoning but is as direct and immediate as the recognition (or perception?) of earth, fire, and water. Yet he has stated with equal clarity that *Φιλότης* is not seen or recognized by the senses. How, then, is it recognized? The context leaves no doubt as to Empedocles' answer to this question: "Because love and hatred are in ourselves, are part of ourselves," he would say, "we can recognize them directly, not only in other living beings, but also as

cosmic forces, everywhere in the world." But, according to B109, this is also true of the perception of earth, water, "aether," and fire, though these elements seem to be perceived by the senses.¹²⁷ What, then, is the difference between the perception of the elements and the perception of hate and love? Why, if there is such a difference, as other fragments seem to indicate, is the same common principle that like is perceived by like applied to both kinds of perception? What, finally, is the origin of that common principle itself?

The principle that like is perceived by like is most easily understandable for us in its application to love and hate. When a person has a certain facial expression, speaks in a certain tone, assumes a certain posture, etc., we seem to feel directly that this person is filled with hatred, is angry, is sad, or is full of joy, etc. At present we are inclined to attribute this feeling to an unconscious inference from the fact that we ourselves have a similar expression or behave in a similar way when feeling a similar emotion. From the extreme behavioristic point of view this may even be an unwarranted inference. But the accuracy or inaccuracy of these modern views and interpretations has no bearing on the present question. What matters is merely that when we see the expression of hate or anger in another person we are not conscious of drawing an inference from his facial expression or his behavior to his feelings but have the impression that we perceive his emotion directly. Yet this "direct perception" of the emotions of a person is not in the same way linked up with a specific sensual organ as is the perception of light and darkness or of sound, since the anger or sadness of a person can be perceived in his voice as well as in his facial expression. It seems, therefore, not difficult to under-

stand¹²⁸ why Empedocles attributes the "direct perception" of love and hate not to the senses but to the *νόος*.

At the same time, it seems clear how this kind of "perception," if it is felt as such, can lead to the theory that like is perceived by like; for when we see an angry or sad person, we have not only the impression that we know *in abstracto* that this person is angry or sad but, even if we remain free from any contagion by his emotion, that there is something in us which responds to it and that, even while remaining calm, we have the feeling that we understand the mood or the emotion of the person in its individual quality because, at least potentially, it is also in ourselves.

In its application, therefore, to love and hate and also to other passions and emotions, the principle that like is perceived by like seems easy enough to understand. Nevertheless, one may very well ask the question whether this is really the origin of the principle (1) because its transference to the perception of water, fire, etc., seems very strange and (2)—and this seems an even more cogent objection—because the principle is obviously older than Empedocles and because his predecessors, as far as we know, did not apply it to the perception of love, hate, and other emotions.

Yet it is exactly here that the key to the whole problem is found. Among Empedocles' predecessors, both Heraclitus and Parmenides, especially the latter, make use of the principle. Yet they do not apply it to emotions but to light and darkness, warmth and cold, silence and sound, etc. On an earlier occasion¹²⁹ it was pointed out that to Parmenides these were not merely sensual qualities and that they are closely related to the primary

¹²⁷ See also below, p. 20.

¹²⁸ See Part I, CP, XL, 240.

¹²⁹ Cf. also Theophr. *De sensu* 7.

contrasts from which, in the philosophy of Anaximander, the world in which we live emerges. It is now time to point out that they are also emotional qualities, or, in the terms of early Greek thought, more correctly, qualities or conditions of the soul. When we speak of warm love, cold hate, the darkness of sorrow, etc., we say that we speak in "metaphors." But these metaphors would not occur in practically all languages if the transference of these concepts from one field to the other was not natural to the human race, whatever the reason for it may be. To Empedocles' predecessors, however, this was not a transference of concepts but actually an identity of qualities, as Heraclitus' famous fragments¹³⁰ on the wet souls of drunkards and the dry fire of the soul of the wise man clearly indicate.

Once this is clearly understood, both the origin and the later development of the theory that like is perceived by like become quite intelligible. In fact, the origin of this theory can be much more easily explained on the basis of the earlier concept than on the basis of Empedocles' philosophy; for the presence of love can still be understood by a man who is full of hatred, but he is no longer able to feel its warmth, and it is a common experience that in the darkness of sorrow everything becomes dark. It is only because to us the warmth of love, the darkness of sorrow or ignorance,¹³¹ etc., have become mere

metaphors that we understand the principle more easily in its Empedoclean application to love and hate than in its application to light and darkness, warmth and cold, silence and noise, etc. Likewise, what appears to us as the transference of the principle that like is perceived by like from the field of emotional to the field of physical qualities is much more natural where emotional and physical qualities are conceived as identical than in the philosophy of Empedocles, in which the theory of love and hate as the driving forces in the physical world and the extension of the principle of perception by like qualities to the elements seem due to rather artificial analogies.

As a result, then, it can be said that *νόος* in Empedocles has three meanings or, if the *νόος* is considered a unit, that it has three functions: (1) It directly perceives love and hate both in other human beings and as driving forces in nature, and it does so either through the senses or in some cases, perhaps, without this intermediary; (2) it co-ordinates and integrates the testimony of the senses into an understanding of the whole;¹³² and (3) it has also the function of planning and guiding the actions of human beings.¹³³

The last of these meanings of *νόος* and *νοεῖν* is obviously taken over directly from the ancient usage of the word which can already be found in Homer. It is not of very great significance in Empedocles' philosophy. The second meaning shows a great affinity to the old Homeric meaning "to realize a situation." But it is extended to comprise the understanding of the world as a whole. In this respect it has a

other, considering one group as positive and the other as negative. For the assumption that dark, cold, etc., exist but are negative implies the assumption of the existence of a *μηδὲν*, which is impossible.

¹³² See above, p. 17.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Herac. B117 and B118 (Diels).

¹³¹ The fact that ignorance appears related to darkness and knowledge to light explains, perhaps, the discrepancy in Parmenides' theory of the acquisition of knowledge pointed out above (n. 90). Theophrastus can hardly be completely wrong when he says that, according to Parmenides, *νοεῖν* through warmth and light is better than *νοεῖν* through cold and dark; for in the introductory myth in Parmenides' work the discovery of the truth appears as a travel from darkness to light (B1. 6-10 [Diels]). But the truth itself, which is revealed to Parmenides at the end of this travel, paradoxically consists in the insight that we are wrong when we divide the world into light, warmth, sound, on the one side, and darkness, cold, silence, on the

certain affinity to the concept of *νόος* as found in Xenophanes and Heraclitus.¹³⁴

It is the first of the three meanings which is historically and philosophically most interesting. It is not found in Homeric usage, yet is not quite remote from it either; for it is very often the mood of a person, his friendliness or unfriendliness, etc., which is the decisive factor in the meaning of a situation.¹³⁵ At the same time, one finds here the only affinity between Empedocles' and Parmenides' concepts of *νόος*; for the direct perception of love and hate by the *νόος*, according to the principle that like is perceived by like, is obviously influenced by Parmenides' theory concerning the origin of *δόξα*.

This relation to Parmenides appears even closer if one supplements the evidence provided by the literal fragments with the testimony of Theophrastus,¹³⁶ who says that, according to Empedocles, the *νόος* functions most properly in those persons in whom there is an equally balanced mixture of the elements; for if the mixture is not equally balanced, a person will be partly blind to the presence of those elements in the external world which are inadequately represented in the person himself.

On the negative side it is most important to notice that in the philosophy of Empedocles *νοεῖν* never has the meaning of "reasoning" and that, in his opinion, all knowledge seems to be acquired by some kind of direct perception, since even the co-ordination and integration of the testimony of the various senses in his philosophy seems due rather to some special faculty of the *νόος* by which it directly perceives the interrelation between the various sensual data than to any kind of reasoning. This is also what Theophrastus obviously has in mind when he says¹³⁷

that in Empedocles' system *φρονεῖν*¹³⁸ and *αἰσθησις* are either the same (*ταὐτό*) or very similar (*παρὰλήσιον*) to each other. In this respect, therefore, Empedocles has no share in the most important development in the history of the meaning of the terms *νόος* and *νοεῖν*, which was initiated by Parmenides and carried further by his disciples, Melissus and Zenon.

While in this respect Empedocles seems to represent a pre-Parmenidean type of thought, there are other features in his philosophy which show him to have been a child of his time and by which he has contributed to the rise of a theory of knowledge which was of decisive importance for the later history of the terms *νόος* and *νοεῖν*, namely, the clear distinction between the immaterial forces of love and hate and the material elements of fire, aether, water, and earth, and the more detailed criticism of sensual perception which is attributed to him by Theophrastus.¹³⁹

PROTAGORAS

In the fragments of the works of those pre-Socratic philosophers who have not yet been discussed, the terms *νοῦς*, *νοεῖν*, etc., appear but rarely and—with the exception of some fragments of the work of Anaxagoras—not in a very significant context. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that some of them had a decisive influence on the later history of these terms by promoting the further development of the antithesis between *αἰσθησις* and *νοῦς*, the first traces of which could already be discovered in the philosophy of Parmenides' disciples, Zenon and Melissus.¹⁴⁰ Most important in this respect are the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus and what is often called the "subjectivism" of Protagoras.

¹³⁴ See Part I, *CP*, XL, 230 and 234.

¹³⁵ See von Fritz, *CP*, XXXVIII (1943), 88 ff.

¹³⁶ *De sensu* 11.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.* 10.

¹³⁸ Concerning *φρονεῖν* as a synonym of *νοεῖν* in the language of Empedocles, cf. above, p. 16.

¹³⁹ *De sensu* 7 ff.

¹⁴⁰ See above, p. 12.

Protagoras' contribution is crystallized in the famous statement: πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. It is obviously not possible within the framework of this study to discuss in detail all the various interpretations of this sentence which have been given in ancient and modern times.¹⁴¹ But it will be sufficient for our purpose to determine its meaning as correctly as possible as far as it has a bearing on the problem under discussion.

Plato, who is the earliest author to quote the famous sentence,¹⁴² indicates clearly that Protagoras illustrated his statement by pointing out that when a wind is blowing, one person may feel cold while another does not; and that in such a case there is no sense in contending that the wind in itself is cold or, on the contrary, that it is not cold, since obviously it is cold for one person and not cold for the other. So far there can be hardly any doubt that Plato gives Protagoras' own interpretation of his statement,¹⁴³ even though he may have slightly changed the wording. But when he goes on to explain that "to be cold for a person" means to appear cold to a person and then identifies this appearance (φαντασία from φαίνεσθαι) with sensual perception (αἴσθησις), he is obviously drawing his own conclusions from Protagoras' interpretation, so that it is no longer certain whether these conclusions coincide exactly with Protagoras' own opinion.

E. Kapp in an excellent discussion of Protagoras' principle¹⁴⁴ has pointed out that the famous statement πάντων χρημάτων κτλ. is essentially directed against those

earlier philosophers who, like Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Zenon, Melissus, and Empedocles, asserted that the opinions of "men," that is, of people in general, are all wrong and that the truth is entirely different;¹⁴⁵ and that Protagoras tried to prove his point by showing in an individual case that it is quite senseless to try to prove to a man who is shivering in the wind that the wind is not cold.

The correctness of this interpretation is confirmed by the fact that it permits the easy and complete solution of both of the main problems which Protagoras' statement presents, which have been discussed by scores of scholars without obtaining a definite result. The first of these problems is whether ἄνθρωπος in the sentence means "man" in general or every single human individual. Kapp's interpretation shows clearly that it means both; that is, that primarily it means "man" as an ordinary human being and his concept of the world in general and the individual things in it, in contrast to the presumed superior truth which the philosopher claims to possess and which he contrasts with the error of the common crowd. But, in trying to prove his point, Protagoras uses the individual as an example, and his demonstration implies unquestionably that even the individual concepts and sensations of the individual, even if they differ from those of other individuals, are as indisputably true for this individual as the common notions of most human beings are true for

¹⁴¹ For a detailed discussion of this controversy see Zeller-Nestle, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, I (8th ed.; Leipzig, 1920), 1349 ff.

¹⁴² *Theaet.* 151 e ff.

¹⁴³ Cf. *ibid.* 152 b: ἡ περὶ μεθετα τῷ Πρωταγόρῃ δοτὶ τῷ μὲν ὑγρῶντι ψυχρὸν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὐ.

¹⁴⁴ *Gnomon*, XII (1936), 70 ff.

¹⁴⁵ This defense of the "natural" views of the "ordinary" or "common" man against the claims of philosophers and scientists, by the way, is also a characteristic of the works of some other Sophists of the fifth century. Antiphon's contention, for instance, that a tangent touched the circle in more than one point belongs obviously in this category. Far from proving that the Greek mathematicians of the fifth century "were not yet able to form the purely mathematical concept of a tangent," as some scholars believe, this contention of Antiphon is an absolutely certain proof that at his time a tangent had been defined as a straight line which touches a circle in only one point.

the majority of the human race, whether they conflict with the ideas of the philosophers or not.

The second problem is whether $\omega\varsigma$ in $\omega\varsigma \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ and $\omega\varsigma \text{ } \text{o}\upsilon\kappa \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ means "that" or "how." Though Kapp has not discussed this problem, it is not difficult to show that his interpretation of Protagoras' statement as a whole makes a complete solution of the problem easy. There can be no doubt whatever that, in accordance with the prevailing linguistic usage of the time of Protagoras and especially in reference to the preceding $\delta\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$ and $\text{o}\upsilon\kappa \delta\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$, $\omega\varsigma \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ means "that they exist" and $\omega\varsigma \text{ } \text{o}\upsilon\kappa \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ "that they do not exist." Yet when Protagoras illustrates his point by means of the qualities or, to use Aristotle's language, the $\pi\omicron\upsilon\delta\eta\tau\eta\epsilon\varsigma$, of "warm" and "cold," it seems equally clear that $\omega\varsigma$ in both cases must mean "how," though in good Greek this would really be $\text{o}\iota\alpha$. At this point, however, one has again to remember that in early Greek philosophy, that is, for the predecessors of Heraclitus and Parmenides, warm and cold were *not* $\pi\omicron\upsilon\delta\eta\tau\eta\epsilon\varsigma$, much less purely sensual qualities, but rather the fundamental contrasts of which the universe consists,¹⁴⁵ and in this sense $\chi\rho\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ or $\delta\upsilon\tau\alpha$. Both Parmenides and Heraclitus had affirmed that "men" are wrong when they speak of these contrasts as of an ultimate reality, Heraclitus by affirming that what is cold or death or generally negative for us is warm and life and positive from another aspect, Parmenides by resolving all contrasts in the unity of that which is. If then, opposing this philosophy, Protagoras declares that it is senseless to tell human beings that they are mistaken in distinguishing cold and warm as they feel them and that, in fact, cold and warm are what they are for the people who feel them, it is clear that, from the point of

view of the philosophy which he combats and therefore, primarily at least, also from the point of view of Protagoras, $\omega\varsigma \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ and $\omega\varsigma \text{ } \text{o}\upsilon\kappa \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ mean "that they exist" and "that they do not exist"; for it was the *existence* of warm and cold, either as contrasts in general or in a given individual case, which had been in dispute. Yet from the standpoint of a later philosophy for which warm and cold are transitory qualities or $\pi\omicron\upsilon\delta\eta\tau\eta\epsilon\varsigma$ of things which exist independently of these qualities, $\omega\varsigma \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ and $\omega\varsigma \text{ } \text{o}\upsilon\kappa \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ in Protagoras' statement inevitably acquire the meaning of "how they are" and "how they are not." Since Protagoras is on the border line between the earlier and the later philosophy¹⁴⁷ and since, by the very statement under discussion, he himself has greatly contributed to the development and clarification of this later philosophy,¹⁴⁸ those modern scholars who have contended that $\omega\varsigma$ means "how" are not quite wrong from the point of view of later philosophy, though their knowledge of the Greek language is not beyond reproach. But one has to see Protagoras in his exact historical situation in order to understand him fully.

If this is correct, it follows that Plato, when drawing his further conclusions mentioned above, had already given a one-sided interpretation of

¹⁴⁷ This distinction between the "earlier" and the "later" philosophy is, of course, very crude and inadequate, since the "later" comprises views so utterly different, as, for instance, Aristotle's distinction between *o\iota\alpha* and *\pi\omicron\upsilon\delta\eta* and Democritus' view (see below, p. 29) that warm and cold, light and dark, bitter and sweet, etc. are the ways in which our sensual organs perceive the shapes of the atoms and the impact with which they strike the various parts of our body or, perhaps more correctly, the subjective qualities into which our sensual organs translate the shape and impact of the atoms. What is common to the "later" philosophy, in the sense in which the word is taken here, is merely that warm and cold, etc., have become real or apparent qualities of something else and are no longer the ultimate constituents of the "real" world.

¹⁴⁸ See Part I, C.P. XL, 240 f.

¹⁴⁹ See below, p. 27.

Protagoras' statement; for, though Protagoras illustrated his point by referring to what we would call the "sensations" of cold and warm, he undoubtedly meant to give his principle a much wider application.¹⁴⁹ What he meant to say was that the world and everything in the world is what it appears to be (a) to human beings in general and (b) to every individual. What it appears to be to an individual may change from time to time, and this change may be influenced by various things, among others by teaching, rhetoric, and indoctrination. But there is no sense in the contention that there exists a true world totally different from what most ordinary people feel the world to be, and even less sense in the assumption that this true world is accessible to human knowledge. This view seems also to have been the serious element in Gorgias' dialectical *tour de force*, when in his famous pamphlet, *Περὶ φύσεως ἢ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*, he tried to prove (a) that nothing exists, (b) that if something existed it would not be accessible to our knowledge, and (c) that if someone did have such knowledge it would be impossible for him to communicate it to others.¹⁵⁰

We have no evidence of any kind concerning the terminology which Protagoras may have used in trying to prove his principle. Specifically, we do not know whether he used the terms *νόος* and *νοεῖν* at all, or even a synonymous term. On the other hand, it is unlikely that he used the terms *αἰσθησις*, *αἰσθάνεσθαι*, since in all the literal fragments of the works of the pre-Socratics that have come down to us the various senses are always mentioned separately and are not brought together under the one designation *αἰσθησις*.¹⁵¹ Yet, in spite

of all this, there can be no doubt whatever that, through the way in which he tried to prove his principle, Protagoras had a very great influence on the history of the terms *νόος* and *νοεῖν*.

THE ATOMISTS

Protagoras had tried to prove his point by referring to the qualities of warm and cold. In pre-Parmenidean philosophy these qualities had been considered the fundamental objective contrasts of which the world consists. Parmenides and Heraclitus, however, though in different ways, had contended that these contrasts appear as contrasts only in the belief of "men," while in reality they are dissolved in a deeper unity. In Parmenides' philosophy both true insight and *δόξα* are ultimately produced by the *νόος*. But Parmenides' successors, Zenon and Melissus, had tried to confirm his conclusions by a criticism of the senses.¹⁵² As far back as the Homeric poems we find the notion that the *νόος* has a deeper insight than our eyes and ears.¹⁵³ The same notion seems also inherent in the philosophy of Xenophanes and of Heraclitus.¹⁵⁴ In Empedocles' philosophy, finally, the perception of love and hate which is possible only to the *νόος* is contrasted with the perception of the elements and their qualities which occurs through the senses.¹⁵⁵ If all this is taken together, nothing seems more natural than that a philosopher who wished to defend the existence of a "real" world

another and more penetrating kind of γνώμη (B11 [Diels]), still enumerates *ὄψιν*, *ἀκοήν*, *ὀσμήν*, etc., but speaks of the fifth sense as of *ἐν τῇ ψαύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι*. The reason is, of course, that one can say *ἐν διαττον ὄραν*, *ἀκοήν*, etc., but not *ἐν διαττον ψαύειν* because *ψαύειν* fundamentally and originally designates the action of touching something or the fact that something comes in contact with something else, but not the sense or sensation of touch.

¹⁴⁹ See above, p. 12.

¹⁴⁹ See Kapp, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

¹⁵⁰ For a further analysis of Gorgias' arguments and of his terminology, see below, p. 32.

¹⁵¹ It is perhaps interesting to observe that Democritus, when distinguishing sensual perception from

¹⁵² See von Fritz, *CP*, XXXVIII (1943), 89.

¹⁵³ See Part I, *CP*, XL, 230 and 234.

¹⁵⁵ See above, p. 18.

different from the world in which people in general believe should draw a sharp distinction between Protagoras' principle in its universal application to all human knowledge, on the one hand, and the special example by which he tried to prove it, on the other. Having made this distinction, he would then point out that what Protagoras had tried to show might well be true to some extent of the special field from which he had taken his example but not of knowledge in general. In view of the preceding development, it would also be natural to identify the field in which Protagoras' argument, within certain limitations,¹⁵⁶ does hold true with perception by or through the various senses, while the field to which it does not apply might be identified with acquisition of knowledge through *νοεῖν*.

As shown above, the restriction of the validity of Protagoras' principle to the field of *αἰσθησις* is made the starting-point for the further discussion, and more or less taken as a matter of course, in Plato's *Theaetetus*. But the distinction on which this restriction is based is much older and, within our knowledge, is found clearly formulated for the first time in the philosophical system of Democritus.

The atomistic theory, which Democritus tried to develop into an all-comprising explanation of all phenomena, had originally been created by Leucippus as an attempt to solve the fundamental problem raised by the philosophy of Parmenides.¹⁵⁷ Parmenides' irresistible logic had

resulted in a denial not only of all coming-to-be and passing-away but also of all motion. Yet the evidence for the existence of motion seemed so strong that a way out of this dilemma had to be found. Leucippus found the solution of the problem in the bold assumption that, contrary to the fundamental premise of Parmenides' conclusions, the *μὴ ὄν*, the nothing, that which is not, in some way did exist, namely, as the empty space. As the opposite to this true nothing of empty space, that which *really* (*κυρίως*) is is filled space and nothing else. Since, besides the space-filling *ὄν*, the *μὴ ὄν* exists as empty space, the *ὄν* can move within this *μὴ ὄν*. But if *that which* is existed, so to speak, all in one lump, it would still not be possible to explain the enormous variety of motion which we observe and the everlasting change of the shape and appearance of the things with which we are surrounded. Therefore, the assumption is made that *that which* is exists in the form of innumerable extremely small particles. Each one of these particles has all the qualities of the Parmenidean *One*. It is uncreated, imperishable, indivisible (hence the name "atom"), and immovable within itself. But by coming together to form a compound, the particles cause this compound to come into being; by separating from one another, they cause the compound to be destroyed; by changing their array, they cause it to change its form and appearance. Finally, by retaining their relative position to one another and moving as a group with the same velocity in the same direction,¹⁵⁸ they cause the compound to move without changing its shape.¹⁵⁹ With this gen-

¹⁵⁶ As to the meaning of this qualification, see below, p. 28.

¹⁵⁷ For a more detailed analysis of the philosophy of Leucippus and of its relation to Parmenides see K. von Fritz, *Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck bei Demokrit, Platon und Aristoteles*, pp. 12 ff. In the same book I have also tried to determine more exactly the essential difference between the character of the philosophies of Leucippus and Democritus and so implicitly to refute the contention of E. Rohde and other modern scholars that Leucippus had never lived and that atomism was exclusively a creation of Democritus.

¹⁵⁸ The other possibility, namely, that the atoms do not retain their relative position to one another individually but that those atoms which leave their relative position are replaced by others, so that the general form of the compound nevertheless remains the same, is only a variation within the same fundamental theory.

¹⁵⁹ The question of what sort of existence the compound has in distinction from the atoms and whether

eral solution of the problem Leucippus seems to have contented himself.¹⁶⁰

Democritus set himself a much larger task. He accepted the fundamental principles of the philosophy of Leucippus. But, not content with having explained the possibility of change and motion, he wished to show the real cause and origin of the qualities which the things surrounding us appear to have, of weight, rigidity, resistance to pressure, but also of the "sensual qualities" of cold and warmth, the tastes, smells, colors, and sounds. What is more, he wanted to show not only that all these qualities, whether seeming or real, could be produced by the atoms whose only fundamental quality was to be space-filling (from which, since they did not fill all space, it followed that they also had shape) but also what particular kind of atoms or combinations of atoms was the basis or cause of every single one of these phenomena.¹⁶¹

An enterprise of such scope could hardly be undertaken without a close reflection upon, and analysis of, the ways in which knowledge is acquired. Democritus' approach to this problem was naturally conditioned by the theories of his older contemporaries, Protagoras, Empedocles, and, to some extent, Anaxagoras. It is, therefore, quite impossible to attain a full understanding of what may be called Democritus' theory of knowledge and of his contribution to the development of the concepts of *nóos* and *νοεῖν* without con-

stantly keeping in mind that he had to formulate his own solution in such a way as to set it off as clearly as possible against the solutions attempted by his contemporaries and predecessors.

The ancient tradition concerning Democritus' theory of knowledge appears at first sight hopelessly confused and contradictory. The most extensive literal fragment of the works of Democritus which deals with the problem¹⁶² distinguishes between two types of *γνώμη*, a word which it is difficult to render in English, since, like the German word *Erkenntnis*, it means both knowledge as something which one has and the process of grasping the truth. The first kind of *γνώμη* is called "dark" and is identified with the five senses of vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. The second is called "genuine" and described as coming in where the senses are no longer able to go *ἐπὶ λεπτότερον*. This is a clear distinction between sensual perception and another and superior organ of knowledge. But the nature of this superiority is expressed in somewhat ambiguous terms; for the true contrast to "genuine" would be "spurious" (*νόθος*). In consequence, it remains uncertain whether Democritus means to say that the first *γνώμη* is false or merely that it is imperfect, though the *ἐπὶ λεπτότερον* seems to support the second interpretation.

The second largest fragment¹⁶³ is a brief dialogue between the *φρήν* and the senses, in which the *φρήν* says: *νόμῳ χροῖή, νόμῳ γλυκύ, νόμῳ πικρόν, ἐπεὶ δ' ἄτομα καὶ κενόν*, while the senses answer: *τάλαινα φρήν, παρ' ἡμέων λαβούσα τὰς πίστεις ἡμέας κατα-*

its apperception as a whole is merely a subjective product of our organs of knowledge must be omitted from the discussion, since we have no evidence concerning Leucippus' views on this problem, if he considered it at all.

¹⁶⁰ For a more detailed discussion see von Fritz, *Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck bei Demokrit, Platon und Aristoteles*, pp. 12 ff.

¹⁶¹ The enthusiastic spirit of investigation inherent in this vast program is also beautifully expressed in the words *βούλεσθαι μάλλον μίαν εἰρεῖν αἰτιολογίαν ἢ τὴν ἱερῶν οἱ βασιλείαν γενέσθαι* (B118).

¹⁶² B11: *γνώμη δὲ δύο εἶναι ὁμοίαι, ἡ μὲν γρησὶν, ἡ δὲ σκοτὶς καὶ σκοτὶς μὲν τὰς συνήματα, ὄψις, ἀκοή, ὀσμή, γεύσις, ψαψίς . . . ὅταν ἡ σκοτὶς μηκέτι δύνηται μήτε ὁρᾶν ἐπ' ἑαυτὸν μήτε ἀκούειν μήτε δυνάσθαι μήτε γεύεσθαι μήτε ἐν τῇ ψαύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ λεπτότερον . . .* The rest of the sentence is lost. Diels suggests the following continuation: *ὡς ἔργειν, τότε ἐπιγίνεται ἡ γρησὶς ὅτε ὄργανον ἔχουσα τοῦ νόου λεπτότερον*.

¹⁶³ B125; cf. also B9.

βάλλεις; πτώμά τοι τὸ κατὰβλημα. Here, then, the second kind of γνώμη is called φρήν, a term which, though originally of a different connotation, had become more and more synonymous with νοῦς.¹⁶⁴ Νόμω, which ordinarily is contrasted with φύσει, usually means "by convention," but it means also what is made by man in contrast to that which is produced by nature and, finally, what is valid only within the circle or group which abides by the convention, in contrast to that which is valid everywhere because it is in the nature of things. In the fragment quoted, however, again the opposite with which it is contrasted is not the usual one, but ἐτεῖ, an adverbial expression derived from ἐτεός, which, in the earliest passages in which it occurs, means the truth of a statement, a prophecy, or the like.¹⁶⁵ There is, therefore, again the same ambiguity, due to the fact that the decisive terms do not appear with their usual opposites. But just as in the first fragment one of the two possible interpretations of the contrast is stressed by the further elaboration of the relation between the two kinds of γνώμη, so here again the answer of the αἰσθήσεις seems to lead to the conclusion that the inferior γνώμη is not entirely false or spurious, as the contrast to ἐτεῖ and γνησίῃ would suggest, but merely less clear and hence imperfect. This interpretation is confirmed by the tradition that Democritus praised the formula of Anaxagoras ὅψις τῶν ἀδῆλων τὰ φαινόμενα,¹⁶⁶ for this statement seems to say¹⁶⁷ that the truth is hidden (ἀδῆλον) but that it can be "seen" in the φαινόμενα, that is, in that which appears to the senses; from which one may conclude that

in some way it is hidden in the φαινόμενα and that hence the φαινόμενα do contain the truth, though in an obscured form.

A difficulty, however, is created by a number of fragments which seem to show that Democritus was rather an agnostic. These fragments are the following: B6: γιγνώσκειν τε χρὴ ἄνθρωπον τῷδε τῷ κανόνι, ὅτι ἐτεῖς ἀπῆλλακται; B7: δηλοῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὅτι ἐτεῖ οὐδὲν ἴσμεν περὶ οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἐπιρυσμῆ ἐκάστοισιν ἡ δόξις; B8: καίτοι δηλον ἔσται, ὅτι ἐτεῖ οἶον ἕκαστον γιγνώσκειν ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἐστί; B9: ἡμεῖς δὲ τῷ μὲν ἔοντι οὐδὲν ἀτρεκές συνίμεν, μεταπίπτον δὲ κατὰ τε σώματος διαθήκην καὶ τῶν ἐπεισιόντων καὶ τῶν ἀντιστηριζόντων; B10: ἐτεῖ μὲν νυν ὅτι οἶον ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἐστιν οὐ συνίμεν, πολλαχῇ δεδήλωται; and, finally, Aristotle's statement¹⁶⁸ that Democritus had said ἦτοι οὐθὲν εἶναι ἀληθές ἢ ἡμῖν γ' ἀδῆλον.

The last of these statements has been brilliantly explained by Kapp,¹⁶⁹ who showed that Aristotle, when quoting the statement in connection with his discussion of Protagoras' famous principle,¹⁷⁰ did not mean to say that Democritus agreed with Protagoras but rather that he used the fundamental observation from which Protagoras started in order to draw from it the opposite conclusion. Protagoras had said that all φαινόμενα are equally true. Democritus answers: Either nothing is true, or the truth is not manifest to us. But to him this undoubtedly meant that there is a truth which is not manifest, which means that it is hidden and difficult to find. Otherwise, his whole atomistic system would be without meaning. In this respect, therefore, Democritus returns to the old conviction of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, etc., all of whom had believed that there

¹⁶⁴ See above, pp. 16 and 18.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. *Il.* ii. 300; xv. 53; xx. 255; etc.

¹⁶⁶ Anaxagoras B21a (Diels); cf. Democritus A111.

¹⁶⁷ For the interpretation of Anaxagoras' formula see H. Diller in *Hermes*, LXVII (1932), 14-42, and Kapp's criticism, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

¹⁶⁸ *Metaph.* Γ. 5. 1009 b. 11; cf. *Dem.* A112.

¹⁶⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 165.

¹⁷⁰ See above, p. 22.

is an absolute truth but that this truth is hidden (*ἀδελον*).

Part of the other fragments quoted can be explained on the same principle. But some of them contain another element which is not covered by Kapp's explanation and which is of very great importance for the problem of the relation of *αἰσθησις* and *νοῦς* or *φρόνη* in Democritus' theory. His repeated statements that "man" is far removed from truth or that we do not understand truly how everything is in reality, "because opinion for everybody is what is formed"¹⁷¹ in his mind (by the atoms which move in it or into it)," cannot, like similar statements of Heraclitus, Parmenides, etc., simply mean that the common crowd is ignorant, while the philosopher knows the truth. The older philosophers never say "we" in a statement of this kind, and Democritus could not assume that he alone was exempt from the common law that the atoms form in our organs of perception various shapes which are not always a true image of the real things outside ourselves.

Democritus' theory of sensual perception, of which Theophrastus has left us a rather extensive report,¹⁷² shows clearly that, in his opinion, one has to distinguish two aspects of the question.¹⁷³ There can, he believes, be no doubt that, in the "real" world, nothing exists but the atoms and the empty space between them and that the atoms, when penetrating into our organs of perception, evoke there those images which most of us erroneously believe to be true pictures of the "real" world outside ourselves. But while we are mistaken when we believe that colors,

smells, tastes, etc., are qualities of the "real" things, we can, from the nature of these subjective sensations, draw definite conclusions not only concerning the shape and motion of the atoms causing them but also, to some extent, concerning the internal structure and composition of the compounds from which those atoms have emanated. So far, and in this sense, it can then truly be said that the hidden truth is nevertheless *in* the phenomena and that sensual perception gives an "obscured" picture, but still a picture, of the "real" world. *But*—and this is the second aspect of the question—while all this is true *in general*, it does not permit us to draw exact and reliable conclusions concerning the actual structure of any object with which we are confronted in any individual instance;¹⁷⁴ for a person might be lacking in those atoms or combinations of atoms which had to be affected for the subjective impression of certain colors, smells, etc., to arise. In this case the person's view of the surrounding world or objects would inevitably be defective and distorted. Or, on the other hand, images, seemingly of external objects, might arise when the organs are affected by atoms which had not come from the outside but had already existed in the person. This would be the case especially when such atoms, by chance, formed a compound similar in shape to well-known objects of the external world. In this case the conclusion from the image to the existence of a corresponding object outside the person would naturally be erroneous and unfounded. While, therefore, a certain and definite knowledge concerning the general structure of the external world is possible and also a general knowledge concerning the structure of objects causing certain sensations, the specific conclusions concerning the presence and

¹⁷¹ Concerning the interpretation of the term *εἰσρομή* see Kapp, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

¹⁷² *De sensu* 49–82; cf. Dem. A135 (Diels).

¹⁷³ It is, of course, not possible within this article to discuss Democritus' theory of sense-perception in detail. But the accuracy of most of the following statements can easily be checked by a perusal of Theophrastus' report (see the preceding note).

¹⁷⁴ This is the meaning of *κακόν* in B8 and B10.

structure of specific objects at a given moment, which we are accustomed to draw, are always uncertain. This is the meaning of Democritus' "agnostic" statements.

The analysis given so far makes it possible to determine accurately the relation between *αἰσθησις* and *νόος* in Democritus' theory of knowledge. The identity of *φρήν*, as it appears in the dialogue between *φρήν* and *αἰσθησις*,¹⁷⁵ with *νόος* could be inferred from the general synonymy of the two terms in the philosophical writings of Democritus' period if it was not directly attested by B129.¹⁷⁶ It is also clear that the *φρήν* or *νόος* gets the material for its knowledge from the senses but clarifies and corrects what the senses offer it and by doing so attains a knowledge of the finer, that is, atomic, structure of the external world, a knowledge of great accuracy as far as the general structure of this world is concerned but less accurate and reliable in the individual case.

How does the *νόος* or *φρήν* achieve this? Kapp¹⁷⁷ formulates it this way: "Thought has no way of its own to the truth. The truth is in the *φαινόμενα*. But thought is not content with the phenomena. It criticizes them and contents itself only after it *has made something* which satisfies thought and at the same time is in agreement with the phenomena." This is an admirable description of the process as envisaged by Democritus. But it is not quite sufficient for the present purpose, since we have also to know how the *νόος* makes this something, even if, in trying to answer this question, we have to take the risk of going beyond Democritus' own awareness of what he was doing. There can be hardly any doubt that two very different elements are involved in the process. On the one hand, there are the ab-

stract deductions from "a priori" concepts, which lead to the conclusion that there can be nothing but empty space and filled space and which, if the attempt is made to reconcile this result with the evidence of the phenomenal world, lead to the further assumption that the filled space exists in the form of innumerable very small indivisible and indestructible particles moving around in the empty space. On the other hand, there is the attempt to determine the shape and the character of the motion of the atoms which cause the various kinds of sensations. This attempt operates obviously with a different kind of "reasoning." If Democritus, for instance, affirms¹⁷⁸ that the bitter taste is caused by small, smooth atoms with a rounded surface with bends (but not sharp corners) and then adds that for this reason the bitter taste has something sticky (*γλισχρόν*) and glue-like (*κολλῶδες*), one can reconstruct his process of thinking in about the following way: The bitter taste has a sticky or glue-like character. Hence it must be caused by atoms of which glue could consist. Glue is sticky. Hence the atoms must have such a shape that, though being absolutely rigid, they will easily cling together. Hence the bends in their surface which may fit into one another. But glue is also liquid. Hence the atoms must easily change their position in relation to one another, and therefore they must have rounded bends and a smooth surface.

What, then, does the mind do when going through this complicated process? First, the taste-sensation of bitter is replaced by the similar or correlated touch-sensation of stickiness.¹⁷⁹ The reason is obviously that this latter sensation, or

¹⁷⁵ A135. 66.

¹⁷⁷ Possibly the reduction of bitterness to stickiness is partly due to the fact that gall was considered the bitter-tasting substance *κατ' ἐξοχήν* and that gall is a sticky substance.

¹⁷⁶ B9; see also above, p. 27.

¹⁷⁸ *Ἐπεὶ θεῖα νόοντα.*

¹⁷⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 167.

rather the objects causing it, lend themselves more easily to an analysis in terms of "atomistic mechanics." Then the substances causing the touch-sensation of stickiness are studied. Both the sense of touch and the sense of vision indicate that "substances" causing the sensation of stickiness are either liquid or semiliquid and that, nevertheless, their parts stick together and also stick to other objects. Since a priori deductions have led to the conclusion that what appears as a "substance" to the senses is in reality a compound of very small particles which are absolutely space-filling and rigid and differ from one another only through their shape (and motion), the question is then asked what sort of solid and rigid particles of visible size, if put together, would have approximately the same properties (of clinging together and to other objects, yet changing their relative position to one another easily, as liquids do) which are characteristic of gluey substances. Since it is found that particles with a smooth surface and rounded bends come nearest to this requirement (for particles with sharp hooks, if interlaced, would hold together more rigidly, and spheric particles with a smooth surface would not hang together at all), the conclusion is drawn that the gluey substances and hence all substances of bitter taste consist of invisible particles of this shape.

The process, then, which leads to the reconstruction of a particular section of the real but invisible world of which we obtain an "obscure" knowledge in sense-perception seems to include at least the following elements: (1) the presence of the most fundamental a priori concepts of "to be," "not to be," space, etc.; (2) deductions from analytical judgments based on these concepts and from the evidence of motion in the phenomenal world; (3) a study of the correlated testimony of the

senses concerning specific objects; (4) various inferences on the basis of analogy; and (5) the search for models in the visible world which satisfy certain conditions derived from 1, 2, 3, and 4 and which, therefore, again by analogy, can be used for the determination of the shape of their assumed correlates in the invisible world. Whatever additional elements may enter the process, there can be hardly any doubt that the activity of the *φρήν* or *νοῦς* in Democritus' philosophy¹⁸⁰ does not exclusively consist of inductive and deductive reasoning in the traditional sense but is much more complex. How far Democritus himself was conscious of, or reflected on, these various elements in his thinking we have no means of finding out. It is, however, sufficient for our purpose to ascertain their presence.

CONCLUSION

With this analysis of Democritus' concept of *νοῦς* and *νοεῖν*, the main task of the present inquiry can be considered completed.¹⁸¹ It remains to draw some general conclusions. If one tries to determine the main changes which the meaning of the terms *νοῦς* and *νοεῖν* underwent in the course of the philosophical speculations of the pre-Socratics, as compared with the meaning or meanings of the same terms in Homer and Hesiod, two facts stand out most clearly: (1) In contrast to early Greek usage in which the *νόος*, whatever its special function in a given case

¹⁸⁰ Apart from the function of the *νοῦς* in Democritus' theory of knowledge, *νόος*, *νοεῖν*, and derivatives, like *νόημα*, appear also not infrequently in Democritus' ethical fragments. But the meaning there is mostly either "practical wisdom," which has its origin in the Homeric use of *φρόνις*, or the wisdom which distinguished the wise man from the common crowd, a meaning which was developed in early pre-Socratic philosophy. These passages, therefore, do not add anything strikingly new to the history of the term.

¹⁸¹ A few odds and ends which still remain may better be taken up later, when the main results of the inquiry have been stated (see below, p. 32).

may be, always has to do with specific situations, in Greek philosophy almost from the very beginning it becomes the main function of the *νοῦς* to discover the "real" world or the "real" character of the world as a whole, in contrast to the erroneous beliefs of most human beings. But what is new in this usage is not that the *νοῦς* penetrates beyond surface appearances and discovers the real truth—for this was also one of the functions of the *νόος* in Homer—but the belief that the world is altogether different from what people in general believe it to be. (2) In Homer and Hesiod, *ἰδεῖν*, which properly designates the sense of vision, can also be used for the recognition and identification of objects and even for the realization of a situation.¹⁸² The use of the term *νοεῖν*, on the other hand, seems originally to have been limited to the latter case but was, even as early as Homer, extended to "planning" and to "the flight of the imagination."¹⁸³ Yet with all this, its field was still rather narrowly circumscribed. In pre-Socratic philosophy, on the contrary, especially after Parmenides,¹⁸⁴ the part assigned to *ἰδεῖν* and the other senses is ever more narrowly defined, while at the same time the domain assigned to *νοῦς* and *νοεῖν* is enormously enlarged. In the course of this process, *νοῦς* becomes synonymous with *φρόνη*, *μῆτις*, *μέριμνα* and, to some extent, with *γνώμη*,¹⁸⁵ *νοεῖν* with *φρονεῖν*, *μητρίσθαι*, and, to some extent, with *γιγνώσκειν*.¹⁸⁵ This means that, at

the end of the process, *νοῦς* and *νοεῖν* cover not only all the meanings which they had had in Homer but also all the meanings originally belonging to those other words¹⁸⁶ and, in addition, designate some further functions of the mind for which no specific terms existed in Homer and Hesiod because they were not specifically reflected upon. The most important additions of this latter kind are: (1) the intuition by which Heraclitus is aware of the hidden harmony behind the apparent contrasts and conflicts which to the common crowd mean ultimate reality;¹⁸⁷ (2) the logical deductions by which Parmenides arrives at his conclusions and the direct contact with ultimate reality which, in his philosophy, is characteristic of the *νόος* even when it errs;¹⁸⁸ (3) in the philosophy of Empedocles, the direct perception of Love and Hate in the external world through the response which these emotional agents engender in ourselves;¹⁸⁹ and (4) the complicated processes by which Democritus tries to attain a picture of ultimate reality.¹⁹⁰ In the fourth century the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle were to make still further very important additions of this kind.

In spite of all this, the preceding analysis has shown that, as long as one concentrates on those fragments which have come down to us in their original wording, it is quite possible to determine with considerable accuracy what the terms *νοῦς* and *νοεῖν* mean in every individual instance; for, though the early philosophers used the terms with many meanings, they always knew exactly what they had in mind. But it is also easy to see that the enormous variety of meanings covered by

¹⁸² See Part I, CP, XL, 223.

¹⁸³ See *ibid.*, p. 225.

¹⁸⁴ Before Parmenides and in the philosophy of Parmenides himself, the narrowing-down of the concept of *ἰδεῖν* and of the functions ascribed to the other senses is foreshadowed by the fact that the senses play only a very minor role in the discussion of the origin of human knowledge and error (see above, p. 12).

¹⁸⁵ *Γνώμη*, while no longer distinguished from *νοῦς* in the same way as *γιγνώσκειν* is from *νοεῖν* in Homer, is sometimes used by Democritus as the larger concept covering both sense-perception and *νοεῖν* (see above, p. 26).

¹⁸⁶ This is true even of the original meaning of *γνώμη* and *γιγνώσκειν*; for the extended meaning of these terms belongs to a later period.

¹⁸⁷ See Part I, CP, XL, 223.

¹⁸⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 241.

¹⁸⁹ See above, p. 20.

¹⁹⁰ See above, p. 30.

the same terms could hardly fail to create a good deal of confusion in the interpretation of early Greek philosophy by later authors, both ancient and modern; for the interpretations attempted by these later authors were naturally conditioned by the specific meanings which the terms *νοῦς* and *νοεῖν* acquired in later philosophical systems. The problem was further complicated by the fact that Hellenistic philosophy replaced the contrast between *νοῦς* and *αἴσθησις*, which is characteristic of the latest stage of pre-Socratic philosophy, by the contrast of *λόγος* and *αἴσθησις*.

Since a complete history of the misinterpretations caused by this situation could easily fill a book and is therefore outside the scope of the present article, it must suffice to give two illustrations drawn from examples which have already been touched upon. In the philosophy of Theophrastus, who is influenced by Plato and Aristotle, the concept of *νοῦς* had again been narrowed as against its widest extension in late fifth-century philosophy. Consequently, since Theophrastus, too, thinks in terms of the simple alternative *νοῦς* and *αἴσθησις*, the field of *αἴσθησις* is enlarged and covers any perception or understanding of individual objects, qualities, or even events, in space and time, whether it be sense-perception in the narrower sense or not. Therefore, when he finds that Parmenides ascribes the error which divides reality into the contrasts of warm and cold, etc., to the *νόος* and that Empedocles attributes the perception of love by love and hate by hate also to *φρονεῖν*, he naturally comes to the erroneous conclusion that these philosophers considered *αἴσθησις* and *νοεῖν* or *φρονεῖν* as the same thing,¹⁹¹ "or something very similar."¹⁹² Yet if one refers everything

to his frame of reference, his interpretation does not go completely astray and can still contribute something to an understanding of the original thought of these philosophers. This is different with Sextus Empiricus, who stubbornly tries to uphold the identity of *λόγος* and *νοῦς* and, since this identification is quite impossible if one takes *λόγος* in the sense which it had acquired in Hellenistic philosophy and *νοῦς* in its pre-Socratic meanings, ends in utter confusion.¹⁹³

During the last few decades the interpretation of pre-Socratic philosophy has made very great progress. But it has not overcome the difficulty altogether. This difficulty can be overcome only by a careful analysis of the history of the terminology. The present article is intended to be a first attempt in this direction—an attempt, which, like all first attempts, is still very imperfect.

In conclusion it is perhaps permissible to make application of the results obtained to some special problems which have been omitted from the previous discussion. As pointed out above,¹⁹⁴ Gorgias' contention that nothing exists, etc.—if divested of its deliberately paradoxical form—is nothing but a confirmation of Protagoras' opinion that man is the measure of all things and that it makes no sense to speak of something which *really* exists and which yet is totally different from the world which we experience. If one interprets Gorgias' famous work in this way, his second point—that, if something existed, it would not be accessible to our knowledge—is merely a different way of formulating the essential meaning of his first contention. But there is one interesting deviation from Protagoras' argumentation. He does not, like Protagoras, use sense-perceptions as examples but *φρονεῖν*.

¹⁹¹ *De sensu* 3 and 10; see also Part I, *CP*, XL, 240; and above, p. 21.

¹⁹² *De sensu* 10.

¹⁹³ See Part I, *CP*, XL, 234 f.

¹⁹⁴ See p. 24 and Gorgias B3 (Diels).

He first shows that things which do not exist, for instance, a wagon driven across the sea or monsters like Scylla and Charybdis, are objects of *φρονεῖν*. Then he concludes that, since that which is an object of *φρονεῖν* does not exist, that which exists is not an object of *φρονεῖν*. If taken without any further qualification, this is an obvious logical fallacy; and since the Sophists liked to play with their arguments, the conclusion was in all likelihood intentionally expressed in this ambiguous form. But if taken as a counterargument against philosophers who, like Anaxagoras and Democritus, contended that Protagoras might to some extent be right in what he said about sensations like warm and cold but that the *φρήν* nevertheless did have access to the reality behind the phenomena, it raised a serious difficulty.

Democritus has obviously struggled with this difficulty. He tried to overcome it by the theory that even the illusions of a dazed or an insane man were caused by atoms which belong to the "real world," though in a given individual case we could never be quite sure whether the combinations of atoms which provoke a certain image in our mind had come from outside ourselves or had been formed in our intellectual organs or whether, if they came from bodies outside ourselves, these bodies had exactly the structure indicated by the images caused by the atoms emanating from them. Yet, he contended, it was always possible within certain limits to draw a conclusion from a sensation to the form of the atoms causing it.¹⁹⁵ On the linguistic side it is perhaps interesting to observe that Gorgias uses *φρονεῖν* in the sense of "to imagine." He could do so because in the philosophical terminology of his period the synonyms *νοεῖν* and *φρονεῖν*

covered any intellectual function that was not sense-perception in the narrowest sense of the word.

While Gorgias' use of the term *φρονεῖν* would make it possible to determine with considerable accuracy the time in which he lived, even if we did not know it otherwise, the opposite is true of the most famous of all the sentences in which the word *νοῦς* occurs—Epicharmus' *νοῦς ὁρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τὰλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά*.¹⁹⁶ Much has been written about his adherence to a specific philosophical system as revealed in this sentence. But the preceding analysis has shown that, disregarding the Sophists, Protagoras and Gorgias, there was not a philosopher from Xenophanes to Democritus who could not have indorsed it, though none of them would probably have done so without adding some further explanation. The sentence is also in harmony with the Homeric concept of *νῆος*. It goes beyond Homer only in so far as it requires some philosophical reflection. But that is all that can be said about it.

In another instance, however, a definite chronological conclusion of some interest can be drawn. An extract from a work of Alexander Polyhistor (who lived in the time of Sulla) in Diog. Laert. viii. 30 says that the Pythagoreans divided the human soul into three parts—*θυμός*, *νοῦς*, and *φρένες*—and contended that *θυμός* and *νοῦς* were also found in animals but *φρένες* only in human beings. This attribution of *νοῦς* to animals is certainly impossible in any philosophy influenced by Platonic thought. But the division is also uninfluenced by the identification of *φρονεῖν* and *νοεῖν*,¹⁹⁷ which is character-

¹⁹⁵ B12 (Diels).

¹⁹⁷ The last pre-Socratic philosophers who, within our knowledge, distinguished clearly between *νῆος* and *φρήν* are Xenophanes and Heraclitus (see Part I, CP, XL, 229 and 232). The complete synonymy of the two terms can be proved only for the second half of the fifth century.

¹⁹⁶ See above, p. 28, and the fragment on *ἀλλοφρονεῖν* (A101).

istic of Greek philosophy in the second half of the fifth century, and by the distinction of *νοῦς* and *αἰσθησις*. It is, on the other hand, in perfect agreement with Homeric terminology; for an animal can certainly have *νοῦς* in the sense of the ability to realize, for instance, the danger of a situation, while it may not be credited with rational action, which is the function of the *φρένες* in Homer. All this, together with the fact that the terms *φρόν* and *φρένες* disappear from Greek prose after the first half of the fourth century, shows that it is hardly possible to place the ori-

gin of the doctrine later than the first half of the fifth century. It follows that Alexander's account, even though some of its parts show the influence of later philosophical terminology, does contain elements of genuine early Pythagorean doctrine and is not so worthless as Zeller and many other scholars have assumed.

A fortiori, it follows that Pythagorean philosophy was not entirely the invention of early Platonists and late Greek mystics, as some scholars seem to believe.

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ROMAN REVENUES FROM GREECE AFTER 146 B.C.

H. HILL

THE ancient evidence relating to the revenues which Rome drew from Greece after the Achaean War is both scanty and obscure, with the result that modern accounts of those revenues show wide divergences.¹ Recently, however, two authoritative works have appeared, which, in this matter, agree in general that, as one of them says, "taxes were imposed on many and probably most of the communities that opposed the Romans [in the Achaean War]."² As there is, therefore, a distinct possibility that the version they give will be generally adopted, it may be worth while to point out that, though it is attractive, it is not definitive, since the evidence on which it is based is capable of being differently interpreted.

The argument which follows is based on the following general assumptions about Roman provincial revenues. These revenues fall into two main types—tribute and rents. Tribute might be either a fixed amount, whether in cash or in kind (*stipendium*) or a *pars quota* in the form of tithes (*decumae*). Rents were drawn from property of various kinds—land, mines, forests, harbors,³ etc.—owned by the Roman state. Second, there was an im-

portant difference in the methods of collection. The fixed tribute (*stipendium*) was paid directly to the Roman treasury, and its collection was the responsibility of the provincial governments. All other forms of revenue, whether tithes or rents, except the tithes of Sicily, were collected by *publicani* holding contracts from the Roman censors (*ensoria locatio*).⁴

Both forms of revenue—tribute and rents—are attested for Greece, and they will be discussed in turn. First, as to tribute: there were three occasions on which the Romans might have imposed tribute on Greece—after the Achaean War, after the Mithridatic War of 88–85 B.C., and at the formation of the province of Achaea, usually dated in 27 B.C.

For the first occasion—146 B.C.—there is only one piece of positive evidence—the statement of Pausanias: *φóρος . . . ἐτάχθη τῇ Ἑλλάδι*⁵—and this is the basis of all modern pronouncements on the subject. Now if, as is probable but not certain,⁶ *φóρος* here does mean "tribute," the statement should mean that all the states of Greece had to pay tribute, and that is how Mommsen interpreted it. But it is well known that quite a number of Greek states paid no tribute,⁷ so that, as it stands, the statement is demonstrably false. To avoid this difficulty, modern scholars qualify the statement in various ways, by saying, for example, that the tribute was

¹ See, e.g., Mommsen, *History of Rome*, III, 271; T. Frank, *Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, I (Baltimore, 1933), 229; Benecke in *CAH*, VIII, 305; E. Pais, *Histoire romaine* (in G. Glotz [ed.], *Histoire générale*), I (Paris, 1926), 593; G. H. Stevenson, *Roman Provincial Administration* (Oxford, 1939), p. 23; H. H. Scullard, *History of the Roman World from 753 to 146 B.C.* (London, 1935), p. 305.

² Larsen in Frank, *op. cit.*, IV (1938), 307 f.; cf. M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford, 1941), pp. 748 f.

³ It is here assumed that *portoria* were a kind of rent for the use of harbors, etc. (cf. R. Cagnat, *Etude historique sur les impôts indirects* [Paris, 1882], *Intro.*).

⁴ See Frank, *op. cit.*, I, 255 f.; for Sicily see J. Carcopino, *La Loi de Hiéron* (Paris, 1914).

⁵ Paus. vii. 16. 9.

⁶ It may mean simply an "indemnity," or taxation in general, since Pausanias' use of the word is far from precise (cf. iv. 14. 4; viii. 43. 1; and viii. 52. 2).

⁷ For details see G. Niccolini, *La Confederazione achea* (Pavia, 1914), pp. 315–16.

imposed only on parts of Greece.⁸ It is this variety of qualifications that produces the above-mentioned divergences in the modern accounts; and, of course, in the absence of other positive evidence, there can be, even among those who agree that the tribute was only partial, many differences as to the parts of Greece affected.

There is, however, another way of looking at this piece of evidence. Pausanias is notoriously unreliable in historical matters,⁹ and the very fact that here he receives no support from any other ancient writer and that some seem to imply, though without actually stating it, the opposite¹⁰ should give us pause. Much more important, however, is the fact that Pausanias' statement about tribute is linked, in the same chapter, with the statement that a governor was sent to Greece after 146 B.C.—i.e., that Greece became a separate province at that date.¹¹ The latter statement is contradicted by other evidence and is now rejected.¹² But, clearly, the two statements hang together. If Pausanias believed that Greece was annexed in 146 B.C., it was natural for him to make the assumption that tribute was imposed then. If, therefore, his first assumption is incorrect, we are justified in rejecting the second also.

No other ancient writer, as has been said, gives Pausanias any support. Such passages as have been quoted as supporting him either do no such thing¹³ or refer

to the imperial period, when the status of Greece had been radically altered.¹⁴

Some scholars quote, in support of the view that tribute was imposed in 146 B.C., another passage from Pausanias himself, in which he records that Elateia, in Phocis, received from Rome a grant of ἀτέλεια for services rendered in the First Mithridatic War.¹⁵ They argue that this implies that Elateia, and even the whole of Phocis, had been paying tribute before the Mithridatic War and that the most likely period for the imposition of such tribute, would be after the Achaean War.¹⁶ Now this reasoning is based on two assumptions, both of which are open to doubt: first, that Elateia, or Phocis, fought against Rome in the Achaean War and, second, and far more important, that a grant of ἀτέλεια is proof that a state had previously been paying tribute. The first assumption is questionable because we do not know whether Elateia (or Phocis) did oppose Rome in the war.¹⁷ The second assumption is more fundamental and requires more detailed discussion. It is obvious, in the first place, that the most common occasion for the grant of immunity was not after the imposition of tribute but at the same time as the tribute was imposed, so that the case of Elateia could well be used to support the conclusion that tribute was imposed on the rest of Phocis, or of Greece as a whole, after the Mithridatic War. G. Colin has discussed the case¹⁸ and reached a different conclusion. He believes that the exemption granted to Elateia was not from any regular tribute but from the extraordinary

⁸ See, e.g., Frank, *op. cit.*, I, 229; Larsen, *op. cit.*, 307–8, 322–23; CAH, *loc. cit.*

⁹ For examples see G. Colin, *Rome et la Grèce* (Paris, 1905), pp. 476 ff.

¹⁰ Zonaras ix. 31; Polyb. xxxix. 5.

¹¹ Paus. vii. 16. 10.

¹² See, e.g., Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, p. 748; Larsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 306 f.

¹³ E.g., Cicero *Verr.* ii. 1. 55, which refers merely to the victory of Mummius in the Achaean War and has nothing to do with tribute.

¹⁴ E.g., Tacitus *Ann.* i. 76, iv. 13; Pliny *NH* iv. 7–8; Strabo x. 485.

¹⁵ Paus. x. 34. 2; cf. i. 20. 6.

¹⁶ Larsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 307, 427; J. Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung*, I (Leipzig, 1873), 168 ff.

¹⁷ Relevant passages are Polyb. xxxviii. 3. 8; Paus. vii. 14. 6, 15. 5; cf. Larsen, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 645 f.

levies which were imposed on Greece from time to time by Roman generals like Sulla, Piso, or Antonius.¹⁹ Such an explanation, though possible, is hardly likely, because it is extremely doubtful whether the Roman government would, as it were, legalize levies of this kind by granting formal exemption from them. There is a third possible explanation of the grant of immunity to Elateia—that it was what may be called “prospective” immunity, i.e., exemption from taxation not yet imposed but which might be imposed at a later date. That this kind of immunity was granted by Rome is proved by cases in which immunity was granted to communities which were not yet subject to Rome at all. There are two known cases of this—Teos and Delos. An inscription from Teos,²⁰ dated 193 B.C., preserves a letter from the Roman senate to the senate and people of Teos, replying to a request that the Romans would respect their sanctuary of Dionysus. Teos was not then subject to Rome, yet we find the senate writing: *κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἱερὰν καθὼς καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν καὶ ἄστυλον καὶ ἀφορολόγητον ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων*. Delos presents us with a similar situation in 58 B.C. At that time the island was still under Athenian control and had never paid any tribute to Rome. Yet a fragmentary inscription of that year records a decision of the senate that Delos should be free of imposts—*uectigalibus leiberari*.²¹ We find the same kind of “prospective” immunity also granted to individuals.²² If we explain the immunity of Elateia in this way, we need not assume the imposition of tribute on Phocis, or Greece, either

before or immediately after the Mithridatic War.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the expression used by Pausanias about Elateia—*ἀτελῇ νέμεσθαι τὴν χώραν*—is sufficiently vague to make it at least doubtful whether the exemption granted was from tribute as distinct from other forms of impost. It may mean, quite literally, that the land of Elateia was to be left free of taxation—i.e., that none of it was to pay rent to Rome and there were to be no *portoria* or other minor taxes.

Thus the case of Elateia is quite indecisive. It can be used to support any one of the three most likely dates for the imposition of tribute on Greece, or it may have nothing whatever to do with tribute in the strict sense.

There is, then, no reliable evidence as to when tribute was imposed on Greece except that which relates to the imperial period. It is probably safer, therefore, to connect the imposition of tribute with the creation of the separate province of Achaea.

The second part of our investigation concerns the other type of Roman revenues—rents. Here again the evidence is scanty and, in some cases, open to more than one interpretation.

For mines and *portoria* in Greece there is practically no information.²³ There is, however, evidence that, in the last century of the Republic, Rome owned land in Corinth, Boeotia, and Euboea. Larsen and Rostovtzeff, in the works already frequently quoted, agree in assuming that this was all confiscated as a result of the Achaean War,²⁴ but, except in the case of Corinth, the date of the confiscations is a matter on which opinions may differ.

¹⁹ For these levies see especially Larsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 291–92, 425 f., 440–41, 453–55; Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, pp. 947, 951, 986–89.

²⁰ *IG*, 3045 = Dittenberger, *Syll.*³, 601.

²¹ P. Roussel, *Délos, colonie athénienne*, pp. 333 f.

²² See the *senatus consultum de Asclepiade*, below, p. 40.

²³ For mines see Larsen, *op. cit.*, p. 462; for *portoria*, Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, p. 988; cf. below, p. 39.

²⁴ Larsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 307, 365; Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, p. 748; cf. Colin, *op. cit.*, p. 645; Marquardt, *op. cit.*, I, 168.

That the territory of Corinth was confiscated in 146 B.C., when the city was destroyed, is well attested. It is stated by Zonaras²⁵ and confirmed by references to the *ager Corinthius*, subsequently, as an important part of the *ager publicus* of Rome.²⁶ There is, however, one point about this land which needs clarification. Strabo tells us that the people of Sicyon "held" (ἔσχον) the majority of it. It has been stated, on his authority, that Rome "gave" this land to Sicyon,²⁷ which implies that she exacted no rent for it. This is hardly likely. The importance of the *ager Corinthius* for the Roman treasury in the later Republic indicates that it was of considerable extent and its revenues large.²⁸ Therefore, it is more probable that the portion held by Sicyon was held on lease and paid rent to Rome. The decision to lease it to a community rather than to individuals would make collection of the rent easier and fits well the politics of a period when the senate was still trying to limit, as much as possible, the activities of the *publicani*.²⁹

For confiscations in Boeotia and Euboea the evidence is less decisive and needs fuller discussion.

BOEOTIA

The Boeotians are said by the Epitomator of Livy³⁰ to have helped the Achaeans against Rome, and Cicero tells us that Mummius "subdued many cities of

Boeotia."³¹ Of these the most important was Thebes, and the same *Epitome* of Livy adds the information that Thebes, along with Chalcis in Euboea, suffered the same fate as Corinth. The well-known *senatus consultum de Oropiis* of 73 B.C. reveals Roman *publicani* at work in Boeotia.³² On this evidence it is asserted that, in 146 B.C., Rome confiscated "the territory of Thebes and probably the whole of Boeotia."³³

The assumption about Thebes is presumably made on the analogy of Corinth. It is, however, known that Thebes was not destroyed, as Corinth was, and the punishment imposed on her and on Chalcis was probably merely the dismantling of their fortifications.³⁴ That her territory was confiscated is completely contradicted by the accounts of the action of Sulla after the battle of Orchomenus. Sulla, we are told, having forcibly borrowed the temple treasures of Delphi, Epidaurus, and Olympia on a promise to replace them later, repaid the debt by confiscating half the territory of Thebes and dedicating it to Apollo and Zeus, ordering its revenues to be paid to the temples concerned.³⁵ Now if the territory of Thebes was *ager publicus* already, Sulla could hardly "confiscate" it—the word used by both Plutarch and Pausanias is ἀποτέμνεσθαι. Moreover, we are told that this action was taken by Sulla as a means of punishing Thebes for her hostile attitude in the Mithridatic War. Had the land handed over to the temples been Roman property, the loss of revenue would have fallen on Rome, not on Thebes. The step might even have

²⁵ Zon. ix. 31.

²⁶ Cicero *Leg. ag.* 1. 5, ii. 51; Pseudo-Victor *De vir.* iii. 73; Strabo viii. 381; *Lex agr.* 96 f. *ap.* Bruns, *Font.*, I¹, 88, No. 11.

²⁷ Larsen, *op. cit.*, pp. 308, 312; Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, p. 748.

²⁸ See the passages quoted in n. 26.

²⁹ Probably this action involved no financial loss to the *publicani*, since they would have the contract to collect the rent from Sicyon; but it would considerably reduce the number of their agents required in this area.

³⁰ Livy *Epit.* iii.

³¹ Cicero *Verr.* ii. 1. 55.

³² Bruns, *Font.*, I¹, 180 f., No. 42; cf. also Cicero *Nat. deor.* iii. 49.

³³ Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, p. 748; cf. Marquardt, *loc. cit.*; Larsen, *op. cit.*, p. 365.

³⁴ Larsen, *op. cit.*, p. 306; Colla, *op. cit.*, p. 625.

³⁵ Plut. *Sulla* 19; Paus. ix. 7. 4-6; cf. Appian *Mith.* 54; Diod. xxxviii. 7.

been regarded by the Thebans not as a punishment but as a change for the better, since they would naturally prefer Greek to Roman landlords. The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that the territory of Thebes remained the property of Thebes until 86 B.C., when half of it was confiscated by Sulla.

As for the *senatus consultum de Oropiis*, the first and essential point about it is that it belongs to the year 73 B.C. and deals with conditions created by Sulla after the Mithridatic War, not by Mummius or his senatorial commissioners after the Achaean War. The decree records the decision of the senate on a dispute between Oropus and some Roman *publicani*. In fulfilment of a vow, Sulla had declared certain land in the area of Oropus sacred to Amphiaras, a local deity, and had further ordered that all the revenues of Oropus be used to defray the cost of sacrifices and games in honor of the god. These facts were not in dispute, but the *publicani* challenged the legality of the arrangements on the ground that Amphiaras was not a god. In the course of the dispute, both sides quoted from a *lex locationis* (ὁ τῆς μισθώσεως νόμος) which evidently regulated the contracts for the exploitation of *ager publicus* in the neighborhood of Oropus or in Boeotia as a whole, and both agreed that it contained a specific reference to Sulla's concessions to Amphiaras.³⁶ Further, in the *instrumenta* attached to the decree, there are quotations from several of the documents involved, one of which was the *lex locationis*.³⁷ From these quotations it is clear that the contract contained both (a) a clause, apparently usually included in all such documents,³⁸ giving general exemp-

tion to all land, etc., granted to gods by either the senate or a general, and (b) a clause specifically exempting the land, etc., granted by Sulla. We are also given, in the *instrumenta*, the history of this latter clause. It arose from a decision taken by Sulla in consultation with his *consilium*; the decision was then confirmed by a decree of the senate, dated 80 B.C., and finally incorporated in the contract. It follows from this that the contract was made after 80 B.C. This does not, of course, rule out the possibility that the *lex locationis* here quoted superseded an earlier one; but it does forbid us to use this document as evidence for conditions in Boeotia in 146 B.C.

Thus the Oropian decree, together with Cicero's reference to the same dispute, proves that, in 73 B.C., Rome was drawing revenues from Boeotia and that these revenues were collected by *publicani* under a contract made after 80 B.C. The main revenue seems to have come from *ager publicus*, but there is also a reference (l. 47) to *portoria*.

On Boeotia, therefore, our conclusion must be that there is no evidence for any confiscations or imposition of taxation by Rome until the First Mithridatic War.

EUBOEIA

Just before the Achaean War, Euboean territory was ravaged by the Thebans, and Mummius ordered Thebes to pay reparations.³⁹ This, together with the fact that Cicero does not mention Euboea among the parts of Greece conquered by Mummius,⁴⁰ makes it improbable that Euboea fought on the side of Achaea and Thebes in the war. It is true that Chalcis is said by the Epitomator of Livy to have fought against Rome and to have suffered a similar fate to that of Corinth, but, as we

³⁶ Ll. 20-21, 25-26.

³⁷ Ll. 35 f.

³⁸ Suggested by Mommsen, *Hermes*, XX (1885), 275-76 = *Gesamt. Schrift.*, V, 502.

³⁹ Paus. vii. 14. 7; 16. 10.

⁴⁰ Cicero *Verr.* ii. 1. 55.

have seen in the case of Thebes, the latter statement, at least, is incorrect.⁴¹ Like Thebes, Chalcis probably merely had her fortifications dismantled and, if no confiscations were made from Thebes, the same is probably true of Chalcis. Certainly, we have no evidence of any such confiscations. In any case, the action of Chalcis would not necessarily involve the rest of Euboea in the war.⁴²

As evidence for the existence of *ager publicus* in Euboea, two documents are usually quoted—Plutarch *Sulla* 23, and the *senatus consultum de Asclepiade* of 78 B.C.⁴³ As in the case of Boeotia, it is noteworthy that both these documents relate to the time of the Mithridatic War and after. Plutarch, quoting Sulla's *Memoirs*, records that, before the Peace of Dardanus, Sulla gave 10,000 *plethra* of land in Euboea to Archelaus. From this it is assumed that this land must have been *ager publicus* and must have been confiscated before the Mithridatic War, i.e., probably in 146 B.C. Neither of these assumptions is necessarily true. Sulla was, at this time, acting independently of the home government, so that the land he gave to Archelaus was probably what he had himself seized. There is no lack of evidence of seizures and requisitions of every kind made by Sulla at this period.⁴⁴ Even if he be regarded as technically representing Rome and the land he seized be reckoned, therefore, as *ager publicus*, the probabilities are that it was land he had taken during the war and not land which had been *ager publicus* since 146 B.C. This passage

of Plutarch, therefore, is not evidence for the existence of *ager publicus* in Euboea before the Mithridatic War.

The *senatus consultum de Asclepiade* is a much more important piece of evidence. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to interpret because it related to both Euboea and Asia and its terms, therefore, are necessarily and deliberately vague to fit the varying conditions in the two areas. We must again emphasize the fact that, whatever interpretation be placed on it, the document belongs to 78 B.C., after the Mithridatic War. The conditions it reveals, therefore, cannot be assumed to have been in existence before that war.

One of the three beneficiaries of this decree was Polystratus of Carystus in Euboea, the other two being from Asia. For services to Rome, they and their descendants were to be exempted from all taxation, both local and Roman, including any taxes that might be imposed in the future. In reference to Roman taxation the decree runs: "[magistrat]us nostri quei quomque Asiam Euboeam locabunt vectigalve Asiae [Euboeae imponent, eurent ne quid ei dare debeant]."⁴⁵ Here there are two points which need explanation—the precise meanings of *locabunt* (Greek *μισθῶσιν*) and of *vectigal* (Greek *προσόδους*). The former is clearly a reference to *ensoria locatio*, and *Asiam Euboeam locabunt* means simply "let contracts in Asia and Euboea." The expression is deliberately vague, as has been pointed out above, in order to cover conditions which probably differed in the two areas. Such contracts, as we have seen, could be of two kinds—for the collection of either tithes or rents. As Asia normally paid both tithes and rents, the expression *Asiam locabunt* could refer to either tithe-contracts or rent-contracts or both; but the very vagueness

⁴¹ Livy *Epit.* III; cf., above, p. 38.

⁴² It is even possible that Chalcis herself did not fight. The destruction of her fortifications may have been carried out as a precaution, because of her strategic importance. The statement that she fought against Rome would then be a false assumption from the action taken after the war.

⁴³ Bruns, *Font.*, I, 176 ff., No. 41.

⁴⁴ See, above, n. 19.

⁴⁵ L. 6.

of the expression forbids us to draw the conclusion that both tithes and rents were also drawn from Euboea. There is no evidence that the Asiatic tithe system was used anywhere outside Asia Minor, and very little for its existence outside the province of Asia;⁴⁶ and it would be hazardous in the extreme to assume that it existed in Euboea without very much stronger evidence than this single vague expression.

As it happens, however, there is good reason to believe that there is no reference to tithes, even in Asia, in this document. Conditions in Asia in 78 B.C. were far from normal. Sulla had recently done away with the tithe-contracts and had instituted a system of tribute-collection which apparently did not involve the letting of contracts at Rome.⁴⁷ Therefore, in 78 B.C., *Asiam locabunt* would refer only to contracts for the collection of rents, etc., and the same would apply to Euboea.⁴⁸

As for *vectigal*, it, too, is a vague word and again deliberately so, since the senate no doubt wished to exempt the men concerned from any and every type of taxation which might be imposed on Asia or Euboea in the future. This decree, therefore, supports the view that, in 78 B.C., Rome was either drawing or about to draw revenues from Euboea in the form of rents. There is nothing in it, however, to

indicate when the property concerned was confiscated. As we have seen, Euboea, with the possible exception of Chalcis, does not seem to have fought against Rome in the Achaean War, and we do not know of anything in her behavior toward Rome between then and the Mithridatic War which could cause Rome to make confiscations there. During the Mithridatic War, however, Euboea had been a base for the forces of Mithridates, and it is thus quite likely that, after the war, the Romans decided to keep her in subjection by confiscating part of her territory and perhaps controlling her harbors through *portoria*, which would require Roman agents to be stationed there.

The conclusions reached in this article may be summarized as follows: there is no decisive evidence that tribute, either tithes or *stipendium*, was exacted from Greece before the foundation of the province of Achaëa, which is the most likely occasion for its imposition. Rome's only revenue from Greece after the Achaean War appears to have been the rents of the *ager Corinthius*. Further confiscations of land were made in Boeotia and Euboea as a result of the First Mithridatic War, and there may also have been revenue from *portoria* about the same time. No certainty is claimed for these conclusions, and, indeed, the main purpose of the investigation has been to indicate that, with the evidence available, certainty is impossible. We may perhaps point out, however, that the picture of events in Greece which we get from the arguments set out above is in full accord with what we know of Roman policy in the period concerned.

It has frequently been stated that Rome's treatment of Greece was, on the whole, surprisingly generous. Those who deny this impugn the sincerity of Polyb-

⁴⁶ The existence of tithes has been assumed in Bithynia, Cilicia, and Syria, as well as Asia, but the evidence is extremely scanty and dubious (see Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, pp. 955, 966 f., 980 f., etc.; Broughton in Frank, *op. cit.*, IV, 537-38, 565, and Frank, *ibid.*, I, 344).

⁴⁷ See especially Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, pp. 1560-61; and Tenney Frank, *Roman Imperialism* (New York, 1914), pp. 304 f., who are surely right, as against Broughton, *op. cit.*, pp. 518-19.

⁴⁸ For a detailed discussion of this point see E. G. Hardy, *Roman Laws and Charters* (Oxford, 1912), pp. 86-93. For *plotus* applied to rents of public land cf. the Oropian Decree, above, p. 39.

ius, who speaks of the senatorial commissioners who assisted Mummius as *καλὸν δεῖγμα τῆς Ῥωμαίων προαιρέσεως ἀπολειπόντες πᾶσι τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν*.⁴⁹ If our conclusions are correct, she was even more lenient than is usually supposed after the Achaean War.

Further, the course of events described above fits well the relations between the senate and the equestrian order in the last century of the Republic. The smallness of the confiscations in 146 B.C. and the leasing of a large part of the *ager Corinthius* to Sicyon show the same anxiety on the part of the senate to limit the activities of the equestrian corporations as is displayed in the Sicilian *lex Hieronica* and in dealing with the Macedonian

mines.⁵⁰ It was not until the time of C. Gracchus that the middle class was strong enough to defy or overrule the senate. Their first decisive victory was the leasing of the tithes of Asia, which threw the eastern Mediterranean open to exploitation by Roman businessmen. After that, the senate was fighting a losing battle. By the time of the Mithridatic War, when further confiscations were made in Greece, there was no point in trying to prevent their full exploitation by the *publicani*. Only on minor questions, such as the dispute with Oropus, could the senate thwart them.

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⁴⁹ Polyb. xxxix. 5. 1.

⁵⁰ For Sicily see Carcopino, *op. cit.*; for the mines of Macedonia, Livy xlv. 18. 4.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

ARISTOTLE ON AESTHETIC PLEASURE

In the *Poetics*, Aristotle describes the response of an observer to a work of art under two headings, emotional and intellectual. The emotional effect produced by seeing a tragedy is discussed in connection with the famous doctrine of catharsis. This doctrine has had ample attention from commentators and will not be touched here. The doctrine of "learning and inference," though not less sparsely treated by Aristotle himself, has yet provoked only perfunctory notices.¹

In the fourth chapter of the *Poetics*, these sentences occur:

And it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation . . . though the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view the most realistic representations of them in art . . . to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind'. . . the reason of the delight in seeing the picture is that one is at the same time learning—gathering the meaning of things, e.g. that the man there is so-and-so.²

Some implications for aesthetic theory of this "learning and inference" doctrine have been investigated in a paper published elsewhere.³ The writer has been encouraged to look again and more closely at other passages on the same theme in Aristotle and to sketch the genesis and connection of the idea.

In any particular branch of philosophy, such as aesthetics, a man naturally sees things in the light of his *summa philosophia* and in keeping with his general habits of thought.

¹ A notable exception is the note in E. M. Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1877), I, 216-18. The fullest modern treatment of the principle involved is in Clive Bell, *Art* (New York: Stokes, 1913).

² *Poet.* 4, 1448 b 4-19. The translation is from I. Bywater, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909). Other translations of Aristotle are from the Oxford series. Cf. *Plato Repub.* 475 D.

³ H. L. Tracy, "An Intellectual Factor in Aesthetic Pleasure," *Philosophical Review*, L (1941), 498-508.

Thus Plato's views on art are the views of a metaphysician and moralist. He interprets art in relation to reality and character. Obviously also, a Hegel or a Nietzsche or a Dewey has views on art that are consonant with his general views on man and the world he lives in. Aristotle brings to aesthetics the attitudes of the scientist and logician. As scientist his procedures are strictly descriptive and analytical, not prescriptive and dogmatic. As logician, with a keen interest in the syllogistic or inferential faculty in man, he discerns very clearly the part played by intellect in aesthetic appreciation. Desultory as is his treatment of both the emotional and the intellectual responses to art, the clarity and force of his remarks on the latter, in the *Poetics* and elsewhere, perhaps justify us in believing that he regarded it as important.

The other passages are as follows:

Again, since learning and wondering are pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of imitation must be pleasant—for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry—and every product of skilful imitation: this latter, even if the object imitated is not itself pleasant: for it is not the object itself which here gives delight; the spectator draws inferences ("that is a so-and-so") and thus learns something fresh [*Rhet.* i. 11. 1371 b].

[Of the animal kingdom]: Indeed it would be strange if mimic representations of them were attractive, because they disclose the mimetic skill of the painter or sculptor, and the original realities themselves were not more interesting . . . [*De part. anim.* i. 5. 645 a 11].

Two passages from the *Peripatetic Problems* may be adduced as parallels, although the undoubtedly Aristotelian passages already quoted are sufficient for the point at issue:

[On the question why it is pleasant to listen to familiar music]: Is it because, when they recognize what is being sung, it is more obvious that the singer is as it were achieving his aims, and this is pleasant to contemplate? Or is it because

it is less pleasant to learn? And the reason of this is that in the one case there is acquisition of knowledge, in the other the use and recognition of it [*Prob.* 19. 5].

[On the same question]: Is it because it is more obvious that the singer is as it were achieving his aim . . . ? [*ibid.* 40].

The basic ideas in this group of passages are very clear: (1) learning is pleasant by nature; there is an inborn delight in the faculty of seeing relationships and eliciting ideas of connection and significance from presentations that do not appear immediately to be connected or significant, that, in fact, present something of an enigma; (2) in the case of a work of art, the observer is establishing a significant connection between the presentation he sees (picture, play, etc.) and some original of which he has knowledge from his own experience; (3) the inferences drawn by an observer of a work of art have to do with, and are conditioned by, the necessarily imperfect degree of adequacy it achieves; (4) i.e., some effort on the part of the observer is required to get him *en rapport* with the artist; (5) satisfaction comes from the successful integration between the artist's way of presenting a given situation or object and the observer's power to interpret the artist's procedures.

Such an integration might even be expressed mathematically, i.e., if it were a fully completed integration in this mode:

Let *A* be the experience that befell the artist,
Let *B* be his symbolic re-presentation of *A*,
Let *C* be the observer's recollection of comparable experience,
Let *D* be the observer's grasp of the artist's symbol, *B*;

then
$$\frac{A}{B} = \frac{C}{D}.$$

But precisely because such an integration in an artistic context is not obvious and perfectible, the conditions arise which make for aesthetic delight. The work of art is not efficient and adequate. The observer does not necessarily respond to life as the artist did, nor does he see exactly the same meaning in the symbols as the artist intended. Symbols are not photographic replicas or constant formulas. Hence some effort is required to make an

integration. The triumph felt, when it comes through clearly, is a large ingredient in the totality of pleasure produced by a work of art.

The presentation that confronts an observer is a complex one. It consists of (i) the datum, i.e., an object or experience or aspect of life that arrested the attention of the artist and induced him to attempt an imitation or re-presentation; (ii) the artist who, with his particular aptitudes and habits and with his peculiar training, makes a symbolic expression of that experience in a particular medium, the nature of which is determined by such aptitudes, habits, and training, as also by its own limitations; (iii) the work of art, a suggestive re-presentation in a limited medium; this medium is subject to conventional controls and to the demands of structural organization. In all three cases, factors are at work to prevent the relation between i, ii, and iii from being palpable and obvious.

In Aristotle the datum is human action, human life. Tragedy is a re-presentation of it. In the process of re-presentation, a good deal of "editing" takes place: the artist arranges, emphasizes, interprets, according to his own points of view.⁴ In this process of interpretation the artistic activity is differentiated from that of a mere recorder or copyist, such as the historian (according to Aristotle's narrow view of the historian's function).⁵ The eliciting of truth, individual and particular and, *ipso facto*, universal, from the gross data of factual material is the artist's business. This process, while it invests the facts with significance, also involves a challenge to the interpretative powers of the observer when he attempts to understand the artist's symbolic mode of expression.

The work of art is a product not only of the individuality of the artist but of various conventional and structural factors, such as literary traditions, limitations of length, unity of theme, causal sequence.⁶ Artistic products notoriously exhibit a tendency to become stylized and patterned not only by the external pressure of conventional habits but by the inner laws of symmetry, coherence, and orderly

⁴ *Poet.* 1. 1447 a 19-20; 2. 1448 a 1; 7. 1450 b 35.

⁵ *Ibid.* 9. 1451 b 5.

⁶ *Ibid.* 1451 a 30.

organization.⁷ These laws are the product of a philosophical instinct in the human mind which imposes upon the crude data of life in general a logical framework.⁸ The artist's expression of experience, in a special, organized medium,⁹ and the observer's efforts to interpret that expression are a special application of our general philosophical instinct for significant arrangement and interpretative reconstruction of experience.

The important thing for the present argument is the imperfect correlation, the enigma presented by these three phenomena, and the effort required to make an integration among them. Their relationship remains imperfect, the enigma remains unsolved, until the observer gets to work. In a sense he and the philosopher are in the same position. The philosopher looks upon a world which is in large part conditioned and modified in the process of becoming. His powers of analysis, inference, and integration are called into play. The data presented to him involve an enigma, the methodical resolution of which is the basic philosophical operation.¹⁰ The observer of a

work of art is confronted by an analogous situation. He, too, must invoke a special kind of dialectic to solve the riddle of art's relation to nature in the presentation before him. What he does is to make an inferential resolution of the complex data with which the artist has confronted him. The aesthetic attitude involves, in part, this intellectual dealing with the situation. The observer, of course, is not concerned with only nature as such, or with the artist as such, or with the work of art as such, but with the relation between them. Relations are the dialectician's business, and one part of the aesthetic attitude is therefore a kind of dialectic.

The "syllogism" constructed by the observer is pleasurable.¹¹ We can infer from many hints what Aristotle meant by this. He seems to think of the regulative and co-ordinating activity of the human mind as an intrinsically pleasant experience, as if the philosopher enjoyed tidying up the world he found littered about him. The co-ordination of artistic data is a unique form of this pleasure.¹²

To put the whole matter into the language of Gestalt psychology, the intellectual part of

⁷ *Ibid.*, 3. 1448 a 19; 4. 1448 b 18; 4. 1448 b 24; *classica* 484; 6. 1449 b 25: "completeness," "magnitude"; 7. 1449 b 28: "causal sequence."

⁸ Cf. *Metaph.* 1032 a 25; 1034 a 21-b 1; 1044 a 35, where there is the series (a) original form, (b) vehicle for reproducing it, (c) a new production deriving from the original.

⁹ *Poet.* 1. 1447 a 17. His discussion of the medium continues in 1447 a 28, b 24; 1448 a 9, and *passim*. B. Bosanquet (*A History of Aesthetic* [New York: Macmillan, 1892], p. 12), although he underrates Aristotle's grasp of the point, states it himself clearly: ".... The translation of an object into a plastic medium involves a double and not merely a single element—not merely a consideration of the object to be represented, but a consideration of the act of imaginative reproduction by which it is born again under the new conditions imposed by another medium" (cf. also *ibid.*, p. 32).

¹⁰ Although the mental exercise of solving the enigmas presented in works of art is not an exercise of logic in the strictly technical sense (involving, e.g., formal syllogisms and induction), nevertheless, the rules of logical procedure are evidently in Aristotle's mind, and logical terms occur in discussions of the point at issue. For logical method as the basis of inquiry, "a part of general culture" as Ross calls it (*W. D. Ross, Aristotle* [London: Methuen, 1923], p. 20), see *PA* 639 a 4; *Metaph.* 1005 b 3, 1006 a 6; *Eth. Nic.* 1094 b 23, quoted by Ross (*loc. cit.*). For the syllogism as a basic process of thought see Ross (*ibid.*, n. 7 and p. 32). Notice the use of *συλλογισμὸς* in the passage under discussion. Notice also the fre-

quent occurrence of the terms "natural likelihood" and "necessity," with which cf. the types of syllogism laid down in *De int.* 21 a 34-37; *An. pr.* 25 a 1-2, 29 b 20-32, quoted by Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 30, n. 4. For a special application of logic to aesthetics see, e.g., *Poet.* 22. 1458 a 23-24, where Aristotle remarks on the "bouquet" imparted to poetic diction by the admixture of words requiring some effort of analysis to be understood, and *Poet.* 1459 a 7-8, where the enigma presented in a metaphor and the logical activity needed in its solution are noted.

¹¹ Among the values of dialectic is its use as mental gymnastics, *Top.* 1. 2 (quoted by Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 56), which is distinguished from other uses by its disinterestedness and so presumably pleasurable. The *Introd.* to the *Metaph.* emphasizes the pleasure found in the acquisition of knowledge, through the senses first, then the memory, then art (here in the broadest sense); cf. *De part. anim.* 645 a 8-10; Ross, *op. cit.*, pp. 55, 154; and Bywater, *op. cit.*, on 1448 b 16: "Our pleasure . . . is explained here to be the natural concomitant of an intellectual act, the discovery or recognition on our part of the meaning of the picture. . . ." Plato had already hinted at the factor of play in the representative arts (*Lysis* 889).

¹² Cf. Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, p. 7: ". . . I will at present simply suggest as an approximate psychological definition of aesthetic enjoyment 'Pleasure in the nature of a feeling or presentation, as distinct from pleasure in its momentary or expected stimulation of the organism'" (my italics).

the aesthetic attitude involves a presentation of unco-ordinated material, followed by "Insight," by which the observer's mind imposes upon the presented data a satisfactory system of his own construction.

This psychologico-logical activity was clearly grasped by Plutarch. There are two passages which show unmistakably the influence of the passages of Aristotle under discussion.

.... When we see a lizard or an ape or the face of Thersites in a picture, we are pleased with it and admire it, not as a beautiful thing, but as a likeness.... the imitation.... if only it attain to the likeness, is commended.... [*De aud. poet.* 18 A]. What we commend is not the action which is the subject of the imitation, but the art, in case the subject in hand has been properly imitated [*ibid.* 18 B].¹³

.... We who are by nature logically-minded and admirers of skilful art, have a kinship for what is orderly and skilfully done and are delighted if it succeeds.... [*Qu. conv.* v. 1. 673 D]. Thus, man the admirer of skill and admirer of beauty, naturally welcomes and admires every feat and performance that is marked by intelligence and reason.... [*ibid.* 673 E]. Therefore such people [the children in a foregoing illustration] are inclined to take pleasure in words that have some enigmatic twist, and amusements that involve some complication and puzzle.... In a successful imitation [*ibid.* 673 F] there is a kind of persuasive skill that is brought home to us, and we naturally take pleasure in that.... Our pleasure in appeals to the eye and ear is not in the faculty of seeing and hearing, but in understanding [*ibid.* 674 A].

¹³ Plutarch, *Moralia*, Vol. I, trans. Frank Cole Babbit ("Loeb Classical Library" (New York: Putnam, 1927)).

The question recurs in Cicero, whose words are again reminiscent of Aristotle. He is, like Plutarch in the second passage quoted and like Aristotle in a later chapter of the *Poetics*,¹⁴ applying the principle under discussion here to metaphor, a particular kind of aesthetic enigma:

.... Nam si res suum nomen et vocabulum non habet.... necessitas cogit, quod non habeas, aliunde sumere; sed in suorum verborum maxima copia tamen homines aliena multo magis, si sunt ratione translata, delectant. Id accidere credo, vel quod ingeni specimen est quoddam transilire ante pedes posita et alia longe repetita sumere; vel quod is, qui audit, alio ducitur cogitatione neque tamen aberrat, quae maxima est delectatio; vel quod in singulis verbis res ac totum simile conficitur.... [*De orat.* iii. 40. 159-60].

Nam et singulorum verborum et collocatorum lumina attigimus.... ex omnique genere frequentissimae translationes erunt, quod eae propter similitudinem transferunt animos et referunt ac movent huc et illuc; qui motus cogitationis celeriter agitatus per se ipse delectat [*Orator* 39. 134].

On the whole, Cicero's grasp of the matter does not seem to be very clear; but in the last two clauses of the first extract quoted, he (or his original) enunciates the notion of integration perhaps more exactly than either Aristotle or Plutarch.¹⁵

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¹⁴ 22. 1458 a 26.

¹⁵ Cf. J. F. d'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory and Criticism* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1931), pp. 92-94.

THE DATE OF COMMODIAN

The date of Commodian, the mysterious "beggar of Christ," as he called himself, "vulgar" Latin Christian poet, of uncertain locale, was somewhat too confidently assigned in this *Journal* (XXXVIII [1943], 62) to the third century rather than the fifth. "That the earlier date is correct," the comment ran, "is now scarcely open to doubt, as has been shown most recently and most convincingly by Kat-

wijk in the Introduction to his *Lexicon Commodianaeum* (Amsterdam, 1934)."

Even more recently, however (1938), Altaner in his *Patrologie* (p. 264) places him among the Christian poets of the fifth century, and, after mentioning the traditional third-century date, declares that weighty considerations speak for the acceptance of a later date, Gasparetti contending for the time around 400,

Brakmann for the fifth century, and Brewer for about 460. Altaner lists the Katwijk lexicon but pays no attention to the short Preface and its reaffirmation of the traditional date.

Katwijk's principal contribution to the controversy seems to be that the bitterness and hatred with which Commodian speaks of Rome and her "tyrants" is quite out of place after Constantine made Christianity the religion of the Empire. But this loses sight of the fact that Commodian is writing from the point of view of Revelation, and Rome for him is not the contemporary city by the Tiber but the Babylon-Rome of the Apocalypse and the long series of persecuting emperors.

A far more serious discussion of the problem is that of Hosius and Krüger in the third part of Schanz, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur bis zum Gesetzgebungswerk des Kaisers Justinian* (3d ed., 1922). Their discussion (p. 399) may be briefly summarized, as embodying the best current opinion on this vexed question. Decisive for the transfer of Commodian to the fifth century are linguistic and metrical considerations (p. 403). His theological views evince not the earlier but the later Sabelianism and reflect the problems that became acute in the times of Augustine († 430). The burden of proof is upon those who maintain the early date, since they lightly set aside the only literary testimony that has come down to us, that of Gennadius, who flourished between 477 and 494—for the crisp verdict of the

pseudo-Gelasian decree *De libris recipiendis et non recipiendis* (sixth century) is only "opuscula Commodiani apocrypha." Gennadius lists Commodian after Prudentius († 405). The self-descriptions of the poet as "mendicus Christi and poenitens" also point to the fifth century rather than to the third, as do the striking contacts with Cassianus († 430–35). His use of Lactantius is so probable as to be well-nigh certain.

We may add that if Commodian used the Epistle to the Hebrews, as Leipoldt thought (*Die Entstehung des neustamentlichen Kanons*, I, 226), he can hardly have been a third-century writer, since no Western writer before Hilary of Poitiers († 367) can be shown to have accepted Hebrews.

In these circumstances we cannot accept the statement "that the earlier date is correct is now scarcely open to a doubt." The reverse seems to be the case. Van Katwijk's little lexicon is an excellent doctor's dissertation, but his brief Preface can hardly stand against the more broadly based conclusions of more mature scholars. Certainly, it has obtained no such acceptance among patristic scholars as the statement in this *Journal* assumed, and I find nothing to regret in having omitted Commodian from a history of early Christian literature down to Eusebius.

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A NOTE ON STRABO xv.694

The following passage in Strabo reveals some interesting details in the history of the text and at the same time betrays a long-standing error in the modern editions. In his description of India, Strabo speaks of the strange trees told about by Alexander's historians. After an account of the banyan tree comes the sentence (xv. 694 C): λέγει δὲ ὁ Ἀριστόβουλος (139 F 37 [Jacoby]) καὶ ἄλλο δένδρον οὐ μέγα, λοποὺς ἔχον, ὡς ὁ κύαμος, δεκαδακτύλους τὸ μήκος, πλήρεις μέλιτος· τοὺς δὲ φαγόντας οὐ ῥαδίως σώζεσθαι ("Aristobulus mentions also another tree, not large, with

pods [sic], like the bean, ten fingers in length, full of honey, and says that those who eat it cannot easily be saved from death" [Jones's translation]). So the text has been edited and quoted since the critical edition by G. Kramer (Vol. III [1852]). The Aldine *editio princeps* (1516) had read οὐ μεγάλους λοβοὺς λεπίσματα καρποὺς ἔχον, which Casaubon (1587, 1620) had emended to read οὐ μέγα, μεγάλους λοβοὺς ἔχον, condemning λεπίσματα καρποὺς as a gloss. He was probably prompted by the vulgate Latin translation, *non magnam, quae magnas siliquas habeat*. This translation

was done by Gregorius Tifernas in the 1450's and was printed without deviation, in this passage, from 1470 (Sweynheym and Pannartz) to 1853 (Firmin Didot), notwithstanding the varying Greek text *e regione*.

The primary manuscripts of this text (BCDF), of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, read unanimously *οὐ μεγαλολεπίσματα ποὺς ἔχον*, with *μεγάλους λόβους* in the margin, as I have ascertained from my own collation of them. It is plain that *λεπίσματα* is an intrusive gloss, as Casaubon said. Removing it, we get Kramer's reading *οὐ μέγα, λοπούς ἔχον*, but with a marginal variant, *μεγάλους λόβους*, which Kramer failed to consider. For *λοποί* means "peels" and *λοβοί* means "pods," and pods are certainly intended here, as they are like beans and are over 6 inches long. Thus Casaubon's reading is vindicated. But it is not originally his. For Tifernas' translation was made from the Greek manuscript copied by the scribe Agallianos for Ciriaco d'Ancona in Constantinople in 1446.¹ Agallianos dealt

¹ Laurentianus xxviii. 15. See T. W. Allen, *CQ*, IX (1915), 24-26; A. Diller, *AJP*, LVI (1935), 99, n. 6.

rather freely with the text of Strabo, and he managed here, on the basis of the primary tradition quoted above, to produce the reading later proposed by Casaubon: *οὐ μέγα, μεγάλους λοβούς ἔχον*.

The passage illustrates a feature of the Strabo tradition which Kramer did not perceive clearly. The text has come down to us equipped with glosses and variants. They are found in the margins in Books i-ix in Codex A of the tenth century, as well as in the more recent manuscripts in Books x-xvii. In Book iv. 198 B, *ἐξιλεομένης*, a gloss on *ἱλασκομένης*, was known to the author of the chrestomathies found in Codex Palatinus 398 of the ninth century (Kramer, III, 474). Both of these glosses correspond to entries in Hesychius' lexicon, *ἱλάσκεσθαι· ἐξιλεοῦσθαι* and *λόπος· λέπισμα*. Other glosses on Strabo also occur in extant lexicons. They show that someone had read the archetype of our manuscripts with the aid of a dictionary.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Sophoclean Tragedy. By C. M. Bowra. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. viii+384. \$6.50.

That a work of Greek scholarship, closely argued and elaborate, produced with the Oxford dignity and using the sedately elegant Oxford Greek font, should have appeared in England bearing the date 1944 is a fact notable in several ways, on none of which is it necessary to enlarge. Some marks of war-strain show themselves: the Index is defective, the English is not flawless, and Greek misprints are numerous.

A different title might have been chosen. We find little about tragic art; the Preface tells us why:

I have attempted to show the importance and place of certain ideas . . . and through them to estimate what the plays really mean and what Sophoclean tragedy really is. . . . Others may . . . feel that I have laid too much emphasis on Sophocles' ideas and paid too little attention to the poetry and the dramatic interest. If I have done this, I have done it deliberately, because . . . the formative thought of Sophocles has too long been neglected, as his style and dramatic effects have not.

The subject proves to be Sophocles' conception of Heaven's dealings with mankind, as the core of his dramaturgy. It thus includes theology, morals, and psychology (though this last dismal word appears, I believe, nowhere). Dr. Bowra places Sophocles' statements and implications against a background of contemporary, earlier, and later opinion, offering copious discussion of all these matters. His learning is consummate and instantly at command; he quotes authority for almost everything, even the assertion that the lion is "ferocious to such as come in its way" being supported by reference to Aristotle (p. 305).

This is much, but can we agree that it covers the subject, even as above restricted? Are not two eminent qualities of Sophocles, here ignored, vitally relevant to it?

One of these is poetry. For example, the conception of Ajax' greatness, and therefore of his claim to "heroization," topics on which this book has much to say, depends directly and largely upon the magnificent poetical eloquence of his last two speeches. There is many a celebrated stage character to whom, if we keep our heads, we shall deny all title to greatness except a turn for great verse. Has Ajax or Electra or Heracles in the *Trachiniae* any other claim? Two of them have deserved and won eulogy, but for achievements unconnected with the dramas in which they appear. It is a deplorable criticism that sets them beside Oedipus and Philoctetes, those noble, warmhearted souls: these latter are great gentlemen; Ajax and Heracles (to be blunt) are magnificent brutes. To this Dr. Bowra and many others would reply: "Think so if you choose: what matters is the view of Sophocles and his audience, not your modern prejudice." No doubt, criticism of ancient literature has often been vitiated by assumptions that Lincoln or the Prince Consort or St. Francis was the Standard Great Man: the hero of Virgil's *Fourth Aeneid* has suffered much thereby. But we should not move too far in the other direction. If we put our own standards entirely out of court, we cannot hope to judge Greek literature at all, or anything else that is Greek. And, more in particular, we are to observe how mightily Dr. Bowra toils over his proof that these two men are less disgusting than—except for their marvelous iambs—they at first sight appear. Ajax (not to dwell on sundry attempts to prove that he merits, as well as possesses, the love of Tecmessa and the Chorus) is credited with a thorough conversion (p. 39): "The great speech which he makes at 646-92 shows that he has recovered himself, got rid of his evil passions and illusions, learned the lesson which the gods have taught him." The delusion based on poetical splendor here involves us in the hopeless task of explaining why, after this alleged conversion, though

nothing fresh occurs, Ajax slays himself. The suicide, we hear (pp. 43 f.), "is intelligible only on the supposition that he is not master of himself but the victim of superior forces and powers." This contradicts the doctrine stated elsewhere (e.g., pp. 210, 365) that Heaven leads great but erring mortals to illumination and peace. A more widely held view—that Ajax is deceiving his friends in order to gain an opportunity for suicide—seems to me unanswerable; dislike of it is due merely to admiration of the language conveying the deception. As for Heracles, Dr. Bowra would save the situation by a sudden insistence (pp. 135 ff.) that ordinary morals and opinions do not here apply, though we have been told (p. 117) that Heracles and Deianira "might be typical of any married pair." After this, we feel less astonishment on reading (p. 142) that Heracles' words "seem to show his love for" Iole, the words being (vs. 1219) *τὴν Εὐρυτείαν οἶσθα δῆτα παρθένον*. Such uncompromising partiality must be imputed only to the glamour of the language used by and about the hero.

τοῦτ' ἔσθ' ὁ θνητῶν εὖ πόλεις οἰκουμένας
δόμους τ' ἀπόλλυσ', οἱ καλοὶ λίαν λόγοι,

says Euripides' Phaedra. They also mislead literary critics, though not the earliest of them:

ψεύδεσσι οἱ ποτὰν ἄ τε μαχανᾷ
σεμνὸν ἔπεστί τι· σοφία δὲ κλέπτει παρ-
άγοισα μύθοις.¹

The other quality which should not have been ignored is Sophocles' excellence as "a man of the theater." Such an artist invents scenes that contribute nothing to characterization or plot, but are inserted only to secure a momentary thrill: the porter scene in *Macbeth*, the Yorick passage in *Hamlet*, the meeting beside the Sphinx in *Caesar and Cleopatra*. Sophocles has devised incidents that should be thus explained and that will mislead us if we estimate them otherwise. In *Electra*² the action becomes slightly more complex merely in order to make a place for that wonderful address to the funeral-urn. Both *Ajax* and *Trachiniae* contain warning about a time-limit, which increases excitement without influencing the

action.³ Even the conversation between Oedipus and Tiresias, though vital to the whole plot, is nevertheless not quite fully appreciated by those who forget that Sophocles was "a man of the theater." More than once he seems to whisper: "See how far I can go in my special kind of irony without ruining the scene!" Things like verses 359-63 can have been written with no other purpose. It appears to me that Dr. Bowra needs this aspect of Sophoclean art even for his own ends—certainly with regard to Ajax' conversion speech and the repetition of Antigone's "offence."

His conclusions about the whole subject, as described in the extract from his Preface given above, are summed up on page 365:

The knowledge acquired by the characters is about themselves, but primarily about themselves in relation to the gods. For Sophocles this is the essential and fundamental knowledge. A man does not know himself or his place until he knows how he stands with the gods. This is obvious with Ajax, Creon, Oedipus, and Philoctetes. They are taught directly who they are and what they must do. When at last they understand the divine will, they have no more illusions and accept their condition. It is true also of Heracles, who forgets his sufferings and his hatred of Deianira when he knows that his death is ordained by the gods; of Electra, whose doubts and hesitations and despairs are resolved by the confidence that the gods are acting for her; of the old Oedipus, who sees on arriving at Colonus that his end is near and, when the thunder sounds, knows that he must go. This acceptance of the truth is a kind of submission, of obedience, even when it brings hope to Electra or a promise of power to the old Oedipus. The characters have learned that they must do what the gods demand, and illustrate what the Platonic Socrates means when he says that the commands 'Know thyself' and 'Be modest' are the same. They find modesty because they have learned to know themselves. So the central idea of a Sophoclean tragedy is that through suffering a man learns to be modest before the gods.

That is a good summary of a discussion both cautious and honest—adjectives not always deserved by disquisitions on artistic problems, still less often by essays on theology or ethics. The hackneyed compliment that "all students

¹ Pindar *Nem.* 7. 22 f.

² Why say "the *Electra*"? Who says "the *Hamlet*"?

³ Despite pp. 36, 150 f.

of this subject are deeply indebted to our author" is, therefore, thoroughly deserved; even those who disagree with him will find their knowledge increased and their perception sharpened. For my part, though acclaiming a hundred acute remarks, I yet feel that his picture is out of focus.

"This is the essential and fundamental knowledge." No doubt Sophocles believed that our life must be founded hereon. But does it follow that, as if he were another Aeschylus, his actual writings aim chiefly at inculcating this doctrine—that it is their "formative thought"? At the risk of seeming to beg the question, I appeal to the total effect which these tragedies make upon us. Do we really think their creator a theological poet? Surely he is, in this regard, akin, not to the authors of *Agamemnon* and *Samson Agonistes*, but to Shakespeare and so many others who are primarily concerned with human character and human interaction and in whose dramas theology is a minor element. Dr. Bowra will have it that Sophoclean tragedy turns on a conflict between gods and men (pp. 13, 367, etc.) and is naturally disconcerted to find a formidable critic against him. "Aristotle . . . missed one vitally important element in *King Oedipus*. He says nothing about the part taken by the gods in the rise and fall of Oedipus" (p. 166). Yes; Aristotle, I imagine, would agree that Aphrodite in *Hippolytus*, the "gods" of *King Lear*, even the "Life-Force" that moves behind *Man and Superman*, resemble (in their various degrees) the divine influence to which Sophocles points. In one or two of his tragedies it is, no doubt, more prominent than in the works just mentioned; but that difference springs from his temperament, not from his dogmatic beliefs. On the one hand, he was not a theologian at all: does not a comparison with Aeschylus, Dante, and Milton make that abundantly clear? He has no system, only a few eloquent assertions; and any connected body of doctrine, however simple, that we offer on his behalf is refuted, as often as not, by the deeds and destinies of his characters. On the other hand, he was a religious man, a man of serene and unshakable piety, who found comfort in a state not of intellect but of

soul. And, further, even the religious factors that do enter into these tragedies may be over-emphasized. Sophocles' material, the heroic legends, was already marked by the frequent intervention of Heaven. We need not assume that, had his material resembled Shakespeare's, his plays would have been a whit more religious or theological than *Macbeth* or *Othello*.

"A man learns to be modest before the gods." This tells us nothing about the gods' characters, wishes, or actions, except that they punish pride when shown toward themselves. So far, it may be man's duty to die resisting them. Dr. Bowra, indeed, says (p. 292) that man should accept whatever the gods send; and, of course, he reports Sophocles correctly, as a good number of passages show. But what sort of theology or ethics is this? Ought Miltiades and Themistocles to have welcomed the Medes? Consider Fragment 247:

σοφὸς γὰρ οὐδεὶς πλὴν ὃν ἂν τιμῇ θεός.
ἀλλ' εἰς θεούς σ' ὀρώντα, κἂν ἔξω δίκης
χαρεῖν κελεύη, κείσ' ὁδοιπορεῖν χρεών·
αἰσχρὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὦν ὑφηγούνται θεοί.

Since we do not know the context, we must not assume that this notion is Sophocles' own; still it is a fair conclusion from a view which he apparently held. The aphorism that we should accept what the gods send is no use as a guide of life, because no sane man will follow it. And it is about equally useless as a guide to Sophoclean drama. Who blames Oedipus for not quietly accepting the plague?

The summary tells us nothing further about the gods and their ways. Sophocles only once distinctly portrays a deity—in *Ajax*, where Athena sorely embarrasses Dr. Bowra by revealing herself as a repellent goblin. Here, still more plainly than elsewhere, our poet is no theologian but a playwright, who thrusts this creature in our faces so as to bring out by contrast the virtue and wisdom of a human being, Odysseus. Earlier in the book (pp. 349 ff.) we read that the gods are just. This statement means two things: that we understand the ways of Heaven and that we approve them. Sophocles certainly does not make the first assertion, not even of prophets such as Tiresias: more than once he says the contrary

(Frgs. 795, 919). Nor does he make the second. The passages⁴ that might be quoted against me all say that the gods encourage righteousness in men, never that they show it themselves. In other places,⁵ again, he speaks directly (and nobly) of Heaven's laws and Heaven's acts, but the reason given for respecting them is never their excellence, only their inevitability. I do not mean to whittle away the impressiveness of these passages; but an unequivocal statement that the gods are themselves just I find nowhere. How, indeed, could Sophocles hail as just the death of Antigone or the miseries ordained for Oedipus at his birth, to say nothing of Teumessa, Haemon, Eurydice, Iocasta, and Deianira? What he really means by "the gods" is that which some call "the Order of the Universe" and others (more colloquially) "that's life." But—and here lies the root of the whole matter—being a playwright, he must do his work with persons as his instruments; therefore he must in some degree personify even the Order of the Universe; and the more definitely he personifies it, the more hopeless the tangle in which he involves himself. I wish Dr. Bowra had somewhere discussed the famous remark of "Longinus" (xxiii. 5) concerning Pindar and Sophocles, that *σβέννυνται ἀλόγως πολλάκις καὶ πίπτουσιν ἀτυχέστατα*. In theology we find one painful instance of such collapse—Athena; so far as the extant plays allow the generalization, Sophocles then learned his lesson and avoided full personification, Heracles in *Philoctetes* being only a messenger and *θεός* in *Oedipus Coloneus* no person, but a voice.

Still, whether intelligible as persons or not, the gods give laws to mankind. Is not this the vital point? What, then, do these laws prescribe? Wherever a clear answer is given, the prescription proves to be what human conscience dictates. An excellent answer; but what becomes of the gods' status and glory as legislators for mankind? Nowhere does Sophocles give us reason to think a man who says "I obey the gods" better or wiser than a man who says "I stand by my own sense of right." Dr. Bowra would surely agree, at least as re-

gards *Electra*, *Philoctetes*, and *Oedipus Coloneus*. "In the last three the ways of the gods are presented in a way that satisfies the human conscience. Their participation in men's lives is shown to be governed by such rules as men set up for themselves" (p. 377). "In the *Electra* there is no conflict between what the gods command and what the human conscience feels" (p. 260).

Up to now we have dealt with the "fundamental knowledge" and "formative thought" as studied almost throughout this book. We must now consider a very striking and suggestive passage close to the end (p. 377), in which for the first time a grouping or development is discussed.

In the first stage, in the *Ajax* and *Antigone*, the scheme is simple and almost traditional. Ajax is punished for pride to Athens; Creon is the victim of a pride which breeds destructive infatuation. The notions are familiar from Aeschylus and need no comment. But this scheme which works well with the guilty does not suit cases where guilt is less clear and the apparently innocent or unconsciously guilty suffer. In the *Women of Trachis* and *King Oedipus* the gods act as they do simply to teach a lesson. It is salutary but not a punishment; it is even in its dark way a benefit. In the third stage, in the plays which end "happily," the gods are with some care shown to be just. In the *Electra* they further the punishment of the wicked; in the *Philoctetes* a much injured man is raised to health and honour; in *Oedipus at Colonus* the gods make amends to one who has suffered greatly at their hands. There is certainly a difference between the confident trust of the last plays and the dark hints of the middle plays.

An attractive scheme is here set forth, and so skilfully that perhaps few will protest. It avoids stumbling blocks that have jarred us in the earlier pages and, by its neatness, disarms all but the most stubborn adherents of the view that Sophocles "saw life steadily and saw it whole."

For, if we grant Dr. Bowra's fundamental thesis, that Heaven's dealings with mankind shape Sophoclean dramaturgy, we shall agree that he is justified in so writing: he summarizes fairly his detailed studies of the seven dramas. But if he greatly exaggerates the importance

⁴ *Ajax* 132 f.; *El.* 1382 f.; *Phil.* 1036 ff.; *OC* 1536 f.

⁵ *Ant.* 450 ff., 604 ff.; *OT* 863 ff.

of the theological element therein, we must reject his classification as based on an improper criterion. To group the plays according to theology instead of dramatic qualities appears to me no less unfortunate than to classify novels according to the political or sociological views which they happen to express.

Why group *Electra*, *Philoctetes*, and *Oedipus Coloneus* together? Because (we are told) here at last the gods treat mankind well. But that is no real link; except for this one fact, the plays are utterly dissimilar. *Oedipus Coloneus*, to be sure, confirms the thesis perfectly. Here, for once, piety, dramatic mastery, and poetical genius work in consummate harmony, to make perhaps the noblest achievement in Greek literature. But it is unlike the other two plays just named—and, indeed, all the other six—in that throughout, with an emphasis and a vigor no less unmistakable than magnificent, it treats directly the relations between God and man. Oedipus companies with divine presences, addressing men and women from another plane than theirs. Everywhere else, Sophocles' primary concern is with people, not with gods. *Philoctetes* resembles *King Oedipus* far more closely than it resembles the *Coloneus*: in fact, save for the happy ending, it has no kinship at all with the latter. Can we deny that its interest is almost completely nonreligious? It depicts three human characters who are tolerably equal in importance, a situation hardly to be paralleled in the surviving mass of Greek tragedy. The plot is beautifully intricate, as close to Scribe as to Aeschylus in this regard. Above all, the emotional and moral interest is engrossing. The religious element has importance—theoretically, about the same degree of importance as in *King Oedipus*; but, whereas in the latter it is felt throughout, in *Philoctetes* it is merely tied onto the outside. This difference appears crudely at the end, in Heracles' epiphany: the gods, who should have worked through mortals (as in *King Oedipus*) suddenly jump in and forcibly reverse a decision at which the human actors have finally arrived as best they can. *Electra*, again, differs from both the other members of the third group. Its chief concern is not the death of Clytaemnestra, and certainly not religion,

though the gods and Agamemnon's spirit are strongly present to Electra's imagination and feeling. Nor does Dr. Bowra destroy the view that Sophocles, after once saddling Phoebus with responsibility for Orestes' matricide, depicts an adventure untouched by the horror that Aeschylus and Euripides so deeply realize. Sophocles' subject is the emotional history of Electra, who, when at last the hour of revenge strikes, has got past feeling the horror. In spirit and action this play stands apart from the other two.

Nor should the *Trachiniae* be bracketed with *King Oedipus*. The latter is a superb masterpiece of plot construction and character-drawing, the *Trachiniae* a second-rate work, falling (say what we will) into separate halves and offering us, in Deianira, a figure not great though "sympathetic"; and, in Heracles, a character deplorable if not revolting. The first group, also, *Ajax* and *Antigone*, should be broken up. Both Ajax and Creon are punished, certainly. But Ajax has learned nothing: he dies cursing; whereas Creon "has no more illusions and accepts his condition." Dramatically the plays are dissimilar. *Ajax* in structure resembles the *Trachiniae*; *Antigone* resembles *King Oedipus*. The characterization, too, suggests other affinities. The stubbornness of Antigone, unrelieved by any charm save family affection, puts us in mind of Electra, not of Ajax, who has some kinship with the far more engaging Philoctetes.

The doctrine propounded falls thus into ruin; and the fact will be suggested to some minds by a trenchant passage on pages 295 f. After quoting *Ion* 253 f. and some Theognidean verses on that old puzzle, the prosperity of the wicked and the poverty of the good, Dr. Bowra proceeds: "The doubt is honest and seems justified by the facts. But there is an answer to it, not that the gods do not care for what men do but that men cannot understand their ways. So Sophocles says" (Frag. 919): . . . "Since the gods are inscrutable, men should not criticize them but acquiesce in their will." That is no answer; it is merely a confession that we do not know the answer. A wise confession, certainly, for men without revelation! But are we to call it a theology? No

sooner do we go forward in quest of a system than we step into a morass. Consider this remark (p. 169) on Oedipus: "He himself feels intensely the horror of his position. . . . Above all, the gods feel it, as they show when they send the plague to Thebes." The doctrinal bankruptcy is complete: they make Oedipus sin, then loathe his offenses and punish the "guilty" man together with his innocent subjects. Antigone's fate is even more damaging. Dr. Bowra does his best:

What are we to make of a divine order which allows her to perish for carrying out the divine will? . . . Sophocles does not attempt to justify the death of Antigone, but he does explain it. It is the result of Creon's folly. . . . But . . . the gods are not blind to such suffering. The part of the play which follows Antigone's last departure is devoted to the punishment of Creon for his treatment of her [p. 113].

This does not help. First, his punishment is caused mainly by his treatment of Polynices' corpse. Second, why use Antigone's death? Creon's fate must be inflicted, yes—and perhaps by the deaths of Haemon and Eurydice. But in order to cause these sorrows the gods can do no better than suffer Antigone to die: a woman, who insists on facing death that the laws of Heaven may be upheld, dies in despair and with no reason to hope that her object will be achieved. As we walk away from the theater, what are our thoughts on divine justice, divine wisdom, divine omnipotence?

Sophocles, in fact, was not a thinker at all as Aeschylus and Euripides, in however different moods and with however varying results, were thinkers. Nor (so far as appears) did he mistake himself for one: modern students do him wrong when they saddle him with a "theology" and "solutions" to "problems" of their own making. Consider him on those lines, and you find yourself, with amazement and chagrin, on the point of belittling a glorious poet and dramatist. That is your fault, not his: never does he use the tone of the tipsy demigod in *Alceste*: "Draw near, that you may increase your wisdom." A pious soul, he accepts, with tranquil sincerity and utterly without pose, the beliefs current among his commonplace fellow-citizens. In religion, as in

the politics to which Ion of Chios confined the description, he was *εἰς τῶν χρηστῶν Ἀθηναίων*—"one of the worthy Athenians"⁶—a fact which helps to explain his popularity.⁷ One of the brightest stars that illumined the Periclean age, Sophocles had, nevertheless, no kinship with, or interest in, the Athenian *Aufklärung*.

But not only does this book, whatever we think of its thesis, help us to clarify our ideas: it offers many useful and attractive remarks by the way; and I gratefully end with a list of those which have most strongly impressed me.

Page 7.—" . . . whether he was not content, like Shakespeare, to arouse the emotions and no more." Shelley, in his *Defence of Poetry*, found the hardihood to call Shakespeare a philosopher "of the very greatest power"; and echoes of that absurdity are still frequent. It refreshes one to hear the voice of common sense.

Page 15.—The development in Sophocles' method of depicting a moral issue. In his later plays the chief characters "no longer stand on opposite sides of right and wrong but seem to present such a struggle in themselves."

Pages 49 f.—A comparison of Ajax and Themistocles as regards condemnation, death, and burial.

Page 114.—Description of Creon in *Antigone*.

Pages 118, 124, 140.—Sophocles implies a detailed comparison of Deianira's situation with Clytaemnestra's in *Agamemnon* and a detailed contrast between their methods of meeting it.

Pages 172-75.—The curse pronounced by Oedipus in *King Oedipus* receives masterly treatment, showing its importance to the sequel. The reference to Xerxes in Herodotus is extremely apt.

Pages 179-82.—The *δαίμων* at the crisis of *King Oedipus* is well emphasized. This theme makes an excellent prelude to *Oedipus Coloneus*, despite the many years separating the two plays.

Page 193.—In Oedipus' story of Laius'

⁶ Not "the Athenian nobles," as the phrase is strangely translated on p. 358.

⁷ In these respects, Sophocles was the Attic Tenyson.

death "we can see the excitement which a man of action feels in recounting his exploits." An admirable help toward understanding his *élan* at other moments of the tragedy.

Pages 258 f.—Sophocles expunges the Furies from his Orestes-story: useful notes on contemporary and later feeling.

Page 307.—"Such views, even when based on sufficient evidence, reveal nothing about the actual play. They may help to explain why Sophocles wrote the play or wrote it as he did, but not what the play is or what it means. They belong, if anywhere, to the poet's biography, not to the study of his work." That is first-rate literary criticism.

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The Late Latin Vocabulary of the Variae of Cassiodorus with Special Adherence to the Technical Terminology of Administration. By ODO J. ZIMMERMANN, O.S.B. (Dissertation, Catholic University of America.) ("Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin Language and Literature," Vol. XV.) Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1944. Pp. xx+277.

This is the second study of the vocabulary of Cassiodorus to be published within the past few years. The first is Sister Mary Gratia Ennis' *The Vocabulary of the Institutiones of Cassiodorus* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1939).¹ The only previous treatments are contained in L. Traube's partial and unsystematic index in Theodor Mommsen's edition of the *Variae* (*Monumenta Germaniae historica, Auctores antiquissimi*, Vol. XII [Berlin, 1894]) and in two articles written by Theodor Stangl, which deal incidentally with the vocabulary of the exegetical works ("Cassiodoriana I," *Blätter für das Gymnasial-Schulwesen*, XXIV [1898], 249-83, 545-91; and "Cassiodoriana II," *Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie*, IX [1915], 205-14; X [1915], 228-39). Scholars

will be grateful to have new light shed on the vexing period of transition from Classical Latin to Late Latin.

The *Variae* contains twelve books of the official correspondence of the sixth-century Gothic rulers of Italy; it is an important historical source for a period for which historical material is scanty. Unfortunately, Cassiodorus was interested in producing models for official correspondence as much as in preserving records. It is natural, then, that his *affecteda eloquentia* should frequently cause obscurity. The language of the *Variae* is, in fact, so turgid and bombastic that the translator, Thomas Hodgkin (*The Letters of Cassiodorus* . . . [London, 1886]), feels under no compulsion to reproduce it in its entirety; his version of each letter is only half as long as Cassiodorus' original and considerably simpler. Under the circumstances, Zimmermann's study performs a useful function: it attempts to determine the meanings of the words used arbitrarily, of Late Latin words not yet adequately treated in our lexicons, of neologisms, and of technical administrative terms.²

Cassiodorus' *Variae* seems to present 129 neologisms (49 nouns; 61 adjectives, including 29 used substantively; 17 adverbs; and 10 verbs). Of this number, 113 are used by Cassiodorus alone and 16 by subsequent authors as well. Sixteen of the words are not treated in our lexicons at all: *antefatus*, *execatio* (or *exsecatio*), *inadiwatus*, *laetificale*, *largare*, *pandia*, *pedor*, *perculsio*, *pota*, *praefixus*, *proemptor*, *repositivus*, *rugescere*, *strepur* (or *strepus*), *sudatilis*, and *transportanci*.

There are 565 words of recent coinage,³ a large, but not surprisingly large, number for the technical writings of a sixth-century author.

With the exception of 1 hybrid (*paraveredus*) and 2 words called Germanic (*carpa* and *saio*), the 154 foreign loan words are

¹ Syntactical studies are also of great value in the attempt to discover the exact meanings of Cassiodorus. For a list of such studies see *ibid.*, p. 27, n. 23.

² This figure represents my own count. Zimmermann gives "522" in the middle of p. 258 and "552" at the bottom of the same page. The other figures which I cite here from Zimmermann ought also to be checked.

³ Cf. the detailed comments on this work in Leslie W. Jones, "Notes on the Style and Vocabulary of Cassiodorus' *Institutiones*," *CP*, XL (1945), esp. 26 (n. 21) and 27-31.

completely Greek. Cassiodorus gives a new meaning to 7 of these Greek words.

Cassiodorus employs approximately 812 familiar words which underwent a semantic change during the Late Latin period before the sixth century. To about 380 of these words he attaches new meanings, 180 of which are not cited in the lexicons. Four words of recent coinage—*abiurator*, *stipsis*, *coaevus*, and *calumniose*—apparently possess meanings different from those given in the lexicons.

Perhaps the most valuable section of Zimmermann's work is the account of the technical terms of administration—a compilation based upon the publications of Mommsen, Stein, Ennslin, Seeck, Schmidt, and others. Historians will be glad to have this material assembled and properly interpreted in a single book. The Goths apparently took over not merely a few of the Roman titles and offices but the entire body of the Roman administrative system. While they controlled military affairs themselves, they allowed the Romans to hold practically all the offices of civil administration. Only a few official titles and institutions are especially adapted to the Goths: *comites Gothorum*, *comitiva*, *saiones*, *maiores domi*, *millenarii*, and *spatharius*. The *tuitio* and *tertia* were introduced particularly on account of the presence of the Gothic element among the Romans. There is only one official title which shows Eastern influence—*scrinarius curae militaris*.

It will be unnecessary to repeat here in detail the strictures which other reviewers have made against our author's carelessness, inconsistency, and incorrectness in such matters as capitalization, punctuation, citation of references, and classification of words.⁴

⁴ E.g., in the first section on semantics, "New Meanings Ascribed to Cassiodorus," it was thought best for some inexplicable reason to list the words as nouns, adjectives, adverbs, and verbs without giving any indication of the nature of the semantic changes. In the second section, "Semantic Changes of Late Origin," on the other hand, the author classifies changes under such categories as "Restriction of Meaning," "Extension or Generalization of Meaning," and "Change from the Material to the Mental or Moral."

The bibliographies of special works on Cassiodorus (pp. xii-xv) and of works on constitutional history (pp. xviii-xx) are decidedly incomplete.⁵ If Zimmermann really feels the need of citing works other than editions of the *Variae* and lexicons, he should include in his lists at least the items which follow; more could easily be added: E. Böcking (ed.), *Notitia dignitatum et administrationum omnium tam civilium quam militarium in partibus Orientis et Occidentis* (2 vols.; Bonn, 1839-53); L. M. Capelli, "I Fonti delle 'Institutiones humanarum rerum' di Cassiodoro," in *Rendiconti del Istituto Lombardo*, Ser. B, Vol. XXXI (1898); R. W. Church, "Cassiodorus," in his *Miscellaneous Essays* (London, 1888), pp. 155-204; P. Corsen, "Die Bibeln des Cassiodorus und der Codex Amiatinus," in *Jahrbuch protestanter Theologie*, IX (1883), 619 ff.; H. Delehaye, "Saint Cassiodore," in *Mélanges Paul Fabre: étude d'histoire du moyen âge* (Paris, 1902), pp. 40-50; E. S. Duckett, *The Gateway to the Middle Ages* (New York: Macmillan, 1938), chap. ii ("The Gothic Rule in Italy: Cassiodorus, Secretary of Theodoric the Great"); A. M. Franz, *Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator* (Breslau, 1872); O. Körbs, *Untersuchungen zur ostgotischen Geschichte* (Dissertation, Eisenberg, 1913); E. A. Lowe, "An Uncial Ms. of Mutianus," in *Journal of Theological Studies*, XXIX (1927-28), 129-33; C. C. Mierow (trans.), *Jordanes, Origin and Deeds of the Goths* (2d ed.; Princeton, 1915); S. Milkau, "Zu Cassiodorus," in *Von Büchern u. Bibliotheken: Festschrift Kuhnert* (Berlin, 1928), pp. 40 ff.; G. Minasi, *M. A. Cassiodoro senatore... ricerche storico-critiche* (Naples, 1895); V. Mortet, *Notes sur la texte des Institutiones de Cassiodore ...* ([Paris, 1904], in part a reprint from *Revue de philologie*, 1900-1904); R. A. B. Mynors, *Cassiodori senatoris Institutiones Edited from the Mss* (Oxford, 1937); R. Nelz, *Die theologische Schulen d. morgenländischen Kirchen während d. 7ten Jh.* (Bonn, 1916); F. Overbeck, *Vorgeschichte und Jugend der mittelalterlichen Scholastik: Eine kirchen-*

⁵ The works by Ennslin and Seeck (who are cited on p. 192 as the authors of "thorough studies") are carelessly omitted from the bibliography of works on constitutional history (pp. xviii-xx).

historische Vorlesung (Basel, 1917); G. Pfeilschifter, *Theodorich der Grosse* (Mainz, 1910); E. K. Rand, *Founders of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928), chap. vii, and "The New Cassiodorus," *Speculum*, XIII (1938), 433-47; M. Roger, *L'Enseignement des lettres classiques d'Ausone à Alcuin* (Paris, 1905); G. Rohlfs, *Griechen und Romanen in Unteritalien* (Geneva, 1924); J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, I (3d ed.; Cambridge: At the University Press, 1921), 258-70; M. Schanz, et al., *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* . . . , Vol. IV, Part II (Munich, 1920); K. W. Schmidt, *Quaestiones de musicis scriptoribus Romanis imprimis de Cassiodoro et Isidoro* (Dissertation, Giessen, 1899); F. Schneider, *Rom und der Romgedanke im Mittelalter* (Munich, 1926); O. Seeck (ed.), *Notitia dignitatum* (Berlin, 1876); H. Thiele, "Cassiodor, seine Klostergründung Vivarium und sein Nachwirkung im Mittelalter," in *Studien und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktiner-Ordens und seiner Zweige*, 1932, Heft 3, pp. 378-419; A. Thorbecke, *Cassiodorus Senator* (Heidelberg, 1867); A. van de Vyver, "Les Etapes du développement philosophique du haut-moyen-âge," in *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, VIII (1929), 425-52; W. Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter bis zur Mitte des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts* (2 vols., 6th ed.; Berlin, 1893-94; Vol. I in 7th ed. by E. Dümmler [Stuttgart and Berlin, 1904]); and W. Weinberger, "Hss. von Vivarium," in *Miscellanea Fr. Ehrle*, IV (Rome, 1924), 75-88.

A number of details need consideration. Many of the items cited under the substantive use of adjectives (pp. 6-7) and the substantive use of participles (pp. 7-9)—e.g., *insolens*, *excedens*, and *transeuntes*—are not Late Latin but Classical. Though *paraveredus* is defined as "a post horse for the lesser highways and out-of-the-way places," no comment is made on the definition in Harper's *Latin Dictionary*: "a horse for extraordinary occasions, an extra post-horse" (Harper's cites the Theodosian Code and Cass. *Var. v. 39*, in addition to Zimmermann's citations). *Carpa*, listed on page 85 under "Germanic Words," is only possibly German (*fortasse germanica*) according to the

Thesaurus linguae Latinae definition cited on Zimmermann's page 4.

Many meanings listed as new in Cassiodorus are, in reality, Classical. Thus, the meaning "practice" for *consuetudo* is hardly new, even though it is applied to "industrial practice" in Cassiodorus. *Minores* in the sense of "the ordinary citizens, the plebs" is surely Classical; this sense is one of many obvious applications of the idea "lesser (in importance, size, weight, age, etc.)" which are not cited in the lexicons. "One not in the active service of the state" is hardly a new meaning for *otiosus* (cf. Cicero *De off. i. 21. 70*). Similarly, *praebita* in the sense of "supplies furnished (for the support of the state)," *principium* in the sense of "the beginning (of a reign)," *prior*⁶ in the sense of "a predecessor," and *scriptio* in the sense of "a list (of titled men)" are not cited in the lexicons for the simple reason that they are normal applications of common Classical meanings to particular texts. Finally, under *sequentes* ("posterity"), our author might at least have mentioned Tacitus *Ann. iv. 31*, where the sense is "the next generation."

By far the largest part of the book (pp. 86-191) is filled with words which are supposed to show semantic changes. These words often show no true semantic changes at all; some are merely employed in conscious metaphors. Examples follow: *lampas* ("brilliance"), *laurea* ("success"), *narrator* ("a historian"), *pastio* ("a feeding [pasturing] of men"), *pondus* ("rigor, weight"), *saepes* ("a fencelike fish-trap in a river"), *saepium* ("a place of safety, sanctuary"), *talenta* ("riches, wealth"), and *vallis* ("a hollow or furrow in the skin").

Though the materials presented in our work have been gathered conscientiously and though they are bound to be of use, future laborers in the lexicographical field are urged to exercise greater care and judgment and to avoid straining excessively in their search for new meanings of words.

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⁶ For this word Zimmermann also lists "the one highest in rank and power" as a new meaning; cf., however, Horace, Ovid, and Livy: "the more important."

The Banquet-Libations of the Greeks. By DE-LIGHT TOLLES. (Dissertation, Bryn Mawr College.) Ann Arbor, Mich.: Privately printed, 1943. Pp. vii+114.

As an editor who has recently heard a number of authors explain the faults in their manuscripts as due to the extra pressure of wartime burdens, I am pleased with the careful and conscientious work of Miss Tolles in her thesis, "The Banquet-Libations of the Greeks," which she submitted to the faculty at Bryn Mawr College. She has approached her subject with full realization that any worth-while publication in the classical field demands one's best efforts. Her reading, which took her over much territory, must have required many months. She has even translated a Swedish book and presumably studied Swedish in order to consult it. The use of material gathered from both ancient and modern sources has enabled her to give a comprehensive and well-organized presentation of her subject. Her conclusions are stated in clear and simple language rather than with "a studied want of simplicity."

The book consists of an Introduction (pp. 1-7) and four chapters, as follows: (i) "The Banquet" (pp. 8-37); (ii) "The Formal Banquet-Libation" (pp. 38-73); (iii) "The Sacred Drinks" (pp. 74-106); and (iv) "Conclusion" (pp. 107-14). The reader would be thankful for an index.

After the Introduction has defined the purpose and scope of the investigation, chapter i gives the settings in which the banquet libations were made, together with ceremonial customs and associations. It attempts "to reveal the religious import of the banquet as a whole and of individual features in its program" (p. 8). Among these features were the washing of hands, the wearing of wreaths, and the use of incense.¹

In chapter ii we have a detailed discussion of banquet libations under the headings "Epic," "Lyric and Tragedy," and "Prose and Comedy." The results are given so lucidly and succinctly in the final paragraph (pp. 72-73) that it seems advisable to quote them here:

¹ Of course, washing of hands and the offering of incense accompanied libations made in household worship (see Hesiod *Works and Days* 338, 724-25). Doubtless, an individual might wear wreaths while worshipping in the home.

In the early period, libations were poured at the conclusion of a feast; later the offerings were made before and during the symposium. The later development is an adaptation of the earlier custom to the changed conditions of banqueting and is accompanied by the addition of offerings to the Heroes and to Zeus Soter, who are less majestic than the Olympian gods and have a more intimate connection with the state and with the house. Although a few of the occasions at which these libations were offered are definitely ceremonial meals, the majority are secular celebrations; some are formal dinners given in honor of one guest, and others are held simply for the sake of the banqueters' pleasure in feasting and in one another's company. While the libation at a ceremonial feast or a testimonial dinner might be regarded as a religious rite demanded by the occasion, at other times it can only be an appeal to divine power, similar to our own custom of saying grace. The fact that the libation was remembered on every kind of occasion shows that the feasters were expected to pause for a reverential moment before relaxing into the gaiety of the symposium.

Chapter iii makes strong appeal to me, doubtless because it fills rather large gaps in my own information. It treats of drinks to *agathos daimon*, Zeus Soter, Hygieia, and Hermes and also discusses sacred drinks in general and secular pledges.

On the basis of her painstaking studies in chapters i-iii the author is able to make valuable generalizations about the development of the banquet libation and to record changes in the Greek attitude toward it. Among her conclusions is the following distinction (p. 109) between the libation and the sacred drink:

.... The true libation, which established a bond between the feasters and their gods by making them *συμπόται*, was both a gift and a simple act of communion. In contrast, the sacred drink did not include the divinity in the pleasures of the feast and was a less reverent expression of the feeling that inspired the libation. The banquet-libation was never so solemn an offering as one which accompanied a sacrifice or was offered independently. The wine given the gods was not specially prepared but was a part of the mixture for the banqueters' own use. Nevertheless, the wine was actually shared with the gods. Although the cup that held the sacred drink was dedicated to the god, the wine was intended for the feasters.

In Hesiod's *Works and Days* 748-49 we have record of taboos against taking anything to eat or even anything (evidently water) to wash with from pots (*chytropodes*) over which proper rites had not been performed. According to Plutarch (*Moralia* 703d) the first taboo was concerned with the giving of *aparchai*, an opinion that Miss Tolles repeats (p. 11, n. 6); but it would seem that any explanation of one prohibition should be equally applicable to the other. Centuries separated Plutarch from Hesiod, and I have sometimes wondered whether Plutarch is correct in this statement. In *The Cults of the Greek States*, V, 219, Farnell says of the *Chytroi*, "the feast of pots": "This seems to have been wholly devoted to the tendance of the dead." May not the taboos mentioned by Hesiod have been related to some ceremony pertaining to the dead, possibly the placating of ghosts? One would not expect a member of a family to eat food from such a pot or even to wash his hands in water taken from it. At the Lemuria, which was concerned with ghosts, the head of a family used spring water in cleansing his hands (Ovid *Fasti* v. 435, 443).

Since the dissertation several times mentions the drinking of wine, even unmixed wine (pp. 77, 84-85, 89), after meals, it may not be amiss to quote a Roman's remarks (Seneca *Epistulae morales* 122.6) about indulging in wine after eating: "Post prandium aut cenam bibere vulgare est. Hoc patres familiae rustici faciunt et verae voluptatis ignari; merum illud delectat quod non innatat cibo, quod libere penetrat ad nervos."

If good authorship and good editorship ought to keep the convenience of the reader in mind, then, *mea quidem sententia*, it is a fault to make "*op. cit.*" refer to a citation in a chapter before the one in which it stands, especially when there is no formal bibliography. On pages 58-59 (chap. ii), for instance, this form of reference is used for five works; but one who wishes to locate the bibliographical data must leaf back to pages 2, 10, 11, 15, and 18 (Intro. and chap. i).

To me it seems unfortunate to make needless compounds such as "banquet-libations" (in the title and elsewhere), "hand-washings"

(p. 21), "drinking-parties" (p. 21, n. 52), "wine-cups" (p. 27), and "wine-jars" (p. 29), even though one may find some precedent for such hyphenation. On second thought, the author herself would surely regard "libation-words" (p. 71, n. 120), meaning "words for 'libation,'" as inelegant. The phrase "verb of libation" (p. 66), though readily understandable in its context, is not at all natural. The wording of "... Hestia ... was hardly distinguished from the hearth which was her name" (p. 2) is far from neat.

The book was manufactured by the offset method, which presents special difficulties to an author who cannot personally confer with the printer and his staff. As an editor who has had to make reluctant concessions to this medium in the publication of three complex books and who hopes that not all gentle readers are dead, I have no desire to list occasional misprints, errors in Greek accents, and faults of typing, which are rather frequent in the footnotes.

As already stated, this dissertation is a careful piece of work, and I hope that Miss Tolles will feel encouraged to publish some of the unused collateral material that she undoubtedly accumulated in the course of her investigations. The scholar who attempts to do for Greek and the Greeks what Carcopino has done for Latin and the Romans should not fail to consult this contribution to our knowledge.

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Virgil: The Eclogues and the Georgics, Translated into English Verse. By R. C. TREVELYAN. Cambridge: At the University Press; New York: Macmillan Co., 1944. Pp. 118. \$1.75.

Virgil's pictures of Mediterranean life and landscape, in both their indolent and their energetic moods, penetrated by his deep sympathy with man and beast, hold a perpetual charm. Realism and fancy, sophistication and credulity, homely fact and brooding sentiment and ardent feeling, are fused by the poet's masterly art. By his plain directness of word and thought and by rising on occasion to the

elaborate display of every poetic device, he achieves his final miracle, that of "adding glory to an humble theme." To recapture this tone, this balance between simplicity and elevation, requires the utmost tact on the part of his translator.

Mr. Trevelyan's version deserves an honored place among the many English translations. His accomplished hand has already won acclaim for its skill in dealing with other poets; it is to be believed that the present translation was done *con amore*. His introductions are brief but in the main adequate and show familiarity with the poet, if not with the *minutiae* of recent scholarship. (On p. 25, l. 1, he is perhaps right in finding in *Ecl.* 8. 85-89 a "passage of great and original beauty," but it is well known that it owes its inspiration to Lucretius and to Varius. On p. 2, l. 17, surely the reference should be to the Eighth, not to the Sixth Eclogue; cf. p. 24.) The rendering of Virgil's sense is faithful throughout; very rarely is the meaning missed; doubtful points of interpretation are almost always competently and tactfully settled in the translation; there is no padding. Perhaps it is too much to ask of a translator that he preserve a verbal correspondence between ideas broached and contrasted in *Ecl.* 10. 69 and *Georg.* i. 145. The tone is just right; in the balance between simplicity and decorative "poetic diction" Mr. Trevelyan's taste is unerring. Above all, his English verse moves along with unflagging ease and vigor; and, as he himself remarks (p. 36), "as with all the greatest poets, mastery of movement comes first in importance."

A few words should be given to the choice of meter. Mr. Trevelyan has decided not to attempt to reproduce in English the hexameters of the originals. For the *Eclogues* he has adopted "an unrimed verse of seven, and occasionally eight, accents," the effect being somewhat like ballad-meter; it is swift and flowing. For the *Georgics* he has chosen blank verse, exploited with a good many liberties—extra syllables, inversions, and even an occasional alexandrine. More and more, as I read modern English verse, I am persuaded that such liberties are warranted; are in keep-

ing with the natural cadence of English speech; are, indeed, necessary if its full force and variety are to be conserved. The reader of these renderings will find much pleasure and enlightenment if he will compare appropriate passages with their counterparts in other translations or kindred works: with Dryden's translation or Calverley's or those of T. C. Williams and T. F. Royds, or of Mackail (in prose); or again with Thomson's *Seasons* and V. Sackville-West's *The Land*, and Bridges' *Testament of Beauty*; or finally with such writers of blank verse as Shakespeare, Milton, and Wordsworth.

As examples of Mr. Trevelyan's versions, it may be not unfair to quote a few excerpts. From the Fifth Eclogue (ll. 45-52, and 81-84):
Such a delight, thou godlike poet, is thy song to me
As, to the weary, slumber on the grass, as in noon's heat
With sweet water to quench one's thirst out of a gushing rill.
Not on the pipes alone you match your master, but in song.
Fortunate youth, now second to him only shall you be.
However to repay you I will sing as best I may
This song of mine, and will exalt your Daphnis to the stars.
To the stars will I lift him. Me too did Daphnis love.

How, with what gifts can I repay you for so sweet a song?
For not the south wind's whisper as it rises, nor the waves
Breaking upon the shore can so delight me, nor the sound
Of rivers that run murmuring down from rocky glen to glen.

And, for a different treatment of a similar theme, which also illustrates Virgil's acute ear for natural sounds, *Georg.* iii. 237-41:

Thus, far away in the mid sea, a wave
Begins to whiten, drawing from the deep
Its curving mass, and rolling to the land
Roars terribly among the rocks; then bursts
Huge as a very mountain, and falls prone;
While from below the water in foaming eddies
Boils up and flings aloft the murky sand.

WILLIAM C. GREENE

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Sulla lirica romanza delle origini. By GUIDO ERRANTE. New York: S. F. Vanni, 1943. Pp. 440.

The origins of the medieval lyric are like a maze through which no one has yet found the right path or lived to tell the tale. There have been many speculations, some claims, some heated arguments. The problem is an especially intricate one, involving, as it does, not only the long and devious tradition of Latin poetry, both secular and ecclesiastic, including the liturgy and hymns, but also the various vernacular lyrics—French, German, Provençal, and Italian. Vergil and Ovid were favorite poets at the time the Latin lyric flourished in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and yet the forms of the lyric were not classical, nor was much of their spirit. Did Latin literature influence the vernacular or vice versa? Or the vernacular lyrics one another? To what degree was the influence within or through the church? Were the poets clerics of the respectable kind or "vagantes" or goliards—and what do those terms signify? And was there ever popular poetry (songs of the folk) which influenced the literary poetry of any language?

Errante approaches the problem of origins as expressed in these and other questions by going back to the German romantics who began the theorizing. He really starts with Wolf, the Homeric critic, and presents the fantastic theories of the spontaneous growth of folk songs as advanced by Herder, Hegel, and their followers. It may seem to us like killing a dead dog to disprove with a series of arguments, topped off by B. Croce's philosophical proof, that there is no such thing as "popular" poetry, a theory discarded long ago after having served the useful purpose (not mentioned by Errante) of arousing interest in collecting and studying folk songs. And yet theories, unlike dead dogs, can be revived, the author seems to imply.

Having thus branded the false start, Errante disposes of such subsequent "popular" theories along nationalistic lines as Jeanroy's origin of the French lyric and Caesareo's claim for the Sicilian School which, Errante says, relies solely on historical instead of on literary

records. That brings Errante to the twelfth-century Provençal lyric, the oldest Romance lyric; for the troubadours in the north were under the influence of the troubadours of the south (p. 159). Where did the Provence get its inspiration? The first answer which he discusses is the theory of classical influence as proposed by Scheludko. Errante accepts Vergilian influence because of the relationship to Vergilian poetry "in carne e in spirito" of two Provençal literary types ("pastorelle e tenzone"), and he rejects much of what is claimed by Provençal scholars for Ovid on the grounds that the Ovidian influence was mainly external, rhetorical, and strong only in the north and among the late troubadours. He does admit (p. 169) that the theory that love is an art must have come from Ovid and demonstrates indebtedness to Ovid in Bernart de Ventadour and a few others, including Marcabru, who was the first to quote him. On the other hand, for his own claims for Vergil, Errante does not give the kind of substantiation which he asks others to give for Ovid, and he is wrong in maintaining that Vergil is the Latin author of whom most manuscripts have been preserved. Next to Cicero's, the manuscripts of Ovid are most numerous in the Middle Ages—305 against 223 of Vergil (from the twelfth century there are 26 manuscripts of Vergil, 18 of Ovid; from the thirteenth there are 68 of Vergil, 66 of Ovid). Also the earliest manuscript of Vergil is dated not s.II but s.III/IV.

Errante considers next the "medieval Latin" theory. He is impressed by P. S. Allen's work, not so much by his "historical" investigations—Errante thinks that Allen exaggerates the Germanic-popular influence—as by his aesthetic investigations in tracing the "Romanesque" spirit from Petronius onward. With Allen he stresses Venantius Fortunatus, a veritable troubadour, whose effect was strong and continuous to the eleventh century, even among the masters and pupils of Chartres, as Errante adds (on p. 216), who cultivated rhythm and rhyme and were one of the concrete links between the poetic medieval tradition and the first troubadours. And yet, for Errante this continuity of the "Romanesque"

current is merely a hypothesis among hypotheses. Similarly, he presents and discredits Brinkmann's theory regarding the importance of the Cambridge Songs and the influence of centers like that at Angers, not denying the essential elements of troubadour lyric contained therein but reserving space always for other theories. For "la verità è che nel fenomeno che studiamo forze molteplici han concorso al processo formativo" (p. 269). Again, the Arabic theory is rejected as a whole without, however, excluding the possibility of some influence. And then Errante comes to the question of forms, on page 283, where the more constructive part of the book begins. The Provençal forms have their counterpart in the Latin lyric and, as Errante demonstrates (on pp. 308-59), following the methods first developed by Wilhelm Meyer, Provençal rhythmical patterns reveal their dependence on Latin liturgical forms, the ties being organic, not accidental. In the last chapter (pp. 360-437), Errante makes his second major contribution, the case for the troubadours, by a detailed study of Marcabru in the setting of his time. Marcabru was a mystic poet, a singer of courtly love, far removed from what we commonly associate with the troubadours at the court of Guillaume. His inspiration was the Bible and St. Bernard.

The contribution of Dr. Errante in the last two chapters is not largely dependent on what precedes. The merit of the large portion of the book (ca. 300 out of 430 pages), devoted to a critical, mostly negative, review of the theories of others, would appear to lie in having brought together widely dispersed materials, in a well-ordered and presumably quite accessible form. Unfortunately, they are not so readily accessible as they might be, for there is no index of any kind. Also the bibliographical items, being many and fairly complete, are a valuable addition to the work; but they are hidden away in footnotes, instead of being assembled somewhere for ready reference.

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The Theory of Literary Kinds: Ancient Classifications of Literature. By JAMES J. DONOHUE. Dubuque: Loras College Press, 1943. Pp. viii+156.

This investigation was undertaken particularly to assist contemporary literary critics who wish "in adequate consciousness of past thinking to try their hand at the classification of literature" (p. 2). The material to be classified is taken in the broadest sense as "that vast body of products whose members have only this in common, simply that they are committed to language" (p. 10). The very extent of the material led the author to restrict this monograph to "general schemes of literary classification and division" (p. 2) as preliminary to further detailed work that he is preparing on certain divisions within the larger scheme. His sources comprise all the ancient theorists of importance through the second century of our era, whose views are analyzed independently in the body of the work and blended, as far as possible, into a table of common denominators at the end. The table must be understood as the most representative composite picture the author could portray of ancient classifications, while the volume, as he says, is his "commentary on the table" (p. 125).

The primary or largest division that antiquity made of all skilful human discourse the author finds in a distinction between the spoken and the written word. This distinction allows for pure speeches, pure writings, and speech-related writings. The first group is discarded, since by definition it records nothing. The second group is discarded on the grounds that almost all ancient writing was felt to be related to speech, either as preserving material actually spoken or as conceived for successful, if not indispensable, recitative effect, and hence may be merged with the third group, that of speech-related literature, for the purposes of further subdivision.

A second division, whereby all literature may now be classified, is found in that of poetry and prose. Without ignoring the anxiety of some of his critics "to make clear that verse is not necessarily poetry" (p. 27), the author insists quite correctly that the tendency of

classical antiquity was "to recognize verse as the most practical differentia of poetry" (p. 27); and although all verse might not be poetry, still he says: "I have not observed among the ancients an unqualified assertion that any non-metric form is really poetry" (p. 47). Poetry thus separated from prose on the basis of meter may undergo its own further subdivision along predominantly metrical lines, as the author shows at some length in his chapter on "Dividing Poetry."

A third comprehensive division of the ancients, capable of application to both poetry and prose is "the distinction of what we call the fine and practical arts of writing" (pp. 49-50). It is evident from his table that the author takes embellished style for the differentia of fine writing, whether in verse or in prose; but it is unfortunate for his commentary that he can quote none of the ancients to support this distinction in so many words.¹ His use of Aristotle in support thereof is disingenuous, since Aristotle does not discover fine art where there is fine diction but rather expects to find a special diction in works that have already by quite another differentia been discriminated as fine art. This is not to say that the author's tabular view suffers seriously in consequence, inasmuch as the main stream of post-Aristotelian rhetorical critics tended actually (though the author does not make the most of the fact) to see in fine diction the criterion for fine literary art.

Finally, the author takes occasion from his third grand division, that of fine and practical, "to sketch what the critics of antiquity took to be the branches of literature" (p. 2). Classification of literature by branches is treated in this work as the most significant of the "smaller distinctions the men of classical antiquity introduced" (p. 10) and is construed primarily as dependent upon the larger distinction of fine and practical art. If the author's plan had permitted him to scrutinize more closely the material that would bear on an investigation of the origin and explanation for the tradition of classification by branches,

he might have been able to formulate some cogent hypotheses toward the elucidation of a topic that remains as obscure as it is important. Since his plan did not allow such a thorough exploration, he would have done better just to state the problem and to leave it for himself or for another to explore later. As it is, he has obscured the problem by treating it sequentially to, and as if derivative from, his stylistic dichotomy of fine and practical.

The problem is this: Why did the Roman rhetorical critics—Cicero, Tacitus, and notably Quintilian in his tenth book—cling to a division of literature into branches of poetry, history, oratory, and philosophy, a division seldom essential to the development of their own special interests and, what is more important, never explained genetically, much less functionally or logically? By classifying some branches of literature under a rubric of embellished diction and others under a rubric of utilitarian diction, as Mr. Donohue does, nothing is advanced to explain why such branches should have been distinguished in the first place. Actually, some of Mr. Donohue's merely passing observations indicate possibly fruitful lines of pursuit; it is regrettable only that he did not pursue them. For example, he observes in reference to the Alexandrian canons that "canon-making presupposes rather than establishes a set of literary kinds" (p. 105). If, then, Quintilian and his Roman predecessors are to be referred to the Alexandrian canons for the branches of poetry, history, and oratory, by whom and on the basis of what distinctions was the Alexandrian set of literary kinds itself established? The answer may have to be referred to Aristotle, or at least to the Peripatetic tradition; and Mr. Donohue's own interpretation of Aristotle on this matter (pp. 58-70) provides hints that any student of the problem will want to consider. The contemporary critic, who probably has already learned a lesson in stylistics, may also welcome even more than this study a more detailed and more convincing statement of the ancient position in regard to the classification of literature by branches.

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¹ Hence, perhaps, his rather weak appeal to "what we call the fine and practical arts of writing." The "we" must be editorial.

BOOKS RECEIVED

[Not all works submitted can be reviewed, but those that are sent to the editorial office for notice are regularly listed under "Books Received." Books submitted are not returnable.]

- BAGAN, PHILIP V. *The Syntax of the Letters of Pope Gelasius I.* ("Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin Language and Literature," Vol. XVIII.) Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1945. Pp. xxiv + 231.
- BJÖRCK, GUDMUND. *Apsyrus, Julius Africanus et l'hippiatrique grecque.* ("Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift," [1944] Fasc. 4.) Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln; Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1944. Pp. 70.
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- FONTENROSE, JOSEPH. *Philemon, Lot, and Lycaon.* ("University of California Publications in Classical Philology," XIII, No. 4, 93-120.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1945. \$0.25.
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- . *Development of the Latin Suffixes "-antia" and "-entia" in the Romance Languages, with Special Regard to Ibero-Romance.* ("University of California Publications in Linguistics," I, No. 4, vi + 41-188.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1945. \$1.50.
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- PHILIPPSON, PAULA. *Thessalische Mythologie.* Zürich: Rhein-Verlag, 1944. Pp. 196 + 3 pls. + 1 map.
- POWERS, OSCAR SCOFIELD. *Studies in the Commercial Vocabulary of Early Latin.* (Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1940.) Chicago, 1944. Pp. iv + 89.
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